To: EPS who wrote (22284 ) 5/25/1998 11:19:00 AM From: EPS Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 42771
GEEK'S-EYE VIEW Sun's Java strategy should focus on the Java Virtual Machine. By Brett Glass Sun Microsystems' battles to defend its Java technology and trademarks against the expanding Microsoft empire have been the stuff of headlines, lawsuits, and flame wars. Most of Sun's problems have been correctly characterized as resulting from Microsoft's partially successful efforts to use its Windows monopoly to fragment a powerful technology. However, they also are the result of three strategic mistakes Sun made at the very outset. None of these missteps has proved fatal--yet. But together these errors threaten to undermine Java seriously, unless Sun takes immediate corrective action. Semantic error The first mistake, as is all too common when avowed techies attempt to market new products, has been one of positioning. Instead of pushing Java's greatest strength, the "virtual machine" technology that allows an application to run on nearly any operating system safely and without recompilation, Sun has cast Java more as a language that just happens to be cross-platform. This does a disservice to the most important and least known feature of Java's technology: that it is possible to compile nearly any existing computer language--not just Java--to run on Java's run-time engine. This doesn't mean Java the language isn't elegant or worth learning; it is. But by putting the cart before the horse, Sun has neglected what must be one of its primary goals: to enable users to choose its products despite the nearly complete Windows monopoly. Sun's second mistake, which follows directly from the first, is how it has chosen to name Java and its components. Sun gave the language a short and catchy name and called the engine by the much more awkward "Java Virtual Machine." This name perpetuates the illusion that the "Write once, run anywhere" aspect of the technology is secondary to the language. Microsoft has capitalized on this tactical error by propagating the incorrect notion that Java is "just a language." But Sun's most telling error has been its failure to keep complete control of the virtual machine. With legions of programmers and plenty of cash to hire more, Sun should not have lazily allowed other vendors to implement the cross-platform engine. Microsoft and Netscape should never have been entrusted with this all-important component. Had Sun implemented the virtual machine itself for all the important operating system platforms (as it has now begun to do, belatedly, with its Activator plug-in technology), it would have had a hot product to license or even sell directly to end users for an immediate gain. (Sun's JavaSoft subsidiary, which is responsible for Java, has yet to turn a profit.) What's more, were Sun the sole author (or nearly so) of Java virtual machines, 100 percent cross-platform compatibility would be easier to achieve, and divergence of the language would be a nonissue. Java the language could be released to standards committees with no negative effect on the platform's viability, eliminating the most strenuous objections to Java as a whole. (This is, in fact, the Red Herring's position: see December's open letter to Scott McNealy) Any language or compiler that created a program for Sun's virtual machines would automatically be able to run on any system, allowing users to choose alternative hardware platforms and operating systems--including Sun's--with confidence. Machine language In promoting Java, Sun has fretted too much about the chrome on the fenders and failed to concentrate on the important part--the engine. Sun can turn things around by giving the Java Virtual Machine a short, trendy, nontechnical name and marketing it independently from the language, thus becoming the primary source of compatible virtual machines for all environments. Sun also should ensure that other languages can be used with the engine via the publication of standard, language-independent interfaces similar to those used by IBM's System Object Model architecture. In summary, Sun must both maintain viable markets for its primary hardware and software businesses and preserve user choice in the face of the Windows monopoly. Though the company's initial strategy was not too far off the mark, a few midcourse corrections will surely make the difference between a smashing success and a slow, painful slide toward insignificance. Brett Glass is a software developer and a freelance technology columnist.