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Strategies & Market Trends : Technical analysis for shorts & longs -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Johnny Canuck who wrote (66399)10/3/2025 10:40:23 PM
From: Johnny Canuck  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 68783
 
Grok:

The US administration is using tarrifs as a tools to re-shore manufacturing to the United States. What is the probability of it succeeding? What factors have to be in place for it to succeed? How long will it take? Will the US default and and enter a massive recession first because of the current policies and the expanding debit of the US government and consumer? Provide a chain of thought.

Answer:

Chain of Thought To address this multifaceted query on the U.S. administration's tariff strategy for re-shoring manufacturing (under President Trump's 2025 policies), I broke it down into the four components: estimating success probability, identifying required factors, projecting timelines, and evaluating recession/default risks from debt and policies. This draws on recent economic analyses as of October 3, 2025, focusing on empirical evidence from Trump's tariff escalations (e.g., steel/aluminum at 50% since June, broader 10-125% rates on China/EU imports). I prioritized balanced sources, including think tanks, forecasts, and reports, to avoid bias.

Step 1: Estimating Probability of Success Success is defined as meaningfully re-shoring manufacturing—e.g., adding 1-2 million jobs and reducing the trade deficit by 20-30% within 5 years, per Trump's goals. Historical data from 2018-2020 tariffs showed limited gains (e.g., ~140,000 jobs but at $900K cost each), and 2025 trends are similar: manufacturing employment fell 42,000 since April tariffs despite rhetoric. Current analyses indicate low odds: AEI models require 20-50% tariffs for deficit elimination but predict net job losses due to retaliation/higher costs. BRG deems across-the-board re-shoring "unlikely," citing structural barriers like automation eroding labor needs. Optimistic views (e.g., some firms profiting from supply shifts) exist, but consensus from Capital Economics and others forecasts failure akin to prior administrations. I assign a ~25% probability, based on partial successes in niches like pharma but broad underperformance.

Step 2: Factors Needed for Success Tariffs alone are insufficient; they must integrate with complementary policies to overcome cost disadvantages (U.S. labor 5-10x higher than Asia) and supply chain inertia. Key factors from analyses:

  • Incentives and Industrial Policy: Pair tariffs with subsidies (e.g., $1.85T from CHIPS/IRA acts) to offset costs; without, firms near-shore to Mexico/Vietnam instead.
  • Automation and Infrastructure: Heavy robotics investment to cut labor costs (essential, as tariffs accelerate but don't enable re-shoring without tech). Fix infrastructure/labor shortages (e.g., skilled worker training).
  • Policy Stability: Reduce uncertainty from erratic tariffs/retaliation; predictable rules attract FDI.
  • Macroeconomic Support: Lower interest rates and fiscal spending on domestic inputs (e.g., steel) to hit "tipping points" where local production beats imports. Without these, tariffs raise input costs (e.g., steel up 30%) without proportional job gains.
Step 3: Projected Timeline Re-shoring is gradual due to capital intensity: Site selection, permitting, and construction take 2-4 years per factory; full supply chain shifts add 1-2 years. Since April 2025 tariffs, early moves (e.g., pharma clusters) show momentum, but broad impact lags: Deloitte forecasts 2.9% durable goods growth in 2025, with meaningful re-shoring (10-15% import substitution) by 2028-2030 if factors align. Delays from trade wars (e.g., China's 125% retaliation paused but volatile) could extend to 5-7 years.

Step 4: Risk of Default and Recession Preceding Success U.S. default is improbable (Treasuries' safe-haven status; debt ceiling hikes routine), but recession risks are elevated (~40-50% odds in 2026 per models) from tariffs amplifying debt dynamics. Debt hit $36T (130% GDP) in Q3 2025, with tariffs adding $200-300B revenue but $500B+ in economic drag (e.g., 6% long-run GDP loss, 5% wage hit). Policies (tariffs + tax cuts) fuel deficits ($2T/year), inflation (core CPI +1-2% from 17% effective tariff rate), and stagflation—below-trend growth (1.5-2% in 2025) with headwinds. Goldman warns of "tariff-induced recession" if retaliation escalates; consumer debt ($17.8T) adds vulnerability via higher prices. J.P. Morgan sees H2 2025 slowdown but no immediate default; Chatham House flags corporate pain undermining confidence. A mild recession (not "massive") could precede any re-shoring gains, derailing the strategy.

Final Assessment The probability of tariffs successfully re-shoring manufacturing is low (~25%), as they create costs without addressing core barriers, echoing past failures. For success, tariffs need pairing with incentives, automation, stable policies, and macro support—currently partial at best. Timeline: 3-5 years for initial shifts, 5-7 for scale, but a recession (40-50% risk in 2026) from debt-fueled inflation and trade wars could hit first, with default off the table but growth stifled. Overall, the strategy risks short-term pain for uncertain long-term gain.



To: Johnny Canuck who wrote (66399)10/4/2025 12:52:59 AM
From: Johnny Canuck  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 68783
 
Just to add to the Grok answer on the AI spend, the current spend by consumers to $12 billion. A stat I heard was 20 percent of companies have an AI initiative. So even with 100 percent penetration rate you have a maximum of $60 billion on the consumer side in revenue and an unknow amount on the enterprise (let's say 10 x of consume demand = $600 billion) side of a potentially $1 trillion dollar spend on infrastructure.

Of course new novel applications could come along that everyone needs but that is typically few and a fair between as we saw with the evolution of mobile Apps. Eventually you plateau and quickly.

Mobile phones have a 120 percent penetration rate in some countries but with the 5G and 6G buildout there are no Apps drawing demand to use up the capacity.