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Strategies & Market Trends : Graham and Doddsville -- Value Investing In The New Era -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: porcupine --''''> who wrote (109)3/24/1998 8:58:00 PM
From: porcupine --''''>  Respond to of 1722
 
Wayne: Buffett and Munger - on ROE - 1997 Annual Meeting

Here is an excerpt of some of what he said last year. It's not all of
it though.

The S&P 500 has a return on equity of 22%, compared with a 12-13%
average for corporate America over the past decade.ÿ How did we get to
this point of extraordinary profitability?

WB:ÿ 22% returns are sustainable in a world where the long-term
interest rates are 7% and where the capability of saving large amounts
in the economy are quite dramatic. You would just think that there
would be some sort of leveling effect between 7 and 22, that as
savings got directed within the economy, and as the competitive forces
operate that we've been taught will operate over time, will come into
play, but I've been wrong on that subject. Let's say you have a 22%
perpetual bond, and let's say a third of that coupon would be paid
out. So, a bond with a 22% coupon, and say 7% is paid out, being the
dividend payout on the S&P we'll say, and the other 15% is reinvested
in more 22% bonds with similar characteristics. Now what's that
instrument worth on a present value basis? A lot of money. In fact,
it's worth so much that it becomes a mathematical fallacy at some
point, because when the compound rate becomes higher than the discount
rate you get infinity, and that's a concept we like to think about
around Berkshire though we may not attain it. There's a book called
The Petersburg Paradox and the Growth Stock Fallacy by David Durant,
written about 25 years ago, and it gets into this bit where the growth
rate is higher than the discount rate, and it shouldn't work for an
extended period of time. Charlie?

CM:ÿ I think a couple of things contributed to this phenomenon that we
so carefully mispredicted. Number one, it became very fashionable for
corporations to buy in shares, and I think that we helped in a very
small way to bring on that. I think that was a plus in terms of
corporate decision making. The other thing that happened is that the
anti-trust administration got way more lenient in allowing people to
buy competitors. And I think that those two factors helped raise
returns on capital in the United States, but you wouldn't think that
could go on forever. What 15% per annum compounded will do is grow way
faster than the economy can grow, way faster than aggregate profits
can grow over the long haul ... I don't think we've reached a new
order of things where the laws of mathematics have been repealed ...
All of you should be aware of this, because all the people who are
professional sellers of investment advice and brokerage services,
etc., etc., have an immense vested interest in believing that things
that can't be true, are true. And not only that, they've been selected
in a Darwinian process to have formidable sales skills and large
incomes. (laughter) That makes it dangerous for the rest of us.

WB:ÿ And you've been selected to be the recipients of their advice.
(more laughter)

Wayne



To: porcupine --''''> who wrote (109)3/26/1998 9:12:00 PM
From: porcupine --''''>  Respond to of 1722
 
Is the Market One Big Wal-Mart in the Mid-90's?

*Graham and Doddsville Revisited* -- "The Intelligent Investor in the
21st Century" (3/24/98)

"The underlying principles of sound investment should not alter from
decade to decade, but the application of these principles must be
adapted to significant changes in the financial mechanisms and
climate." (Benjamin Graham)

A reader writes:

> This market reminds me of Wal-Mart in the early 1990s. Their
fundamentals were
> superb, but their share price more than discounted that performance.
Hence, despite
> continued progress toward becoming the dominant retailer in the US.,
the stock
> went sideways to down for three years while that story caught up to the
stock
> price. In 1995/96, the stock eventually became a steal below $20 and
those
> that bought it then have since profited handsomely. But those that
bought it in
> the early 90's based solely on the fundamentals (i.e., having no regard
for
> share price) have dramatically underperformed the overall market.

> I wonder if the same thing can be expected of the U.S. market as a
whole for the
> next three years.

It is an interesting comparison. Wal-Mart's fundamentals in the 1994 to
1996 period were not as "superb" as investors had previously come to
expect. This was a period for Wal-Mart of declining profit margins and
return on equity. Not a dramatic decline, but the shares were priced too
high to allow for any decline at all.

And, consistent with your comparison, that might be just what lies ahead
for the overall Market in the next 2 to 3 years: mild declines for margins
and ROE in a Market priced for no declines at all.

Not only the dour John Bogle, Sr., but even the permanently optimistic
Peter Lynch, have predicted that total returns on the Dow going out 5
years were likely to return to the long-term historical mean of around 9%
per year. However, they made this prediction more than five years ago.
As it turned out, the total return for the 5 years ending 12/31/97 on
Vanguard's S&P 500 Fund was 22.6%.

In the case of Wal-Mart, the average annual return over this 5-year span
was 5.0%. This is far less than the return the S&P 500 produced. But, if
the alternative had been leaving the Market entirely, it should be noted that
bonds were not much better, and that cash was no better at all. Corporate
A-rated bond funds returned around 7.3% over this period. T-Bill money
market funds averaged 4.2%.

In the 3/23/98 GADR Update, I predicted that the stock market would not
double in the next 3 years, as it has in the 3 years just past. But, I would
not want to predict that bonds or cash would be a better alternative. If the
Market is now one big overpriced Wal-Mart, I would rather hang in with
an overpriced Wal-Mart. The alternative would be to wait in cash or
bonds for a profitable re-entry point that might not materialize, which has
been the case for so many investors who have left the Market over the
past 5,000 points.

*********

[For a free e-mail subscription to GADR, reply to: gadr@nyct.net
In the subject header, type: SUBSCRIBE.

Kindly remember to turn off the "quote message" feature before
replying.]

The *GADR* Reader's Forum is now on Silicon Investor, at:
Subject 19528

*********

Graham and Doddsville Revisited
Editor: Reynolds Russell, Registered Investment Advisor
Web Site Development/Design: ariana <brla@earthlink.net>
Consultants: Axel Gunderson, Wayne Crimi, Bernard F. O'Rourke,
Allen Wolovsky

In addition to editing *GADR*, Reynolds Russell offers investment
advisory services. His goal is to provide total returns in excess of
those produced by the S&P 500.

His investment strategy applies the principles of Value Investing
established by Benjamin Graham to the circumstances of today's economy
and securities markets.

For further information, reply via e-mail to: gadr@nyct.net

*********

"There are no sure and easy paths to riches in Wall Street
or anywhere else." (Benjamin Graham)

(C) Reynolds Russell 1998.



To: porcupine --''''> who wrote (109)3/30/1998 12:01:00 AM
From: porcupine --''''>  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1722
 
GM: The Cash Keeps Pouring In -- 3/29/98 Update

*Graham and Doddsville Revisited* -- "The Intelligent Investor in the
21st Century" (3/29/98)

"The underlying principles of sound investment should not alter from
decade to decade, but the application of these principles must be
adapted to significant changes in the financial mechanisms and
climate." (Benjamin Graham)

General Motors: The Cash Keeps Pouring In

With a Market priced for permanent perfection, General Motors
continues to be priced for imminent disaster.

In the recession of the early 1990's, the survival of even mighty GM
was called into question. All of the big 3 auto makers say they have
reformed and this time will be different. As a reason why investors
should believe that this time they mean it, the auto makers point to
global competition as providing the discipline that will prevent them
from backsliding into their old ways.

Whether or not GM (and other auto makers) will come through the next
recession without the kind of financial bloodbath endured the last
time around remains to be seen. But, it may be a long wait to find
out -- because there is still no sign of recession. Meanwhile, the
cash keeps pouring into GM, and a generous portion of this cash
continues to be passed on to shareholders.

In this business cycle, GM in particular has shown noteworthy resolve
in controlling expenses and increasing shareholder value. But,
economic forecasters have been predicting that recession is 12 to 18
months down the road -- since sometime in 1993.

Hence, year after year GM's stock has traded at a
recession-is-just-around-the-corner p/e of between 7 and 9. This is
Mr. Market's way of saying that he expects earnings will soon
collapse. Yet, year after year GM continues on the same path of
moderate but steady growth as the rest of the U.S. economy.

Since early 1994, GM has earned over $46 per share in cash earnings,
plus extraordinary gains of over a dollar per share, after netting out
all special charges. It has paid $5.50/share of this in dividends,
built up a $18.75 per share cash reserve against the next recession
(or strike), and funded its pension liabilities.

Yet, it's share price remains little changed over this period,
because, as Standard and Poor's has written about GM, "....[there is]
mounting evidence that North American demand is rapidly maturing and
that the peak of the current business cycle is near....[and]
conflicting macroeconomic and industry developments warrant caution."

S&P put those words into print in October of 1995. And, in December
1995, S&P wrote, "[W]e would not add to to positions until it becomes
more certain that a recession will not occur." And, in November 1996,
"[I]t is late in the economic cycle".

In fairness to S&P, 1995 did mark a plateau for GM's earnings. But,
even a year and a half later, we cannot agree that it is "late in the
economic cycle". There is no question that it is not early in the
cycle. And, there is no question that the cycle must some day turn
down. But, there is no economic law that limits the duration of the
cycle.

On the supply side, companies still turn out a profit, inventory as a
percentage of sales has fallen (instead of rising) so far in the
cycle, debt is shrinking as a percentage of corporate assets, and the
value of the dollar is stable or rising at home and abroad. On the
demand side, employment is up, wages are up, consumer spending and
house buying are strong, and household debt as a percentage of
disposable income has plateaued.

So far, there isn't the buildup in supply, slack in demand, or
financial excess that precede a recession -- anywhere on the horizon.

Recently, GM announced another $4 billion in share buybacks, on top of
the $5 billion announced since this time last year. Combined with
about $3 billion in dividends and Raytheon stock now worth over $3.5
billion, since the start of 1997 GM will have distributed about $22 in
cash and stock to shareholders by the end of this year.

1997's (primary) per share earnings were a record $7.89. Total
revenues were a record $178 billion. Operating margins, at 17.8%,
were the highest going back at least 20 years.

GM's market share keeps inching downward in the face of withering
price competition, currency devaluations, and industry overcapacity in
Asia. But, GM had promised to yield market share in exchange for
increased profitability and shareholder value -- the exact opposite of
the strategy that has brought Asia to its current economic impasse.
So far, GM is keeping the promise.

Value Line's most recent update on GM predicts modest, but
respectable, growth in per share earnings to $12.25 (from 1997's
$7.89) sometime between 2001 and 2003 -- without assuming *any*
additional share buybacks.

How much does a $68 stock have to earn to be undervalued?

*********

Graham and Doddsville Revisited
Editor: Reynolds Russell, Registered Investment Advisor
Web Site Development/Design: ariana <brla@earthlink.net>
Consultants: Axel Gunderson, Wayne Crimi, Bernard F. O'Rourke,
Allen Wolovsky

In addition to editing *GADR*, Reynolds Russell offers investment
advisory services. His goal is to provide total returns in excess of
those produced by the S&P 500.

His investment strategy applies the principles of Value Investing
established by Benjamin Graham to the circumstances of today's economy
and securities markets.

For further information, reply via e-mail to: gadr@nyct.net

*********

[For a free e-mail subscription to GADR, reply to: gadr@nyct.net
In the subject header, type: SUBSCRIBE.]

*********

"There are no sure and easy paths to riches in Wall Street
or anywhere else." (Benjamin Graham)

(C) Reynolds Russell 1998.