To: Maurice Winn who wrote (9967 ) 4/19/1998 8:01:00 PM From: Ramsey Su Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 152472
Maurice, does this look like the Asian problem is over? dougjn, that is kind of why I am very gun shy about adding to QCOM or any other positions for now. Ramsey Monday April 20 1998 Cost of finance-sector bailouts double forecasts, Barclays warns SHEEL KOHLI in London Governments have severely underestimated the cost of bailing out Asia's crippled financial systems, and the true level of damage could be double present forecasts, Barclays Capital, the debt markets arm of Britain's Barclays Bank, warns in a report today. It said the economic turmoil in Indonesia in particular had become so severe that a further depreciation of the rupiah could not be ruled out. Non-performing loans (NPLs) in the worst-hit Asian economies could be up to half of gross domestic product, according to Barclays Capital. In stark comparison to Mexico's 1994-95 banking crisis, where total fiscal, liquidity and foreign exchange subsidy costs is at present 14 per cent of gross domestic product, the true cost of Indonesia's financial sector bailout is likely to be at least double the 15 per cent of GDP now expressed. Barclays Capital said that during the Latin American "tequila crisis" NPLs peaked at about 9 per cent of all loans in Brazil, 11 per cent in Mexico, and 17 per cent in Venezuela. In the Scandinavian banking crisis of the early 1990s, NPLs peaked at 11 per cent in Sweden and 9 per cent in Finland. "In contrast, NPLs in Indonesia could peak around 75 per cent by the end of this year," Barclays said. "In Korea, a level above 40 per cent is likely, while in Thailand and Malaysia, a figure significantly above 30 per cent is expected. "Given the high degree of leverage in Asian economies, these NPLs are even more sizeable when seen as a percentage of GDP. In these four Asian countries NPLs will conservatively peak at between 35-50 per cent of GDP." In Indonesia, Barclays Capital said the 80 trillion rupiah (about HK$75.5 billion) already pumped into the banking sector by the central bank amounted to about 12.7 per cent of GDP, and more support would be needed. Extra funds to help recapitalise banks and reduce NPLs would be required, which would take liquidity and recapitalisation support easily above 30 per cent of GDP, without the potential sizeable foreign exchange cost of guaranteeing foreign loans. The bank said such reasoning for Indonesia implied pro-cyclical fiscal tightening for several years, slowing growth, increasing corporate credit risk, and depressed local asset markets. "With domestic demand set to remain sluggish over the coming years, a competitive currency policy will inevitably have to be followed," it said. Such trends equally applied to Malaysia, Thailand and Korea, which meant the total cost of the banking sector bailout would exceed 15 per cent of GDP. In Malaysia, official liquidity support to the banking sector already accounts for 10 per cent of GDP, while in Thailand it is 12 per cent of GDP. The cost of a banking crisis is expressed most obviously in foregone economic growth, where risk aversion in banks coincides with domestic liquidity tightening, which results in reduced lending. Another cost is in fiscal and monetary terms as authorities try to prevent systemic risk, through direct liquidity injections, exchange-rate subsidies on foreign debt repayments, and buying out NPLs. Such measures were often inflationary, as they meant creating extra liquidity. They also served to destabilise the currency and create higher real interest rates. Methods to bail out a banking sector included increasing government spending on bank support, but would mean diverting spending from other areas. Such measures were usually insufficient, Barclays said, and only increased budget deficits.