Yes, Jay, you and Manus know all about what's going to happen between China and Japan with war inevitable by January ‘26.
Whatever. If I bother to remember, I will remind you by then.
In the meantime, Grok4 seems a lot more balanced and analytical.
What in G*d’s name do you feed Manus?
Do you ever tire of spreading misinformation?
It is such a shame to have watched your posts become increasingly low quality propaganda screeds after years of very decent macro discussions
Grok4:
Likelihood of War Between Japan and China
Based on the current state of relations as of November 17, 2025, the likelihood of an outright war between Japan and China remains low in the short term (next 1-2 years), estimated at around 5-15% by various analysts and think tanks, though it could rise to 20-30% over the next 5-10 years if escalatory triggers like a formal Taiwanese independence declaration or direct clashes over disputed territories occur. This assessment draws from a range of sources, including Western think tanks (e.g., RAND, CSIS), Chinese state media, Japanese polls, and international reports, which highlight heightened rhetoric but emphasize deterrence, economic interdependence, and the high costs of conflict. Subjective biases in media—such as hawkish Western narratives portraying China as aggressive or Chinese outlets framing Japan as militaristic—are factored in, leading to a balanced view that war is not inevitable but risks are growing.
Current State of Relations
Tensions have spiked since early November 2025, primarily over Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statements that a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, potentially justifying Self-Defense Forces (SDF) intervention under collective self-defense laws. China responded with diplomatic protests, summoning Japan’s ambassador, issuing travel warnings to its citizens (impacting Japan’s tourism-dependent economy), and deploying Coast Guard vessels near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands—over 100 incursions this year, up 50% from 2024. Chinese state media has warned of a “crushing defeat” for Japan if it intervenes, invoking WWII history, while Japanese polls show public division: 49% support military action over Taiwan, but 44% oppose, reflecting wariness of escalation. On X, discussions range from alarmist predictions of imminent conflict to dismissals as mere posturing, with users citing historical grievances and military imbalances.
Factors Increasing the Risk of War
• Taiwan Flashpoint: China views Taiwan as a core interest and has intensified military drills simulating blockades, which could cut off 97% of Taiwan’s energy imports in weeks. Takaichi’s shift from strategic ambiguity signals Japan might join U.S. forces early, potentially drawing China into direct confrontation. Analysts note China’s preparations (e.g., barges, bridges, replicas of Taiwanese infrastructure) suggest action could come by late 2026 if red lines like independence are crossed.
• Territorial Disputes: Increased patrols near Senkaku Islands raise miscalculation risks, with drones and aircraft incursions testing responses.
• Military Imbalances and Alliances: China’s manufacturing edge (larger than U.S.+EU+Japan combined) and MLRS superiority (2,800-3,000 vs. Taiwan’s 11 HIMARS) could overwhelm defenses, but U.S.-Japan alliances deter full-scale invasion. Wargames predict heavy PLA losses in intervention scenarios.
• Domestic Pressures: Nationalist sentiments in both countries, amplified by media, could push leaders toward brinkmanship.
Factors Decreasing the Risk of War
• Economic Interdependence: Bilateral trade exceeds $317 billion annually; a conflict could slash it by 10-20%, devastate global GDP (U.S. -5-10%, China -25-35%), and disrupt supply chains. China’s tourism boycott already hurts Japan (9.6 million visitors, $10B+ revenue), but full war would be mutually ruinous.
• Deterrence and Rationality: Experts argue odds are “zero” without provocation, as neither has offensive capabilities for sustained war; China focuses on internal stability over risky adventures. Japan’s Article 9 constitution and public hesitation limit aggression.
• Diplomatic Efforts: Ongoing talks, including a senior Japanese diplomat in Beijing, aim to de-escalate; historical treaties (e.g., 1972 San Francisco) provide off-ramps.
• Broader Context: Southeast Asia and global stakeholders (e.g., EU, U.S.) face risks from spillover, pressuring restraint.
In summary, while rhetoric and military posturing have intensified, structural deterrents make war improbable without a major catalyst. Monitoring Taiwan’s actions and U.S. policy under potential future administrations will be key. |
