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To: Dragonfly who wrote (389)6/6/1998 5:50:00 PM
From: jlallen  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 880
 
DF: CIA says no harm. DOD disagrees. Whether or not there was harm, the question remains was the waiver purchased? On the issue of harm to national security interests surely an investigation is warranted. JLA



To: Dragonfly who wrote (389)6/6/1998 7:19:00 PM
From: Zoltan!  Respond to of 880
 
June 6, 1998

Scientist Who Led Missile Review Promised
Help to China


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By ELAINE SCIOLINO and JEFF GERTH

WASHINGTON -- The scientist at the center of an investigation of
whether two U.S. companies improperly helped China improve its
rockets told the Chinese in 1996 that he would do everything he could to
make their rockets the most reliable in the industry.

The scientist, Wah Lim, a Chinese-born American citizen, was a senior vice
president and engineer at a unit of Loral Space and Communications when he
wrote a cordial letter to China Aerospace Corp. in April 1996, two weeks
before a technical review he oversaw was provided to the Chinese company
without U.S. government permission and contrary to Loral policies.

Federal officials are investigating whether
the review, an analysis of a Chinese
rocket-launch failure that destroyed a
Loral satellite, violated export-control
laws and damaged national security by
giving the Chinese information that would
enable them to improve their missile
program.

The investigation caused Justice
Department prosecutors in February to
oppose President Clinton's approval for
China to launch another Loral satellite.

Loral officials insist that the unauthorized
and perhaps illegal disclosure to the
Chinese was just a mistake.

But both the warmly worded letter by
Lim, in which he promised a fruitful joint
effort to figure out why the Chinese
rocket had exploded two months earlier,
and other internal Loral documents
portray a corporate mind-set in which
the priority was to fix a serious problem
of concern both to the American
company and to the Chinese.

The Chinese rocket carrying the Loral
satellite crashed into a hill 22 seconds
after liftoff in February 1996. The
Chinese thought they had figured out the
cause, but their insurance companies
wanted a second opinion.

Enter Lim. The Loral physicist, an
intensely private man of 53 who grew up
in Singapore and came to the United
States on a Fulbright scholarship, was so
highly respected by the Chinese that Liu
Jiyuan, the chairman of China
Aerospace, asked Loral executives to
put him in charge of the review.

Although his mandate was narrowly
defined, his letter to Liu during the early
stages of the review and other internal
Loral documents suggest that he may
have had broader objectives: to offer
concrete recommendations to improve
the reliability of China's troubled Long
March rocket program.

Since many of Loral's satellites are
launched in China, such a goal was in the
company's best financial interest as well.
But China Aerospace launches rockets
with both commercial and military
applications, and improvements in the
ability to launch rockets accurately and
reliably could aid not only its business of
sending communication satellites into
space but also its testing and delivering
of nuclear weapons from ballistic
missiles.

So the Loral documents underscore the
risks of the Clinton administration's
policy of promoting the transfer of
sophisticated U.S. technology to
countries like China at the same time as
trying to prevent that technology from
being used for military purposes.

That policy has now come under broad congressional review, while there are
also federal investigations into testimony about surreptitious contributions to
the Democratic Party by the Chinese military through a China Aerospace
executive, and into campaign contributions to the party from Loral's chairman,
Bernard Schwartz.

In his letter to the Chinese, Lim said he felt "truly honored for having been
asked" to head the review team and noted that an important goal of the review
was "using this failure as an opportunity to ensure that the Long March launch
vehicles have the best reliable record in the future."

Lim added, "We, at Space Systems/Loral would like China Great Wall to be
a strong supplier of launch services and we will do everything in our power to
help you."

The letter, to an important business partner, offered other expressions of
encouragement as well, including Lim's confidence "that your company will
take their share of the world market for satellite launch services."

A week and a half earlier, in a strategy report, Lim had outlined four
objectives for the review team, including recommending to China Aerospace
and its launching subsidiary, China Great Wall, "any other areas of
improvement."

Before writing that outline, Lim had received a security briefing by Loral
officials instructing him on what kinds of information the Chinese could receive,
records show.

Under the ground rules imposed by the U.S. government on Loral, the
company was allowed to help the Chinese mount its satellite on the Chinese
rocket. But the company, according to its written briefing, was forbidden to
disclose "launch vehicle/satellite detail design" or "information that will enhance
the launch site facilities or launch vehicle/mission capabilities" of the People's
Republic of China.

Because of his role in the technical review, Lim, who now heads the
technology and development arm of Hughes Space and Communications Co.
in Southern California, is the central figure in the Justice Department's criminal
investigation into whether Loral and Hughes, whose scientists also worked on
the review, illegally transmitted information to the Chinese that may have
helped its missile program.

According to a confidential 21-page letter by Loral's lawyers to the State
Department in June 1996, Loral acknowledged that the company should have
asked the State Department to approve the activities of its review team, calling
it "a serious mistake" not to have done so.

The letter stated that "it is not clear there was any violation" of law because of
the transfer of technical data to the Chinese.

It also acknowledged that the issue of whether illegal assistance was given to
the Chinese in the "testing, manufacture or repair" of the rocket "is more
problematic."

What was also problematic was the way in which the report by Lim's review
team made its way to the Chinese, according to the confidential letter.

On May 6, 1996, Lim approved a press release by the Chinese anticipating
the release of his team's report four days later.

The following day, Nick Yen, an aide to Lim, faxed a draft version of the
report to the Chinese.

But along the way, Lim apparently got cold feet. He decided to seek the
approval of Loral's general counsel, Julie Bannerman, before sending the
Chinese the final version of his report.

When Ms. Bannerman read the report, she "became concerned that export
control laws had not been properly considered," and asked Loral's expert
outside counsel for advice, the Loral letter said.

By the time she tried to block the transmission of Lim's report from Loral's
Beijing office to the Chinese on the morning of May 10, she was too late. It
had been faxed to the Chinese one hour before -- by Yen, but with a cover
letter written by Lim.

Lim declined to be interviewed. But his lawyer, George Newhouse, declared
that his client is innocent of any wrongdoing.

"He is a nice man, a quiet, low-key individual, a scientist, not a lawyer or an
expert in export-control laws," Newhouse said. "And now he finds himself in
the eye of the hurricane."

But Rep. Gerald Solomon suggests there may be more to it. The New York
Republican and chairman of the House Rules Committee wrote Defense
Secretary William Cohen asking 22 questions about whether the scientist was
properly given security clearances or was a security risk.

Lim's lawyer took exception to the insinuation that his client compromised
U.S. national security -- either intentionally or unintentionally.

"He is not a spy," said Newhouse. "He is a 100 percent red-blooded
American. To suggest he would betray his country or do anything in any way
to damage American national security interests is not only wrong but
offensive."

Newhouse declined to discuss any of the specifics of the current investigation.

Lim was born in China to a landed, Catholic anti-communist family. At the age
of 4, he fled with his family to Singapore after the communists took power.

In Singapore, his father became an investment banker and the family enjoyed a
comfortable life. Lim majored in physics at the University of Singapore in
1967, and came to the United States on a Fulbright scholarship, getting a
Ph.D. in theoretical physics from the University of Minnesota.

Like other scientists, Lim advanced by moving throughout the aerospace and
defense industries. From 1973 to 1982 he managed the group at Honeywell,
Inc., that successfully introduced the ring-laser gyroscope for commercial
airlines.

For the next seven years, he was responsible for the development of advanced
guidance and navigation systems for strategic missiles at Northrop Grumman
Corp. Until early 1997, he was senior vice president of technology and
operations at Loral, when he left to work for Hughes.

The fate of Lim rests, at least in part, on interpretations of technical information
understood best by rocket scientists like himself.

Loral says that it was simply trying to help the insurance companies assess
whether China's own inquiry into the accident had reached the correct
conclusion.

But federal officials have said that Lim's review team went beyond confirming
to the Chinese what the problem was and gave them insights into the cause of
the explosion and the way to prevent future accidents. nytimes.com



To: Dragonfly who wrote (389)6/7/1998 12:40:00 PM
From: Bill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 880
 
<<The waivers have been granted routinely to donars and non-donars alike by Republican and Democrat presidents.>>

Can you name a non-donor that Clinton granted a waiver to?



To: Dragonfly who wrote (389)6/8/1998 8:40:00 AM
From: Bill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 880
 
<<The waivers have been granted routinely to donars and non-donars alike by Republican and Democrat presidents.>>

Can you name a non-donor that Clinton granted a waiver to?