SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Technology Stocks : Loral Space & Communications -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Ramsey Su who wrote (3757)6/13/1998 10:44:00 AM
From: Glass Bead Player  Respond to of 10852
 
Today's Barron's Cover Story. FWIW

June 15, 1998

Crowded Skies

Will satellite phone systems come crashing down on investors'
heads?

By Eric J. Savitz

Before long, the skies will be clogged with more than a thousand new
satellites, some designed to let you use your wireless phone from anywhere on
the planet, others to provide superfast Internet access. The first of these new
satellite systems, Iridium, is scheduled to start operating in the fall. Others plan
to follow shortly thereafter. But don't get too starry-eyed. The risks are
immense. Already there have been failed satellites and botched launches.
More will follow.

For investors, the most important question is whether enough customers will
materialize to keep all these new systems in business. And it is investors, after
all, who are being asked to pony up a large part of the estimated $100 billion
it will take to turn all these lofty plans into reality.

Lost In Space | How the Satellite Ventures Stack Up

Merrill Lynch, in a highly optimistic report, projects that global demand for
phone-calling via satellite will reach $31.6 billion a year by 2007, up from
about $1 billion today. By that same year, Merrill figures, the annual revenues
for Internet access and data transmission conducted via satellite will hit $37.5
billion, compared with maybe $200 million right now. On top of that, Merrill
expects the now-tiny practice of taking pictures of the earth via satellite to
reach $6.5 billion in revenue by 2007, and radio transmissions via satellite,
another nearly nonexistent business, to hit $8.2 billion.

Given such robust growth projections, not to mention the need to raise that
$100 billion, you can easily understand why Wall Street's investment bankers
are drooling. To date, their best clients have been Iridium and its chief rival,
Globalstar. Each has raised $1.4 billion from junk bonds, and each has been
wildly successful in the stock market. Since first issuing shares to the public
last June, Iridium has seen its shares jump nearly threefold, to a recent 56 3/4.
Globalstar's shares, which debuted in February 1995, have skyrocketed from
a split-adjusted $5 to more than $60, a gain of better than 1,100%.

These ebullient stock prices mean
Iridium is now valued at $8.1 billion and
Globalstar is worth $7.5 billion -- and
they aren't even operational yet. Eager
to get their own piece of this pie in the
sky, investment bankers are busy lining
up new stock offerings. ICO, a
London-based company that is
considered the third serious player in the
satellite-telephony business, will likely
issue shares to the public as early as this
summer. Orbcomm, a venture owned
by Orbital Sciences andTeleglobe,
recently filed to make an initial offering
to raise up to $137 million. Stock offers for Ellipso and ECCO, both satellite
telephony projects, seem likely next year. And a year or two down the road,
you'll probably see one for Teledesic, a proposed $9 billion satellite system
that's meant to deliver lightning-fast Internet access. Teledesic was dreamed
up by billionaires Bill Gates and Craig McCaw.

So, should you climb aboard when the next stock offer hits the launch pad?
Given the trajectory of Iridium and Globalstar shares, the idea is tempting. But
be careful. Over the next few years, as technological, competitive and
regulatory obstacles emerge, several of today's promising satellite projects
could turn into so much space debris.

What could go wrong? You name it. Exploding rockets. Flawed satellites.
Uncooperative regulators. Political scandal. Even price competition.
Consider, for instance, the sudden demise of Galaxy IV. A communications
satellite operated by PanAmSat, Galaxy IV became front-page news when it
stopped working and temporarily knocked out most of the country's pagers.
While industry executives insist that kind of failure is rare, it demonstrates the
problems caused by misbehaving satellites. You can't just take out a big
ladder, send up a guy in overalls and a tool belt and have him fix it.

And then there's the China controversy. Republican legislators have raised
questions about the relationship between Loral Space & Communications,
one of the most active satellite companies, the Democratic Party and the
government of China. At issue is whether the Clinton Administration
improperly allowed Loral, headed by big-time Democratic contributor
Bernard Schwartz, to help the Chinese government figure out why one of their
rockets blew up. Loral and other satellite companies use Chinese rockets to
launch satellites, but one could use them to launch nastier payloads.

Schwartz says neither he nor Loral did anything wrong, but some
Congressmen want to bar the use of China's Long March rockets by U.S.
satellite companies. Steven Dorfman, vice chairman of Hughes Electronics, a
division of General Motors that has made use of China's Long March rocket,
warns that blocking access to the Long March "would have a negative impact
on American industry."

Keep in mind that the limited menu of alternatives includes both Russian and
Ukrainian rockets. It's not hard to imagine a similar controversy over those.

You want more things to worry about? Scan the "risk factors" section of the
current prospectus for Orbcomm. Orbcomm is building a network of 36
low-orbit satellites for simple data collection -- mundane tasks like remotely
reading electric utility meters, tracking truck fleets and monitoring security
systems. The $332 million network, targeted for completion in late 1999, uses
small, cheap, low-earth-orbit satellites. The snags Orbcomm has suffered
demonstrate where some of the dangers lie for all of these projects.

Among other things,
Orbcomm's satellites have had
disturbing technical glitches. So
far, Orbcomm has 10 in orbit.
Of those, according to an SEC
filing, eight have "experienced
an anomaly in their solar power
system resulting in reduced
power margins." Orbcomm
says they still produce enough
power to do work -- except
that two of the eight also "have
experienced an anomaly in their
subscriber transmitters," which
means they can't communicate
with the ground. Orbcomm is
attempting a software fix to
work around the "anomaly."
Even if the fix is successful, the coverage area for those satellites will be
reduced. Orbcomm also notes that its first two satellites, launched in 1995,
have suffered electronic outages, and one of them has been out of commission
since mid-February.

Other things can go wrong on the ground, including launch timetables and
budgets. In Orbcomm's case, the launch schedule is running nine months
behind what they projected in an August 1996 debt offering circular. Over
that same span, the anticipated cost of the Orbcomm system has increased
29%, due to an increase in the number of satellites, among other things. Cost
creep can affect bigger systems as well. Marco Caceres, senior space analyst
at the Teal Group, in Fairfax, Virginia, notes that the original cost estimate for
Iridium was $1.2 billion. The latest guess: $4.4 billion.

Keep in mind, too, that launching satellites is an inherently risky endeavor.
Globalstar, for instance, plans three launches this year, each carrying 12
satellites, using the Zenit, a Ukrainian rocket. But the Zenit has a nasty habit of
blowing apart -- four of the last 28 Zenit launches have failed -- and the
rocket has never before been used for a commercial launch. Even when
launches are successful, satellites can inexplicably fail -- Iridium's network,
now in place and soon to begin operation, already includes five dead
satellites.

But perhaps the biggest danger to the satellite industry involves their business
model. All of the satellite phone companies will be reliant on dozens, even
hundreds, of wired and cellular phone companies to sell their wares, handle
billing and interact with customers. While almost everyone agrees that the
potential market is huge, no one really knows how long it might take for the
services to be adopted, or how well the satellite companies can control their
distribution networks. The optimists expect a success story akin to cellular
service, blowing past even the most wide-eyed projections.

Maybe so. But the danger level is high, and the current investment options for
betting on the service providers -- Iridium and Globalstar -- are anything but
cheap. If you feel the urge to bet on the growth of the satellite industry, the
safer route would be to focus on the diversified satellite companies, in
particular Loral and Hughes. Companies seem sure to keep buying satellites,
no matter who wins the coming shoot-out in space.

While mulling over the risks, take a moment to understand what makes these
new satellite systems different from one another. The most ambitious new
projects rely on satellites that are in low or medium orbits above the Earth.
These are known as LEOS or MEOS. Historically, most satellites have
circled the Earth in geosynchronous orbit, more than 22,000 miles above a
fixed spot on the surface. Those satellites, called GEOS, for their
geosynchronous Earth orbits, can serve huge areas of the globe. But their high
orbits -- the Space Shuttle, by contrast, orbits at 150 miles -- creates an
annoying glitch. The time it takes for a caller's voice to go from the ground to
the satellite and back creates a fraction of a second delay, which makes
normal conversation awkward. Blame those darned laws of physics -- you
just can't transmit faster than light speed. The problem explains why
transoceanic calls are carried by undersea cable, rather than by satellite.
Low-orbit satellites, however, avoid the timing problem.

Having demonstrated an ability to
design a low-orbit system, attract
capital, cut nightmarish red tape, get
satellites built and launch them, Iridium
now faces its toughest test. On
September 23, the company begins
operations, and we all get to find out
who will pay up for its service. Iridium
CEO Edward Staiano has set an
ambitious initial goal: He aims to break even a year after service starts.

First conceived by Motorola in 1987, Iridium will knit together 66 satellites in
the most technically ambitious of the sky-borne telephone systems. Iridium
will use its satellites to switch calls in space, sending signals from one satellite
to another before being downlinked to the ground station that offers the most
economical route to a call's destination. Other systems use a more traditional
"bent-pipe" design, meaning that calls go up to the satellite, then back down to
the nearest ground station, and from there they join the terrestrial network.

Iridium's elaborate design makes the cost of an Iridium call far higher than the
projected cost for rival services. You can figure $3 a minute for the average
Iridium call, versus less than half that for rivals. For the short stretch in which
Iridium has the market to itself, pricing won't be much of an issue. But as new
competitors get their systems up, Iridium's high prices will be difficult to
maintain. Jerry Waylan, CEO of Constellation Communications, sponsor of
the Iridium rival called ECCO, puts it this way: "Anybody who says anything
other than the following is missing the boat -- pricing will come down."

But not right away. Says Iridium's Staiano, "If you call from an Iridium phone
to a regular phone -- we expect the vast majority of our calls to be made that
way -- it's probably going to cost 30%-35% more than if you were
somewhere in the world calling from a hotel room using USA Direct. You'll
pay a premium for the privilege of making the call without a wired phone or
nearby cellular tower."

Certainly, as the first to market, Iridium will attract early adopters, whatever
the price. And Iridium will spend freely in an effort to build a global brand.
Staiano says the company will spend $140 million on advertising, acquiring
customer database information, and developing affinity programs. This despite
the fact that the company won't be providing service directly to consumers.
Instead, Iridium has developed a three-tier business model. It will operate the
satellite network and provide service wholesale to 15 regional gateway
operators. (The Defense Department gets a gateway of its own.) The gateway
operators then re-sell service to local carriers and roaming partners, a group
that as of last week included 209 companies, covering 60% of the world's
population.

Iridium will spend most of its resources targeting two groups -- industrial
markets and international travelers. The first segment includes miners,
shippers, drillers and relief agencies -- in short, any institution that sends
people to places without decent phone service. Staiano counts more than four
million potential users in that category, and he figures Iridium can get a quarter
of them. Soundview Financial analyst Tim O'Neil thinks the industrial niche
could prove to be the most lucrative part of Iridium's business. "They should
provide faster adoption, higher usage and more loyal customers," he says.

Staiano counts the international-traveler market at up to 30 million people,
though Iridium will make sense only if you spend time in areas without cellular
service, especially given the coming generation of cell phones, which will allow
you to use your cell phone in pretty much any location that has a cellular
network. In other words, Iridium won't help much for travelers to London,
Tokyo and Paris. And for more than one reason, actually. Satellite antennas
need a clear line-of-sight. That means they're not very effective inside
buildings, or in places with lots of skyscrapers, like lower Manhattan, for
example. More useful for urban travelers will be Iridium's global paging and
messaging services, which cover the entire earth and can penetrate most
buildings with a page or a message.




To: Ramsey Su who wrote (3757)6/13/1998 10:46:00 AM
From: Glass Bead Player  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 10852
 
Barron's cont'd.

Iridium's chief rival, Globalstar, continues to lag some months behind. A
project dreamed up by Loral, Globalstar plans to start service in early 1999.
Globalstar's network will have 48 low-orbit satellites; eight have been
launched. Assuming no problems with its three Zenit satellite launches,
Globalstar will provide Iridium with tough competition. For one thing, the
system will be a lot less expensive, $2.7 billion, versus $4.4 billion for Iridium.
That will allow Globalstar to undercut Iridium's pricing -- figure 65 cents to $1
a minute at retail, versus $3. Globalstar's handsets will be cheaper, too,
running $750, rather than $3,000 for Iridium's.

"We've constructed a satellite system that's very simple, with all the
complexity of the processing done on the ground, not in the air," says Bernard
Schwartz, CEO of both Loral and Globalstar. "Iridium does
satellite-to-satellite cross-linking, which is expensive. They would argue they
gain some quality, but I would doubt anybody could discern that." Globalstar
will also have far more capacity. Schwartz says Globalstar can handle seven
to 10 million subscribers, versus five to six million for Iridium and ICO
combined.

Globalstar, though, has its own particular risks, not the least of which is their
above-mentioned dependence on the none-too-reliable Zenit rocket.
Assuming the Zenits don't cause a problem, Globalstar will have to establish
itself in the face of a marketing blitz from Iridium. Thomas Watts, an analyst at
Merrill Lynch, pointed out in a recent report that Globalstar will be far more
reliant than Iridium on local partners to market the service. Where Iridium will
spend a fortune to establish a brand, Globalstar has chosen to act as an
unbranded wholesaler.

Schwartz isn't worried. "In 2002, our marketing plan calls for just 80,000
subscribers in India," Schwartz says. "That's not a big hurdle. We expect
20,000 in Greece, 200,000 in Brazil, 200,000 in Russia. Our capacity will be
used up by low-hanging fruit." In all, Globalstar forecasts three million
subscribers by 2002, producing more than $2 billion in annual revenues. For
investors, though, that doesn't leave a lot of room for error, with the stock
effectively trading at close to four times the revenues that are expected four
years from now.

Starting in 2000, Iridium and Globalstar will face new competition from
London-based ICO Global Communications, a company originally part of
Inmarsat, the international maritime satellite consortium. Now independent,
ICO faces the obvious quandary of coming to market at least two years
behind its primary rivals. But it should be a formidable adversary, thanks to a
list of investors that includes all of the more than 50 members of Inmarsat,
many of them huge state-owned phone companies.

ICO will use medium-orbit satellites, built and launched under a $2.5 billion
contract with Hughes, which has an equity stake in ICO. While ICO will use a
traditional bent-pipe design, there's a twist. The company has set up its own
fiber-optic network, ICONet, to help keep down the cost of the earth-bound
portion of each call. In a sense, they'll do on the ground what Iridium does in
the air -- carry traffic off the normal public telephone network.

ICO figures its network will be easier to build and maintain. It won't be any
cheaper, though, costing $4.6 billion, on a par with Iridium.

Like Iridium, Globalstar and ICO will target both industrial markets and
business travelers. But Globalstar and ICO also plan to offer basic service to
people now not reached by cellular or land lines, a market Iridium has
decided to avoid because of cost. ICO Executive Vice President Fredrik
Verkroost figures there are three billion people who fall into the underserved
category, as many as 100 million of whom would sign up for telephone
service if they could get it. One way to address part of that market will be
with a type of remote, solar-powered phone booth.

The key problem faced by Ellipso and ECCO, the other primary satellite
phone projects, are their late start -- being the fourth or fifth player in the
market isn't ideal. Each has some unique features, though, which could help
them survive. Ellipso, created by privately held Mobile Communications
Holdings, plans a 17-satellite system, most operating in an unusual elliptical
orbit. Ellipso has heavyweight partners -- Boeing will be the prime satellite
contractor, and Lockheed Martin will make the ground stations.

Thanks to those elliptical orbits, Ellipso's satellites will spend two-thirds of
their time over the Northern Hemisphere, which Mobile Communications
considers more lucrative than the Southern Hemisphere. Ellipso thinks it can
keep costs to 50 cents a minute during peak times and 35 cents off-peak. In
fact, Ellipso say out loud what their rivals won't: that the company intends to
bring prices below those of terrestrial cellular service. Says spokesman Brian
Willard, "Our goal is to bring low-cost telephony to the world." The planned
debut of Ellipso's $1.4 billion project is 2001.

That same year should see the rollout of ECCO Equatorial, the first phase of
a project sponsored by privately held Constellation Communications. ECCO
Equatorial will use 11 satellites to provide service to a quarter of the Earth's
population. By the end of 2003, Constellation will unveil ECCO Global, with
the addition of another 35 satellites. Orbital Sciences will build satellites for
the first phase of the project, which is backed by Bell Atlantic and Raytheon,
among others. The smaller first phase of the project should cost less than $1
billion, the second phase about twice that.

There will be some additional competition from regional projects using one-
or two-satellite high-orbit systems. While suffering the usual geosynchronous
signal latency, those systems will be cheaper to build and operate than the big
low-orbit systems like Iridium and Globalstar. ACeS, a project led by Pasifik
Satelit of Indonesia, Philippine Long Distance Telephone and Jasmine of
Thailand, will target Southeast Asia, India, China and Australia. Etisalat, the
United Arab Emirates phone company, is building Thuraya, a project targeting
the Mideast, Turkey, Iran, India, Central Asia, North Africa and Eastern
Europe.

One thing the satellite phone companies won't do effectively is transmit data --
at a top speed of 2,400 baud, they wouldn't be much good for surfing the
Web. That's where Teledesic and its rivals in broadband satellite service
come in. These companies will provide fat data pipes for Internet access,
virtual private networks, video-conferencing, interactive gaming and myriad
other applications. The market won't lack for competition. The Teal Group's
Caceres counts at least 60 proposed broadband satellite systems, with a
combined price tag of $130 billion.

The most imposing project is Teledesic, which has received funding not only
from Bill Gates and Craig McCaw but also from Boeing and from another
billionaire, the Saudi Arabian investor Prince Alwaleed bin Talal. Teledesic
recently struck a crucial deal with Motorola which instantly eliminated its most
direct competitor. Motorola, which been planning a comparable service called
Celestri, instead agreed to combine forces with Teledesic, providing $1.5
billion in cash and technology for a 26% stake. This suggests that Motorola
executives think the project is already worth almost $6 billion.

Teledesic, born in 1990, will provide extremely rapid data transmission, 64
megabits per second downstream, to be exact, which is about 2,000 times
faster than a 28.8 modem. The uplink is slower, though at two megabits per
second, it's still faster than the T-1 line you may have in your office.

In short, it's the wireless equivalent of fiber optics. While Teledesic could
theoretically be used for some wireless-phone applications, what the system
will do best is provide broadband data to fixed points, using an antenna the
size of a laptop computer. The first satellite launch is planned for 2001, with
full service available in 2003.

Teledesic has the potential to provide the equivalent of "fiber to the curb,"
delivering nearly limitless data-transmission ability to homes and offices. Few
people have real fiber access today. For the most part, such fiber lines are
used for "trunking networks," capable of aggregating large volumes of traffic.
For individual users, says Teledesic CEO Russell Daggatt, the economics of
fiber don't work. "Even in this country," he says, "we're virtually starting from
scratch when it comes to broadband access."

Though the bulk of Teledesic's business will initially come from corporate
customers, to the average bandwidth-starved technology reporter, Teledesic
sounds like Nirvana. "We'll be able to provide anyone, anywhere, the
equivalent of optic fiber," says Daggatt. "No part of the world will be left
without that capability." While telephone companies are installing fiber at a
rapid rate, Daggatt doubts they'll ever catch up to demand. "The terrestrial
infrastructure will never be anything approaching ubiquitous," he says. "To
provide global connectivity, you have to look to satellites."

Technologically, Teledesic is hugely ambitious. Like Iridium, its 288 satellites
will be able to pass signals from one to another, avoiding the terrestrial
network. But Teledesic will have more than four times as many satellites.
Adding Motorola to the team, Teledesic gains the experience that was gained
engineering Iridium's satellite-to-satellite switching, while also getting
Motorola's expertise in making satellites. When required, Motorola cranked
out an Iridium satellite every four days.

Having absorbed Celestri, Teledesic's primary rival in LEO-based broadband
services is SkyBridge, a project sponsored by Alcatel and Loral. SkyBridge
plans a simpler approach. "Basically, SkyBridge is a wireless broadband local
loop system," says CEO Pascale Sourisse. The system will provide "last mile"
data access, linking consumers or businesses to the terrestrial fiber network
via a bent-pipe design. "We'll have gateways in each country in which we
operate," Sourisse explains. "We've tried to simplify the space segment, to
keep the intelligence on the ground. That allows us to re-use broadband
technologies used for other purposes. Switches in our gateways, for instance,
don't need to be designed specifically for SkyBridge."

SkyBridge is expected to be operational at the end of 2001, beating
Teledesic to market. That's despite the fact that SkyBridge recently increased
the size of its system to 80 satellites from 64, lifting the project budget by
$700 million to $4.2 billion. That's still less than half Teledesic's price tag, and
the modification should boost SkyBridge's capacity by 50%.

Surprisingly, Sourisse says SkyBridge plans to offer voice services in some
markets. "SkyBridge will primarily be used for things like high-speed access
to the Internet, delivering training, and Intranet connections," she says. "In
developed countries, that's where the demand will be. But we'll have capacity
available everywhere, including countries which may not need such services.
Instead, we can provide voice service at very attractive prices, 10 cents a
minute or lower."

That would pose a real threat to ICO, Globalstar and regional systems
planning to offer more expensive fixed-site voice services in developing
countries.

Several companies are developing broadband systems based on high-orbit
satellites. While unappealing for interactive applications, they would make
sense for corporate data networks, some Internet traffic and broadcast
applications. Among the players: Astrolink, from Lockheed; Cyberstar, from
Loral, and Spaceway, from Hughes.

Cyberstar will start service later this year, initially using capacity leased from
other Loral satellites. Spaceway, from Hughes, will target not just broadband
data, but also fixed telephony service in underserved markets. Hughes will
spend $3.5 billion on an eight-satellite network that includes celestial routing,
like Iridium and Teledesic. Lockheed's Astrolink will spend $3.2 billion for a
nine-satellite system, with launches starting in 2001.

No question, both voice and data satellite services have the potential to be
huge businesses. But for these ambitious, capital-intensive projects, the risks
are high. Most observers think both Iridium and Globalstar will find long-term
success, but at the moment neither stock looks especially cheap, and both
face weighty near-term risks.

SkyBridge CEO Sourisse notes that customers care about service and
pricing, not impressive technical feats. Access to technology gets you into the
game, but the real challenge will be turning the hardware into a real business.
And, take our word for it, not everybody will pull it off.