To: Jim McMannis who wrote (49227 ) 3/3/1998 11:16:00 AM From: Mary Cluney Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 186894
Jim, >>>Here we go again...<<< >>>"It just seemed like every time the stock would creep up a few points, Kurlak would say something to beat it back down."<<< >>>But something odd is going on here. As analysts have become real players on Wall Street, they no longer seem content to predict the movements of stocks they cover on the basis of a company's fundamental strengths and weaknesses<<< >>>the result is very often short-term stock fluctuations that have little if anything to do with a company's actual performance. A forme r Wall Street research director puts it succinctly: "If you were from Mars and you saw this system, you'd say it was wacko." <<< >>>Yet the constant refrain from the buy side is that Kurlak is perhaps the single best example today of an analyst who actively seeks to maximize the impact he has on the stocks he follows. <<< >>>When Kurlak likes a company, his estimates tend to be much higher than everyone else's; when he is down on a company, they're much lower. "He likes to use his estimates to make a statement," says one buy-sider. But those wide swings in his estimates also exaggerate his impact on the stock when he revises his numbers.<<< >>>"The thing you've got to understand about Kurlak," says a hedge fund manager, "is that he's an entertainer. He's never been about fundamental research. He's about showmanship." <<< >>>Kurlak is every bit as controversial today, but he has accumulated so much clout that the buy side has to listen to him whether it wants to or not. Nor do Kurlak's competitors have the luxury of ignoring him. <<< >>> It is easy to see Kurlak, with his big, market-moving calls, as being at least partly responsible for that volatility and the chronically depressed (intel's) P/E ratio. <<<< >>>"It only takes one or two analysts with a contrary view to push a stock down," sighs Gordon Moore. With the analysts so divided over everything the company did, no wonder the stock was so volatile, the P/E so depressed. <<< >>>For all the press Kurlak gets, he's an endangered species. His outsized reputation gives him job security, but his style alienates much of his constituency. For instance, Kurlak's disdain for investment banking means that Merrill has very little banking presence in a sector awash in deals. Back in 1984, Kurlak even helped prevent Merrill from being the underwriter of Micron Technology's IPO--for which he makes no apologies: "I thought the stock was too risky for our retail clients." <<< >>>Having long since accepted the soundness of Intel's strategy, most analysts today try to time their calls around the basic element of that strategy--Intel's inexorable transitions to its latest, most powerful class of microprocessors. During times when Intel is phasing out one generation of chips and phasing in the next, the stock is likely to be a little rocky. But once that latest microprocessor is ramped up, and all systems are go, the stock is likely to fly. Typically, though, Intel doesn't tell the analysts when it is entering a transition phase. They have to figure it out themselves, partly by mining sources among Intel's customers and partly by paying close attention to Intel's gross margins, which offer clues about the product cycle. (Lower margins can sometimes mean the company is in the midst of a transition.).<<< The above comments were selected from a Fortune Magazine article "Who Really Moves Markets" October 27, 1997:pathfinder.com