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Technology Stocks : Year 2000 (Y2K) Embedded Systems & Infrastructure Problem -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: John Mansfield who wrote (254)	3/21/1998 3:45:00 PM
From: John Mansfield	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 618

Rick Cowles at NRC/NEI JOINT; MEETING NOTES; last year `Bottom line - if local and state emergency response isn't working, eg. simple stuff like 911 plus nuclear emergency response communication et.al., the plants have to shut down. `NRC/NEI JOINT MEETING NOTES (The following are my personal notes from the above meeting. I believe them to be essentially correct, but have routed a copy to all those who attended 'just in case' some correction was in order. My comments are in italics.) JOINT MEETING OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION / NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE <snip> 10/07/1997, 9AM - 2PM NRC Headquarters, Rockville Md. HT (NRC) - Comment: How do you identify the right people to sponsor and lead the effort? (No industry response) (RBC Comments: This is where the meeting started to get really interesting, and where NEI started trying to position itself as the appropriate "vehicle" for raising awareness and prompting response. NRC wasn't buying. NEI/NUSMG wasn't hearing the message. Also of note was an example of external interfaces provided by Rich Lomax. During the major mid-west flooding a few years back, NPPD was forced to shutdown Cooper Nuclear Station - not because of a threat to the plant from the flooding, but because local emergency response teams would have been unable to respond to a nuclear emergency during the flood situation. Carry this out to the global Y2K implications, like loss of telecommunications and loss of offsite power. Bottom line - if local and state emergency response isn't working, eg. simple stuff like 911 plus nuclear emergency response communication et.al., the plants have to shut down. I hadn't even considered this before.) euy2k.com Here's a brief roadmap to success: anticipate the worst possible regulatory response (because it's going to happen), and be prepared. Every domestic US licensee should begin, now, to look at every tech spec required system for operability in light of the Year 2000 issue. Consider reviewing every last logic diagram and system schematic associated with the above described systems for PLC or other microprocessor based involvement in the control cycle. Consider system inter-relationships and dependencies based on time, date, and event logging input/output. Review impact on postulated DBA's as addressed in the SAR, paying particular attention to LOOP and operability of emergency diesel generators. And lastly, become involved in the industry working groups that are currently developing Y2K project methodologies specific to the nuclear industry. NEI, NUSMG, EPRI, and EEI all have Y2K working groups. Think about the following codes/regulations, and how Y2K might apply: euy2k.com