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Strategies & Market Trends : World Outlook -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Les H who wrote (51190)	1/27/2026 9:04:38 AM
From: Les H	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 51299

How Atrocity Propaganda Manufactures Consent For War. The Latest Atrocity Propaganda About Iran Is The Latest In A Long Series Of Atrocity Propaganda Claims Used To Manufacture Consent For War. The Dissident Jan 26, 2026 How Atrocity Propaganda Manufactures Consent For War. US and NATO used false claims of atrocities against civilians in Libya to get a resolution through the UN security council to authorize a no-fly zone which they exploited to provide air support to their foreign rebels to overthrow the Gaddafi government. From the Military Review: A Novel Norm in Action: Libya With the ground situation worsening during the Libyan uprising of 2011, the UN faced a dilemma. Should it heed the warnings and threats promulgated on national radio of then Libyan President Muammar Gadhafi to protesters and proactively intervene? Or should it simply choose to monitor the situation from the sidelines? As the situation deteriorated and Gadhafi’s forces appeared intent on conducting a large-scale massacre throughout the city of Benghazi, the UN decided to step in at the invitation of the African Union and League of Arab States using a novel jus ad bellum principle—R2P. Responding to calls for intervention from regional security organizations such as the African Union and League of Arab States as well as other UN bodies, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1970, which asserted Libya’s “right to protect” its citizens and imposed an arms embargo and travel ban on the Gadhafi family and on key members of the government.21 However, with progovernment forces rapidly advancing on rebel positions, calls for the UN to establish a no-fly zone gained traction. Within a month of Resolution 1970’s adoption, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973, which established a no-fly zone and authorized states to “take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat.”22 As then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon stated, “Resolution 1973 affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community’s determination to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them by their own government.”23 For the first time since its establishment, R2P was invoked and incorporated within a UN resolution aimed to militarily safeguard citizens amid civil strife without the approval of the respective sovereign. After Resolution 1973’s adoption, a coalition of nations primarily composed of NATO members volunteered to enforce the no-fly zone in the skies above Libya. After the coalition successfully destroyed Gadhafi’s antiair defense systems, it quickly evolved to supporting rebel forces on the ground. What started off as a moral crusade justified in protecting civilians quickly added one additional objective: regime change.24 Eight months later, Gadhafi was found in a drainage pipe, beaten, sodomized with a bayonet, and killed by rebel forces. His body was publicly displayed as a “trophy” inside a Misrata meat store.25 The Aftermath of Libya and the Delegitimization of R2P NATO ended its mission soon after Gadhafi’s death against the wishes of the Libyan National Transitional Council. Many were left bewildered at how quickly NATO’s mission evolved from R2P to regime change and questioned the logic of NATO’s intervention and its true purpose. For many, NATO reinterpreted the UN mandate to achieve its true ulterior motive.26 Rather than protecting Libyans, NATO used Resolution 1973 as a cover to oust Gadhafi from power. Furthermore, NATO stymied the African Union’s mediating efforts which might have led to a political power-sharing arrangement that kept Gadhafi in power. The rejection of such peaceful solutions by NATO calls into question the prevention responsibilities enshrined within R2P. The rejection of a regionally orchestrated outcome by NATO and its absence postintervention illuminates the most glaring failures of R2P in Libya. Although military intervention is intended to be a last resort in R2P’s framework, NATO and the UN’s decision to resort to hard power by circumventing Luck’s first two doctrinal pillars is exactly what postcolonial states warned against. These actions, coupled with NATO disregarding the rebuilding aspect of R2P’s postintervention pillar, and the overall worsening situation in the country postintervention, corroborated the anxieties the Global South had expressed and consequently dealt a significant blow to R2P writ large. When ICISS first expanded upon R2P, the principle emphasized the importance of prevention and rebuilding rather than military intervention. NATO’s campaign in Libya proved that the Global North could use R2P as a façade for pursuing underlying core objectives. Furthermore, it can be argued that if NATO’s priority were the protection of civilians, it would have been sufficient to operate within the parameters of Resolution 1973.27 Even if one were to argue that protecting civilians necessitates regime change in certain instances, then such a policy still must be enacted as a last resort as stated in both the ICISS report and in the World Summit resolution, and it must be enshrined within a requisite UNSC mandate. As Giselle Lopez notes, “While it is debatable whether the intervention fulfilled the ‘right intention’ requirement, it is apparent that it did not fulfill the requirement of armed intervention as a last resort.”28 The Responsibility to (Selectively) Protect: R2P’s Dubious Future Post-Libya The lies surrounding Iraq, Libya, and Syria may have proven to be the end of the 'rules-based order' as the US and NATO no longer can expect to obtain authorization through the UN to launch wars to support covert operations