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To: golfer72 who wrote (1579233)	12/23/2025 2:08:12 PM
From: Maple MAGA	1 Recommendation Recommended By longz Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 1579949

Pfizer is in business to make people well, if they are not enough people to make happy and whole, they create some sick ones. Whatever COVID actually was or is, we can thank Canada for helping distribute it. Canadian Scientist's Secret Work On Wuhan Bat Virus Could Have Caused Covid, New Revelations In Book by Tyler Durden Wednesday, Oct 29, 2025 - 08:30 PM Submitted by The Bureau's Sam Cooper, In his new book Under Assault , historian and former Canadian national security analyst Dennis Molinaro uncovers evidence that Chinese-Canadian scientist Dr. Xiangguo Qiu secretly collaborated on a 2019 Wuhan "bat filovirus" research project that some Western intelligence agencies — including the CIA, with varying degrees of confidence — assess to have likely caused the COVID-19 pandemic. While The Bureau has previously reported on Qiu's links to Wuhan's "Batwoman," Shi Zhengli, Molinaro's findings — drawn from redacted CSIS records, open-source intelligence, and parliamentary disclosures — take the case significantly further, situating Qiu's compromise within the broader escalation of Chinese intelligence collection in Canada since 2000, and highlighting Ottawa's conspicuous lack of capacity — or will — to enforce against Beijing's incursions. [url=][/url] His reconstruction shows how Canada's top-security National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg became deeply enmeshed with Chinese military and bioweapons program scientists, culminating in what Molinaro describes as "a biosecurity collaboration of the highest strategic importance to the People's Republic of China." As in a number of explosive cases explored in Under Assault , Molinaro offers careful caveats distinguishing what is proven, what is plausible, and what demands further investigation. But in raising the possibility that a Canadian scientist may have directly or indirectly contributed to a man-made virus responsible for millions of deaths, Molinaro breaks new ground — no current or former Canadian national security professional has made such an assertion so plainly before. "Let's put all this together and consider the implications," Molinaro writes after laying out the sequence of evidence. "Qiu secretly works with the Wuhan lab overseeing a gain-of-function project about bat filoviruses, and months later COVID-19 is unleashed on the world, with this lab being at the centre of the lab-leak theory. Canada then partners for a vaccine with CanSino — a company connected to the PLA, one of the officials of which Qiu had secretly worked with on vaccine research. If the lab-leak theory is ever confirmed, one has to ask: Did a Canadian researcher who was secretly assisting China have a role in the creation and breakout of COVID-19, and then did the Canadian government try to buy a vaccine from a PRC company that the same researcher had assisted and that has connections to China's military?" Molinaro situates the Qiu affair within a broader continuum of Chinese espionage operations in Canada. "The frequency of China's spying on Canada seemed to be increasing through the turn of the millennium," he writes, describing how Beijing's intelligence activities evolved from traditional political influence and industrial theft into targeted scientific infiltration — often leveraging financial inducements and patriotic sentiment within the overseas Chinese diaspora. He traces this pattern through earlier cases, including aerospace engineer Su Bin's theft of Boeing designs from British Columbia and in Toronto, Klaus Pflugbeil's alleged sale of Tesla battery technology to Chinese interests in New York— both involving illicit technology transfers to the PRC. In each case, Molinaro notes, Canadian authorities failed to act until U.S. agencies intervened. Citing former FBI agent Justin Vallese, who commented after the Su Bin investigation, "I don't know how many Su Bins there are," Molinaro extends the warning. Canada's open, well-funded research system — long a source of national pride — has become a global magnet for exploitation by the Chinese Communist Party's technology-gathering apparatus. Against that backdrop, Molinaro lays out the case in Winnipeg. He reconstructs CSIS findings showing that in early 2019, Qiu and several Chinese collaborators were approved by a PRC evaluation committee to conduct a project at the Wuhan Institute of Virology — China's first P4-level biosafety laboratory. The project, Molinaro quotes, aimed to "assess cross-species infection through the creation of synthetic virus strains," placing Qiu in charge of "overall planning." It was a classic gain-of-function experiment — the deliberate development of viral strains in a lab before they evolve in nature. Another researcher was assigned "project design," another "animal infection," and one, whose name remains redacted, was known to have worked on bat viruses similar to SARS. Molinaro writes that these experiments appeared to extend the same line of research associated with Shi Zhengli. Molinaro's review of CSIS files shows that Qiu and her husband, Dr. Keding Cheng, maintained undisclosed ties to Major General Chen Wei, the PLA's leading bio-research officer, who later directed China's COVID-19 vaccine program for CanSino. Chen had worked with Qiu on an Ebola vaccine project years earlier, using cell lines provided by Canada's National Research Council — an institution that was subsequently the target of confirmed PRC cyberattacks. Qiu claimed she did not know Chen was involved in biological weapons research, but Molinaro notes she had listed their collaborations on her Chinese CV—then removed them from her Canadian résumé. Both Qiu and Cheng also co-authored papers with members of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences, China's top institution for chemical and biological weapons research. The Academy even awarded Qiu for "international cooperation," commending her for "using Canada's Level 4 Biosecurity Laboratory as a base to assist China to improve its ability to fight highly pathogenic pathogens… and [Qiu] achieved brilliant results." CSIS investigators later found that Qiu had travelled to Wuhan without permission from the Public Health Agency of Canada. Officially, she was approved to attend a Beijing conference, but the agency was "not aware of any PHAC-approved travel for Ms. Qiu to Wuhan during this period." CSIS also discovered multiple incomplete applications for Chinese talent recruitment programs, which offer large research grants to scientists willing to transfer intellectual property to China. One internal communication between Wuhan and Beijing described Qiu's role as "very important for our future development," and she was reportedly promised about a million dollars in funding for several years of part-time work at the Wuhan lab. The CSIS reporting summarized her value to China's military — citing Chinese sources — bluntly: Qiu was of interest to China's new P4 lab because she was the only highly experienced Chinese expert available internationally who is still fighting on the front lines in a P4 laboratory. CSIS concluded that Qiu "developed deep, cooperative relationships with a variety of People's Republic of China institutions and has intentionally transferred scientific knowledge and materials to China in order to benefit the PRC government." The agency assessed that their activities "constitute a threat to the security of Canada" and that they were likely to continue if left employed. Dr. Cheng's conduct in Winnipeg, Molinaro reports, raised additional alarm. According to CSIS, he facilitated unauthorized access for Chinese visitors to NML facilities, providing passwords so they could download data from the lab's secure network. Some visitors attempted to smuggle out pathogen vials. One of them, the documents state, "was connected to the People's Liberation Army." "A person connected to China's military was allowed to roam freely through, and have access to, a highly restricted Canadian laboratory where scientists could work only with a CSIS-level security clearance and that houses some of the most dangerous viruses in the world," Molinaro writes. "Let that sink in." When the pandemic erupted in 2020, Canada struck a deal with CanSino Biologics — the same PLA-linked company Qiu had helped — to develop a COVID-19 vaccine. But China refused to deliver the samples, and the agreement collapsed. "Months were wasted," Molinaro writes, "which was valuable time in the middle of a pandemic." He asks the question that anchors his critique: "Did the Canadian government try to buy a vaccine from a PRC company that the same researcher had assisted — and that had connections to China's military?" The author draws parallels to previous security lapses. In the Su Bin case, FBI investigators discovered a Chinese espionage network operating from Vancouver that stole U.S. military aircraft designs for Beijing. Molinaro recounts how "five years of espionage against the U.S., assisted by an individual in Canada, and nothing was done until the U.S. came knocking." Molinaro concludes that Qiu and Cheng were likely driven more by ambition and funding than ideology. "The fact that Qiu had filled out multiple talent program applications that promised big funds is a strong sign she was motivated to find funding to continue her research," he writes. The PRC's recruitment machine exploited that motivation, playing on her professional frustration and heritage. He suggests Qiu and Cheng may have romanticized the idea that science transcends politics, unaware — or unwilling to admit — that they were serving the interests of a foreign military. "Qiu and her husband would have been easy targets to be co-opted by the PRC," he writes. "Sadly, that is an impossibility in a world of nation-states with militaries constantly seeking to gain an edge over their rivals."

To: golfer72 who wrote (1579233)	12/23/2025 2:08:31 PM
From: Maple MAGA	1 Recommendation Recommended By longz Respond to of 1579949

Canadian scientist sent deadly viruses to Wuhan lab months before RCMP asked to investigate Documents show concerns about Ebola shipment from National Microbiology Lab, no relation to COVID-19 Karen Pauls · CBC News · Posted: Jun 14, 2020 3:00 AM CT \| Last Updated: June 15, 2020 Xiangguo Qiu, her biologist husband and her students have not returned to work at the National Microbiology Lab in Winnipeg, after being escorted out in July 2019. The RCMP is still investigating a possible 'policy breach' reported by the Public Health Agency of Canada. (CBC) Newly-released access-to-information documents reveal details about a shipment of deadly pathogens last year from Canada's National Microbiology Lab to China — confirming for the first time who sent them, what exactly was shipped, and where it went. CBC News had already reported about the shipment of Ebola and Henipah viruses but there's now confirmation one of the scientists escorted from the lab in Winnipeg amid an RCMP investigation last July was responsible for exporting the pathogens to the Wuhan Institute of Virology four months earlier. Dr. Xiangguo Qiu, her husband Keding Cheng and her students from China were removed from Canada's only level-4 lab over what's described as a possible "policy breach." The Public Health Agency of Canada had asked the RCMP to get involved several months earlier. The virus shipments are not related to the outbreak of COVID-19 or research into the pandemic, Canadian officials said. PHAC said the shipment and Qiu's eviction from the lab are not connected. Online claims that Chinese scientists stole coronavirus from Winnipeg lab have 'no factual basis' "The administrative investigation is not related to the shipment of virus samples to China," Eric Morrissette, chief of media relations for Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada wrote in an email. "In response to a request from the Wuhan Institute of Virology for viral samples of Ebola and Henipah viruses, the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) sent samples for the purpose of scientific research in 2019." 'It is alarming'However, experts are concerned. "It is suspicious. It is alarming. It is potentially life-threatening," said Amir Attaran, a law professor and epidemiologist at the University of Ottawa. WATCH \| Deadly viruses were sent from Canada to China, documents show: Deadly viruses were sent from Canada to China, according to access documents1 year ago One of the scientists escorted from the National Microbiology Lab last year amidst an RCMP investigation was responsible for a shipment of Ebola and Henipah virus to the Wuhan Institute of Virology four months earlier - although the Public Health Agency of Canada still maintains the two are not connected. 2:38 "We have a researcher who was removed by the RCMP from the highest security laboratory that Canada has for reasons that government is unwilling to disclose. The intelligence remains secret. But what we know is that before she was removed, she sent one of the deadliest viruses on Earth, and multiple varieties of it to maximize the genetic diversity and maximize what experimenters in China could do with it, to a laboratory in China that does dangerous gain of function experiments. And that has links to the Chinese military." Gain of function experiments are when a natural pathogen is taken into the lab, made to mutate, and then assessed to see if it has become more deadly or infectious. In Canada, gain of function experiments to create more dangerous pathogens in humans are not prohibited, but are not done because they're considered too dangerous, Attaran said. "The Wuhan lab does them and we have now supplied them with Ebola and Nipah viruses. It does not take a genius to understand that this is an unwise decision," he said. "I am extremely unhappy to see that the Canadian government shared that genetic material." Dr. Xiangguo Qiu, right, accepts an award at the Governor General's Innovation Awards from Gov. Gen. Julie Payette at a ceremony at Rideau Hall in 2018. Qiu is a prominent virologist who helped develop ZMapp, a treatment for the deadly Ebola virus which killed more than 11,000 people in West Africa between 2014-2016. (CBC) Attaran pointed to an Ebola study first published in December 2018, three months after Qiu began the process of exporting the viruses to China. The study involved researchers from the NML and University of Manitoba. The lead author, Hualei Wang, is involved with the Academy of Military Medical Sciences, a Chinese military medical research institute in Beijing. All of this has led to conspiracy theories linking the novel coronavirus responsible for COVID-19, Canada's microbiology lab, and the lab in Wuhan. Online claims that Chinese scientists stole coronavirus from Winnipeg lab have 'no factual basis' The RCMP and PHAC have consistently denied any connections between the pandemic and the virus shipments. There is no evidence linking this shipment to the spread of the coronavirus. Ebola is a filovirus and Henipa is a paramyxovirus; no coronavirus samples were sent. Amir Attaran, professor in the Faculty of Law and the School of Epidemiology and Public Health at the University of Ottawa, is concerned about the shipment of dangerous viruses sent from Canada's only level-4 lab to China. (CBC) The ATIP documents identify for the first time exactly what was shipped to China. The list includes two vials each of 15 strains of virus: Ebola Makona (three different varieties) Mayinga. Kikwit. Ivory Coast. Bundibugyo. Sudan Boniface. Sudan Gulu. MA-Ebov. GP-Ebov. GP-Sudan. Hendra. Nipah Malaysia. Nipah Bangladesh. PHAC said the National Microbiology Lab routinely shares samples with other public health labs. The transfers follow strict protocols, including requirements under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA), theTransportation of Dangerous Goods Act, the Canadian Biosafety Standard, and standard operating procedures of the NML. CBC News has not been provided with some of the paperwork involved with the transfer, as information was redacted under sections of the Access to Information Act dealing with international affairs, national security and other issues. Confusion, concern over shipmentThe ATIP documents provide details about the months leading up to the shipment — including confusion over how to package the deadly viruses — the lack of decontamination of the package before it was sent, and concerns expressed by the NML's director-general Matthew Gilmour in Winnipeg, and his superiors in Ottawa. They wanted to know where the package was going, what was in it, and whether it had the proper paperwork. In one email, Gilmour said Material Transfer Agreements would be required, "not generic 'guarantees' on the storage and usage." He also asked David Safronetz, chief of special pathogens: "Good to know that you trust this group. How did we get connected with them?" Safronetz replied: "They are requesting material from us due to collaboration with Dr. Qiu." CBC News received hundreds of pages of documents through an Access to Information request, detailing a shipment of Ebola and Henipah viruses sent from the National Microbiology Lab in Winnipeg, to the Wuhan virology lab in China. (Karen Pauls/CBC News) Meanwhile, it appears the NML's shipper initially planned to send the viruses in inappropriate packaging and only changed it when the clients in China flagged the problem. "The only reason the correct packaging was used is because the Chinese wrote to them and said, 'Aren't you making a mistake here?' If that had not happened, the scientists would have placed on an Air Canada flight, several of them actually, a deadly virus incorrectly packaged. That nearly happened," Attaran said. The package was routed from Winnipeg to Toronto and then to Beijing on a commercial Air Canada flight on Mar. 31, 2019. The next day, the recipients replied that the package had arrived safely. "We would like to express our sincere gratitude to you all for your continuous support, especially Dr. Qiu and Anders! Thanks a lot!! Looking forward to our further cooperation in the future," said the heavily redacted email, which does not provide the name of the sender. Access to information documents show a flurry of emails dealing with the shipment of viruses from the National Microbiology Lab in Winnipeg to China. (John Woods/Canadian Press file photo) Nearly one year after the expulsion of Qiu, Cheng, and her students from the NML, there are still no updates on the case from the RCMP or PHAC. At the time, Public Health Agency spokesperson Morrissette said the department was taking steps to resolve this case as quickly as possible. On Thursday, he said the investigation has not yet concluded. "Administrative investigations are impartial, thorough and in-depth. They are also procedurally fair and respect the rights of individuals," he said. Gordon Houlden, director of the China Institute at the University of Alberta, said he welcomes scientific collaboration and exchanges with China, "but there has to be a framework of rules in place" and Canada's intellectual property must be protected. Houlden, a former diplomat, has many unanswered questions about this particular shipment. Gordon Houlden, the director of the China Institute at the University of Alberta, says there are many good reasons to share biological samples between labs, but any transfers must follow proper protocols. (Terry Reith/CBC) A vacuum of information is always a problem, especially in a situation of heightened tension with China over the arrest of a Huawei executive in Canada, the seemingly retaliatory arrest of two Canadian men in China and questions over the origins of the coronavirus, he said. "There's also a danger if you don't provide information that people will jump always to the worst conclusion," Houlden said. Chinese researcher escorted from infectious disease lab amid RCMP investigation Canadian government scientist under investigation trained staff at Level 4 lab in China Current NML head Matthew Gilmour was not made available for an interview. He is leaving as of July to work for the U.K.-based Quadram Institute Bioscience. His medical adviser, Dr. Guillaume Poliquin, will take over until a permanent replacement can be found. Qiu could also not be reached for a comment. CBC's Journalistic Standards and Practices\| About CBC News