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Technology Stocks : Winstar Comm. (WCII) -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Steven Bowen who wrote (4377)3/9/1998 1:24:00 PM
From: Steven Bowen  Respond to of 12468
 
I think I'll waste a couple post to post some of the narative from the CSFB report. It is a very decent, thorough evaluation, and should be recorded here for posterities sake. Those not interested in the report can jump ahead 5 posts, and sorry for the inconvenience.

WinStar is a competitive local exchange provider using 38 GHz technology to build out local telecom networks in major markets throughout the country.

Expedited Network Deployment Improves Growth Outlook
Progress at WinStar is exceeding our expectations. Recent acquisitions are speeding up the roll out into new markets and the deployment of an Internet/data strategy; newly developed point-to-multipoint radios should enhance the capability of 38 GHz technology as well as its efficiency, and key additions to management have been made to fill new needs. Responsible for the most significant impact to our earnings outlook for WinStar are the acquisitions of key assets such as switches, customers and employees. WinStar acquired these in its purchases of US One, MidCom and GoodNet. As a result of these purchases, WinStar has been able to accelerate by an entire year, its CLEC business plans. The acquisitions have substantially changed the financial outlook for the company, and we have adjusted our model to reflect this. In addition, the changes have altered our valuation target for the company. In line with management guidance, we are expecting that the acquisitions will be EBITDA neutral in 1998 and 1999, and will significantly accelerate EBITDA growth thereafter. Hence, our EBITDA estimates for 1998 and 1999 have not changed, staying at losses of $187 million and $53 million, respectively. Beginning in the year 2000, when the company now expects to be in 40 markets, we have significantly increased our targeted EBITDA growth rate, and now expect EBITDA to grow at a compounded annual rate of 80% from 2000 to 2007.

Using a 14% discount rate, a 9x terminal multiple of EBITDA, and a 20% private-to-public market discount, we reach our new year-end 1998 price target of $61. Our model reflects five and ten year revenue CAGRs of 57% and 35%, respectively. EBITDA is expected to turn positive in 2000, while the EBITDA inflection point (i.e. EBITDA losses start shrinking sequentially) is still expected to be hit in the fourth quarter of 1997 with a loss of $49.6 million.

Progress Report

Summary of Acquisition Benefits. Strategic acquisitions in the fourth quarter have positioned WinStar for an acceleration of its CLEC deployment. Through the purchase of key assets (i.e., switches and salespeople), as opposed to internally developing them, WinStar accomplishes two key goals. It is able to build out its local networks faster and with lower capital expenditures, and in turn, can begin earning positive returns more quickly and at a faster rate. The acquisitions also open new doors for WinStar to immediately begin offering data and Internet products. In response to WinStar's acquisitions we expect EBITDA growth will accelerate at a faster
rate than we had previously projected.

One Year Advancement. By acquiring the 14 installed switches from U.S. One (some of which have since been divested as planned); Internet access provider, GoodNet; and long distance reseller MidCom, WinStar essentially advances its CLEC buildout plans by one year. WinStar's revised plans are to be in 30 markets by year-end 1998 and 40 markets by year-end 1999. Original plans had called for being in 30 markets by year-end 1999. At year-end 1997 WinStar had switches in 15 markets.

Accelerated Access Line Growth. The accelerated entry into new markets should result in a much higher deployment of access lines. We are now targeting the addition of nearly 194,000 new lines in 1998, bringing WinStar's total number of access lines to about 276,000. (In 1997 WinStar matched our target to end the year with 82,000 lines.) By year end 1999 when WCII is expected to be in 40 markets, our model assumes 550,000 lines, and by year-end 2000 we are looking for end of period lines of about 992,000.

Change in Customer Behavior. Coinciding with the addition of new lines and the introduction of more advanced technology such as point-to-multipoint radios, we are anticipating a critical change in customer usage patterns. Currently, many of WinStar's customers are purchasing lines for use as back-up facilities, and not generating much in usage revenue for WinStar. This is evident in WinStar's low revenue per line in the low $50s, while most CLECs are at least $80. As WinStar's technology gains greater acceptance, the technology becomes more efficient (i.e., point to multi-point), and its data strategy is rolled out, we make the assumption that usage will grow significantly and increase the average revenue per line to $80 by 2001.

Lower Operating Costs. WinStar's plans to serve a greater proportion of customers on-net will be enhanced by the addition of the new switches and the expanded deployment of radios. The result should be lower operating costs, since there will be less resale of LEC loops. The promise of 38 GHz wireless is a more efficient deployment (faster, cheaper, more profitable) of local networks, with more customers being served on net. And in this case "on-net" means, using the CLEC's switch and wireless local loops. In New York, WinStar's goal is to have 50% of its lines on-net by year-end and two-thirds ultimately. By year-end 1998 we are expecting WinStar to have 25% of its total lines on-net and by year-end 2000 we are targeting 50% of lines will be on-net.

More Efficient Use of Capital. The acquisition of already installed switches, versus the purchase of new switches should reduce WinStar's initially planned capital expenditures for switches by 15-50% (depending on the sale of some of the switches), and cut the time to deploy them by one year. The efficiencies created by point-to-multipoint radio technology will also be material, and should help to expand the addressable market. Point-to-multipoint essentially allows WinStar to make more efficient use of its spectrum. It will be able to operate many buildings or radios off a single hub, as opposed to its current point-to-point method that requires one radio at the hub for each radio at the customer building. In addition, the point-to-multipoint radios are expected to be less expensive for a given amount of bandwidth, than those used today, allowing WinStar to more efficiently deploy capital.



To: Steven Bowen who wrote (4377)3/9/1998 1:26:00 PM
From: Steven Bowen  Respond to of 12468
 
Acquisition Details
U.S. One - From U.S. One WinStar acquired 14 installed Lucent class 5 switches for $100 million. Some of the switches were redundant with switches already installed by WinStar and have subsequently been sold since the transaction closed in late 1997. In our model we have added $80 million to our estimated 1997 capital expenses to account for these switches, with the assumption that WinStar received, at minimum, $20 million for the switches it sold. U.S. One switches that WinStar plans touse are located in Minneapolis, Seattle, Tampa, Denver, Kansas City, San Francisco and Columbus.

GoodNet - The purchase of GoodNet, an Internet access provider, for approximately $22 million in stock, meaningfully enhances WinStar's data strategy. It gains 27 points of presence, many of which are in the markets
WinStar had been targeting for entry by the end of the first quarter of 1998. These markets include Denver, Tampa, DC, San Jose, New York and Philadelphia, just to name a few. By the end of the first quarter 1998,
GoodNet plans to have a point of presence in each of the 21 markets WinStar plans to offer switched telecommunications products. GoodNet leases back-haul fiber from IXC Communications, on which it has installed 27 ATM switches. This provides WinStar with the data network it needs in order to launch a data and Internet business. In addition, GoodNet has about 150 small and medium sized business customers and about 100 ISP customers. It also has 12,000 dial-up customers in Phoenix. Cross selling products to the commercial and ISP customers, should create additional benefits. GoodNet is expected to turn EBITDA positive in 1998 and contribute $10 million to EBITDA in 1999. The company is currently operating at a run rate of $8 million in revenues per year and an EBITDA loss of $150,000 per month. In each of the past couple of years, its sales growth has been between 200-300%. In our model we are targeting annual revenue growth of between 30-40% with total revenue contribution in 1998 of $18.5 million and growing to $24.5 million in 1999.

MidCom and PacNet - MidCom, a long distance reseller that was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, was purchased for $92 million in cash. Net of collectable accounts receivable the purchase price was closer to $72 million. Of the
$72 million, WinStar is paying about $35 million for what it believes will be about $50 million in retainable long distance revenues and about $35 million for $20 million of high growth frame relay/data revenues. The deal
includes some protection if revenues erode beyond expectations. If by March 1998, revenues fall below an $8.7 million per month run rate the purchase price can be adjusted downward. The deal structure protects the downside in acquiring a bankrupt company, and provides significant upside for WinStar's business plan. MidCom adds six long distance switches as well as a significant sales force of about 200 people in eleven cities (ten of which are in WCII's 21 target cities). Four of the cities already served by MidCom are included in WinStar's list of target cities for 1998. Retaining sales force is always hard after an acquisition. And, if WinStar suffers significant turnover in the sales ranks, it will likely negatively affect revenue growth. But, given the protection that exists in the deal structure, if sales fall, the purchase price will also. There are essentially two parts to MidCom: the core long distance business and a frame relay business called PacNet. MidCom's current revenue run rate for long distance and PacNet is $80 million and $20 million respectively based on last quarter's annualized revenue. Given expected erosion in long distance revenues, 1998 total revenues should be around $70 million and in 1999 around $90 million. WinStar's plan is to improve the revenue base of MidCom's customers. In our model we estimate that the "new customers," those acquired during the latest regime of MidCom management, will continue to grow at a rate of about 15% per year and maintain a higher level of revenue per month of around $180. The "old customers" on the other hand, should be progressively spun out. We are targeting a loss of 20% off of this base per year and an average revenue per month of about $80.

Further Developments
The CLEC operations as we have noted so far through out this report, should derive the benefit from acquisitions as well as new advances in technology. Both of these factors should speed up the deployment of WinStar's CLEC markets as well as improve its efficiencies. In our model we are targeting CLEC revenues of $115 million in 1998, up 405% from our 1997 estimate of $22.6 million.

As a result of the mergers, we expect WinStar will be able to considerably improve the profit margin of each segment as well as that of the consolidated entity. The following are some of the benefits WinStar expects to realize just from the acquisitions:
MidCom's salesforce has an account team for large businesses, a segment WCII was planning on adding in 1998.
WinStar expects that $70 million in MidCom's overhead costs will be eliminated through a reduction in back office expense, an elimination of separate company costs, the consolidation of redundant staff hires, and a
reduced need for new hires. As a result, a 10 percentage point improvement is expected in MidCom's cost of sales.
The backhaul costs of PacNet should be significantly reduced when carried over GoodNet's backbone.
In addition to these operating expense savings, WinStar should also realize significant capital cost reductions. By purchasing fully installed switches, as opposed to deploying them itself, WinStar figures it is saving approximately $3-5 million per switch. When WinStar made its initial agreement to purchase the switches for $100 million, $80 million was due in cash and $20 million was due in stock at a later date (based on the closing
price of about $25 per share). The company promptly sold two of the fourteen switches for $20 million bringing its cost for 12 switches down to $80 million. Management believes it can sell an additional five switches for $40-50 million. If achieved WinStar would have paid between $30-40 million for seven switches or between $4-6 million per switch. The typical capital it takes to internally install a switch is between $7-8 million. These savings do not even take into consideration that the $20 million in stock WCII agreed to pay at the deal signing is based on the stock's price of about $25 per share. If the stock were to be paid at today's value, the acquisition could save another $5-8 million.



To: Steven Bowen who wrote (4377)3/9/1998 1:26:00 PM
From: Steven Bowen  Respond to of 12468
 
Discussion of Other Business Lines in the Model
WinStar's CLEC business is the real driver of growth, despite the company's ownership of other business lines. The residential long distance business is being slowly eliminated and the wholesale business is sitting patiently
on the banks of the stream, waiting to catch the big fish. This leaves CLEC operations and New Media as the only material contributors to growth. As the CLEC is still in a fairly early stage of development, New Media
remains a large contributor to total revenue. Of our estimated 1997 total revenues of $77.1 million, we expect New Media to be responsible for approximately 52% and the CLEC to contribute only 29%. However, by years
ending 1998 and 1999 we anticipate a significant roll reversal with New Media responsible for only 21% of total revenue in 1998 and 14% in 1999. The CLEC's contribution should grow to 73% in 1998 and 80% in 1999. In
1998 we expect the contribution from residential long distance will decline to $1.5 million from $8 million in 1997. By 1999, we expect this business will be gone.

WinStar's wholesale division is in a sort of holding period while the company focuses on building out its CLEC operations. In other words, WinStar is not actively marketing its wholesale services to a number of small players, but is rather waiting to win a single, significant client (like an AT&T). Because we cannot predict that this will happen, we maintain fairly steady and flat growth in this segment. But, we must note, that were WinStar to capture a large wholesale client, we believe there is significant potential for earnings upside. In 1999, we target the wholesale division will hit EBITDA break-even, as a result of the slow-down in spending to expand this segment.

WinStar New Media aggregates and develops information content and delivers it through broadband systems to businesses and educational facilities. We are targeting revenue growth for WinStar New Media of about 53% in 1998, at which point we believe the business will hit its stride and growth will begin a gradual slow-down to about 7% per year and a consistent operating margin of just a little over break-even. Because we don't have good insight into this business and its growth strategies, and we do not know whether or not it will permanently continue to be considered necessary by management, we are maintaining these conservative estimates. We should note that in 1997, New Media consistently beat our revenue estimates and it is not inconceivable that we could be surprised on the upside again.



To: Steven Bowen who wrote (4377)3/9/1998 1:28:00 PM
From: Steven Bowen  Respond to of 12468
 
Filling Management Posts to Support Future Endeavors
WinStar has recently made key additions to its management team that will assist it in successfully expanding into the data and Internet arena.

Following the acquisition of GoodNet, David Jemmett, GoodNet's CEO, entered into an agreement to continue at WinStar as President of WinStar GoodNet.
At the same time as this announcement WinStar also announced that it has hired Howard E. Taylor, a former business unit president at SNET. Prior to joining SNET in 1994, Taylor was vice president of global marketing at MCI and has also held positions at Quotron Systems, Telenet Communications and IBM. Taylor's hire accompanies the creation of a separate broadband services group, of which Taylor will serve as president and COO. This group will focus on developing WinStar's Internet, data transport and LAN/WAN services. Both of these new hires provide WinStar the leadership and experience needed to develop a data and Internet strategy.

These new additions are healthy contributions to an already strong management base. One other notable hire worth mentioning is WinStar's new CFO, Charlie Dickson, who has years of experience from MCI (as do many
others of WinStar's top management). From 1984 until 1993 Mr. Dickson was a senior financial executive at MCI. In the four years prior to joining WinStar, he was CFO of NextLevel Systems, an equipment and service provider for advanced broadband networks.

Competition Created By LMDS Auction should be Inconsequential to WinStar
As we expected, the advent of the LMDS auctions, an auction of licenses in the 28 to 31 GHz band of spectrum, appears to be raising a higher level of consciousness toward spectrum in the 20-38 GHz range. Generally speaking, we believe that the auctions will have little to no impact on WinStar. In our view there is no spectrum shortage - the government has seen to that. And as a result the availability of spectrum should not be viewed as an important barrier to entry into any radio- based telecom business. The barriers to entry involve the process of building a business. Since WinStar is ahead of any other wireless CLEC operation in this process of building a business, and is years ahead of potential new CLECs using LMDS, we don't view this auction as competitively significant.

On February 6, the U.S. Appeals Court in DC ruled that the LMDS auctions will go forward on February 18, under the FCC's original guidelines that bar incumbent local carriers from buying spectrum in-region. This decision further supports our belief that the auctions should be fairly inconsequential to WinStar as it prevents incumbent LECs from using wireless to block the entry of new competition.



To: Steven Bowen who wrote (4377)3/9/1998 1:29:00 PM
From: Steven Bowen  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 12468
 
Valuation
The principal driver of valuation for WinStar is a DCF analysis. This gives us an absolute sense of the value of the stock. Going a step further, we look at the valuation compared with other CLECs who have similar growth and operating characteristics. Using these approaches we conclude that the stock is undervalued presently, and should reach approximately $61 by year-end. Thus, potential price appreciation makes WCII extremely attractive, deserving our Buy rating.

Table 1 shows that WinStar is more advanced than most of its peers in termsof build out. Out of seven comparable CLECs, only two had more access lines than WinStar at the end of the third quarter, 1997. Of these
comparables, only three had a larger percentage of lines on-net. It should be noted that WCII's on-net lines is defined as customers fully served by WCII, using both switches and wireless connections. This demonstrates that by some important measures WCII is one of the most well-developed CLECs. This implies that management is executing its strategy effectively. Further evidence of success will be provided as the benefit of a wireless strategy is demonstrated through faster and more cost effective deployment.

In addition, WinStar needs to achieve higher revenues per line to show that customers are utilizing its services in ways comparable with other CLECs and ILECs. As the year progresses we think both of these developments will become obvious, which should be key catalysts for the stock.

WinStar's direct wireless CLEC comparables, Teligent and ART are significantly behind WinStar in terms of business development. Certainly Teligent has the benefit of having attracted a strong stable of well-know management talent. But it will take some time for this company to catch up to where WinStar already is. Teligent is in the process of deploying switches and obtaining roof rights and plans to become commercially
operational in the second half of 1998. It's target is to enter ten markets by year-end 1998 and 30 markets by year-end 1999. ART is operational but its business strategy is quite different from WCII as its focus is on the wholesale market, not direct sales to end users. In addition, neither Teligent nor ART has as much spectrum as WinStar, particularly in top markets.

Neither Teligent nor ART generated revenues in the first nine months of 1997 that come close to matching WinStar's. While WinStar produced $49.6 million in revenue in the first nine months of 1997, Teligent only
generated $2.9 million and ART generated $0.9 million. Even if we only consider WinStar's CLEC and CAP revenue, WinStar would still be far and away the more advanced carrier. WinStar's revenue from the first nine
months was $17.2 million.

Our DCF analysis of WinStar leads us to our $61 price target, and the comparison to other CLECs confirms our view that the stock is undervalued relative to this group. As noted earlier, we use a 14% discount rate, a 9x
terminal multiple, and a 20% private to public market discount in arriving at our valuation. The cash flow model, shown in Table 6 shows that we forecast results to 2007, and expect terminal year EBITDA growth of about 12%, with EBITDA margins of 29%. Revenue growth in the final year is about 9%. These financial assumptions are consistent with our other CLEC models, and seem reasonable to us.

Because WCII's wireless approach to the CLEC business requires significantly less plant than the fiber-based CLECs, a comparison of enterprise value to gross plant can be misleading. On that basis, WCII looks expensive, having a much higher multiple than any of the fiber-based CLECs. On the other hand, comparing it on the basis of enterprise value to revenues is a good comparable valuation measure. On this basis WCII's valuation of a 6.1 multiple of forecasted 1998 revenues makes it look relatively cheap compared with the group. Thus, we conclude that our DCF analysis has put us on the right track, and is a good indicator of upside potential in the stock.