Dear STitch:
I don't know if you've seen the latest Stratfor post.
Here it is:
For Personal Use Only
(C) Stratfor
Alert
May 25, 1998
Indian Ocean Basin Becoming Focus of International System
For the past six months, the Global Intelligence Update has been following
events in two countries in particular: Iran and Indonesia. In the past
couple of months we have become increasingly concerned with the Indian
subcontinent as well. Although these events appear to be, and indeed are,
unconnected, their effects are not. We invite you to sit down with a map
and trace the maritime consequences of these events. From the Straits of
Hormuz, through the Indian Ocean, into the Straits of Malacca past
Singapore--these are the choke points through which Asia's oil supply flows
and they are now in jeopardy.
In recent months, the Iranian navy has been conducting sophisticated and
successful exercises combining surface and submarine units. Whatever their
intentions, the Iranians have clearly demonstrated their ability to
jeopardize the movement of oil tankers through the Straits of Hormuz. It
is likely that the United States can still clear a path through the Straits
should the Iranians wish to interdict the flow of oil. However only the
United States has that ability. Moreover a probability is not a certainty.
The Iranians may well be able to impose a substantial cost on U.S. attempts
at sea lane control. Iranian intentions are unclear. Neither the internal
political situation nor the geopolitical reality permits clarity. Last
week, the Iranian army conducted large-scale exercises in southwestern
Iran. Whether the motive for these exercises was simply part of the normal
training cycle, a dress rehearsal for an attack on southern Iraq or an
attempt to keep regular army forces--whom we assume are pro-Khatami--out of
the cities, is not clear to us. What is clear is that Iranian military
power is growing while Iranian political stability is in doubt--an
explosive combination.
Everyone has focused on the Indian government's decision to test nuclear
devices. We regard this as far less important than the fact that the new
nationalist government has substantial and growing conventional military
assets at its disposal. Last month, the Indian government established an
entirely new fleet command in the Bay of Bengal. The Indian government's
ability to project naval power into the Indian Ocean has grown dramatically
in recent years. The new nationalist government appears to be signaling
the world that it is prepared to use that power if the need arises. While
the United States is pressuring India on nuclear testing, it is ignoring a
much more critical set of questions: what does India intend to do with its
naval power? The flow of oil tankers passing from the Straits of Hormuz to
the Straits of Malacca all pass through waters that are increasingly
patrolled by Indian warships.
Then, of course, President Suharto has resigned, settling absolutely
nothing. President Habibe is a change of personality at the top, but the
main personalities that were enriched and empowered under Suharto's reign
continue to control the country. The core issue is whether this group will
be deposed and disposed of--whether we are facing another Iran. There is
an obvious difference between the Shah's Iran and Suharto's Indonesia.
There is no Khomeni in Indonesia. That is to say, there is no central
focus for the anti-Suharto rebellion that is both charismatic and morally
defensible. This increases the possibility for the Suharto group to
survive, but it also increases the possibility for absolute chaos. The
Suharto group has lost its legitimacy but there is no single group that is
its logical successor. The result could be massive instability, which is
what we think is the most likely outcome. The counter to stability is
nationalism. Suharto and Sukarno, the two poles of Indonesian history,
were both claimants to the nationalist banner. Today, nationalism lies in
the gutter. Habibe will undoubtedly try to pick it up, as will others.
And this is what makes the situation dangerous. The only real alternative
to chaos is Indonesian nationalism which, in the extreme form required to
draw the country together and legitimize the coming repression, is
inherently xenophobic, certainly confrontational, and potentially
expansionary. Imagine, if you will, Sukarnoism coupled with anti-Chinese
racism for a sense of the future.
Thus, Iran, India and Indonesia all pose a dramatic challenge to the
international system as a whole. If the Straits of Hormuz, the Indian
Ocean or the Straits of Malacca (and Lombok) are closed, or even become
insecure, the ability of Asia, especially Japan, to access the oil required
to run its economy will be jeopardized. Japan imports 100 percent of its
oil--some from Indonesia, most from the Persian Gulf. If any of those
waterways become inaccessible for any reason, Japan, already in a long-term
depression, would find itself in a catastrophic position.
There are now three nations, any one of which could disrupt the flow of oil
to Asia if it chose. None is motivated to do so at this moment, but it is
not difficult to imagine circumstances under which any one of them might
choose to do so. At this moment, there is only one power that would be
able to secure the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf past Singapore: the
United States. There is no doubt in our minds that the U.S. could readily
deal with sea lane closures in any one place. However, given the imprudent
draw down of naval forces by the Clinton administration, it is far from
clear that the United States Navy could secure the Indian Ocean while
simultaneously carrying out its missions elsewhere in the world.
We are now entering an extremely dangerous period. Economic forces have
created desperation in strategic regions. Historically low oil prices have
made Persian Gulf politics more unpredictable than usual. The collapse of
the Asian economic miracle has cast Indonesia free from the stabilizing
influence of prosperous trade relations. India, long neglected by the
United States, has few reasons to play a stabilizing role.
The only effective counterweight is the United States. But the truth of
the matter is that the United States is not the main beneficiary of its
Indian Ocean patrol-- Japan is. And as Japan is trying to export its way
out of its economic problems, friction between the United States and Japan
is bound to increase. As the Indian Ocean basin destabilizes, the key
question is this: what rational justification is there for American
exertion on behalf of Asia. There are certainly answers to this question,
but not necessarily very clear and obvious ones.
All of this is a bit off in the future. Iran is not about to close the
Straits. It is merely demonstrating that it could if it wished. India is
not about to start interdicting tankers on the high seas, although given
the current shrill anti-Indian rhetoric, they may at least raise that
specter. And Indonesia has not yet advanced to the point of international
adventurism in the Sukarno tradition, but no reasonable person could simply
discount this possibility.
The Indian Ocean Basin, from Hormuz to Malacca, is about to become the
centerpiece of the international system. Iran, India and Indonesia are
going to be the poles of the region. And the United States does not have
good relations with any but the weakest and least stable. We cannot help
but believe that Japan is watching this evolution carefully and thinking
about its meaning and its response. Note that we remain convinced that
Japan, and not China, will be the wildcard of the international system in
the first decade of the 21st Century.
Between times they haven't done a very good job on India. However, their coverage of the middle east has been the best of any news, or strategic service on earth. The benchmark.
My best to you,
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