To: Abner Hosmer who wrote (9839 ) 4/14/1998 9:21:00 AM From: Gabriela Neri Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 116762
Another Steve Roach classic on the Yen and Japan: G-7: Yen Meltdown Averted -- What Comes Next? Stephen Roach (New York) While there is still a solid case for a further weakening in the yen, it now seems as if world financial markets will be spared the pyrotechnics of the meltdown scenario. Japanese authorities have moved to contain the downside of the currency by deploying the classic combination of a policy shift and direct intervention in foreign exchange markets. Yes, Robert Feldman cautions that Japan's latest fiscal initiative hardly qualifies as an aggressive policy action. Nevertheless, I am gratified that at least the Japanese authorities seem to be taking a stand at Y130 in front of this week's G-7 meeting. It is now conventional wisdom that FX intervention rings hollow unless it is backed up by policy actions. But considering the extraordinary political gridlock that continues to grip Japan, the LDP, Hashimoto, the BOJ and the MOF must now be given some credit for attempting to draw a line in the sand. Only time will tell if this strategy succeeds. If the yen's free-fall can be averted, it pays to probe what comes next. In my view, two key implications could quickly come into play -- the first being heightened concerns about the downside risks to the US dollar. Ravi Bulchandani, our resident dollar bull, has argued consistently (and correctly) in favor of strength in the US currency. But in the end, it really boils down to which factor drives the foreign exchange outcome -- relative interest rates, the excesses of monetary expansion, or the potential imbalances of global capital flows and current account adjustments. In my view, the capital flow model is likely to loom increasingly important in shaping the next major move in foreign exchange values, and it spells nothing but trouble for the US dollar for the first time in three years. In brief, the currency ramifications of the capital flow model will be dominated by the mounting current account imbalances between the US and Japan. In 1997, the US balance-of-payments deficit totaled 2.1% of GDP, the highest such reading since the late 1980s. Moreover, this widening of America's current account imbalance predates any meaningful impacts from the Asian crisis. I continue to believe that the US balance-of-payments deficit is headed toward at least 3% of GDP over the 1998-99 time frame, as the strength of American domestic demand continues to boost import growth and the problems in Asia crimp export growth. Nor should this prognosis be considered a low-probability doomsday scenario. The just-released global economic update of the OECD now calls for a 2.8% current account deficit in the United States in 1999, matched by a 3.7% surplus in Japan. In my view, it would not be surprising to see imbalances of this magnitude trigger a balance-of-payments financing problem in the United States -- precisely the outcome that was evident in the latter half of the 1980s when a similar dollar overhang emerged. Moreover, if EMU goes ahead as smoothly as now appears to be the case, an externally vulnerable US currency could well face some new and tough competition in world financial markets that could also exacerbate the vulnerability of the greenback. A second implication of a yen-containment strategy is that it finally unmasks the cyclical risks of the US economy and, as a result, pushes the Fed into action. I, for one, continue to believe, that the sharp strengthening in the dollar over the past three years has been key in limiting US inflation in a climate of exceptionally tight labor markets. According to our estimates, CPI-based inflation would have been 0.5 to 0.75 percentage point higher were it not for the nearly 25% appreciation of the trade-weighted dollar since the spring of 1995. In the current economic climate, any dollar depreciation would be most worrisome - not only would it eliminate the headwind that has been critical in containing inflation, but it would boost import and commodity prices at precisely the moment when labor cost pressures are beginning to accelerate. The result would be a confluence of labor cost and currency pressures that an inflation-conscious Fed could ill afford to ignore. In short, if a yen-containment strategy tips dollar risks to the downside, it could well unleash the cyclical endgame that financial markets have long been unwilling to face. It's always possible that I'm making too much out of the latest signals from Japan. After all, there is an eerie similarity with the events of December 1997, when an earlier tax-based fiscal initiative was last accompanied by intervention in support of the yen. But with the heavy artillery of the G-7 now aimed squarely at Japan, I think it now pays to ponder the other side of what has long been a fool-proof trade. If I'm wrong, and the yen resumes its steep slide, then the worst-case meltdown scenario would quickly come back into play. Either way, it's hardly a rosy outcome for world financial markets.