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Technology Stocks : Intel Corporation (INTC) -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Burt Masnick who wrote (53299)	4/15/1998 11:00:00 AM
From: shust	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 186894

i think it was worth. shust

To: Burt Masnick who wrote (53299)	4/15/1998 11:49:00 AM
From: Mary Cluney	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 186894

Burt,>>>I still think it was Fortune<<< You may have been referring to the October 27, 1997 issue of Fortune - in it is this article "Who Really Moves the Market," pathfinder.com Some highlights from this six part online edition: >>>But something odd is going on here. As analysts have become real players on Wall Street, they no longer seem content to predict the movements of stocks they cover on the basis of a company's fundamental strengths and weaknesses. True, stocks ultimately rise and fall over the long term on the basis of those fundamentals. And yet there's no getting around it: Power now accrues to analysts who make stocks move, if only for a brief moment. <<< >>>As it has become imperative for companies to beat those estimates, a little dance has developed, in which analysts cluster around a "consensus" estimate that largely reflects the company's own thinking. Kurlak, however, refuses to play along. When Kurlak likes a company, his estimates tend to be much higher than everyone else's; when he is down on a company, they're much lower. "He likes to use his estimates to make a statement," says one buy-sider. But those wide swings in his estimates also exaggerate his impact on the stock when he revises his numbers. The same is true of his upgrades and downgrades. Buy-side institutions often feel blind-sided by Kurlak's calls because they can be so extreme--as in his Intel call of late August. Merrill Lynch has a five-tiered rating system; when Kurlak downgraded Intel, he took it down two full notches--all the way to "neutral." (Kurlak is not so extreme that he is willing to issue "sell" recommendations, but then, nobody does that. It doesn't matter: As a practical matter, "neutral" now means "sell.") He'll issue a downgrade just weeks after reiterating his buy on a stock. And in terms of the market's psychology, his timing is legendary--no one has better instincts for sensing the moment when his call can serve as the straw that breaks the camel's back. "The thing you've got to understand about Kurlak," says a hedge fund manager, "is that he's an entertainer. He's never been about fundamental research. He's about showmanship." Kurlak professes to be angered by these accusations. Why did he downgrade Intel a mere two weeks after reiterating his strong buy?"In those two weeks there was a big change in the stock price. It reached my [$100] target price." What about the charge that his calls have more to do with the market's psychology than with a company's reality? "My job is to make people money," he replies. "If I don't include every factor that moves a stock--market psychology included--then I'm not doing my job." <<< >>>"The thing you've got to understand about Kurlak," says a hedge fund manager, "is that he's an entertainer. He's never been about fundamental research. He's about showmanship." <<< Joe Granville was the same way until his luck ran out. That's show biz. Mary