To: Keith Hankin who wrote (20213 ) 6/24/1998 11:18:00 PM From: Gerald R. Lampton Respond to of 24154
Anne Bingaman's meaningless consent decree is now officially meaningless. I'm actually starting to come to the view that maybe the Consent Decree is not meaningless, that it, not general antitrust law, may well turn out in the opinion of the DC Circuit panel the gets this case to provide the tighter restrictions on Microsoft's ability to tie products together. If so, DOJ is in real trouble. Of course, neither Microsoft nor DOJ is limited by the terms of the Consent Decree in arguing about how antitrust law should apply to tie-ins. It seems like the court here was bending over backwards to provide an interpretation of the Decree which did not render either the prohibition on conditional licensing or the "integrated product" proviso meaningless. That makes sense, because you need to interpret a contract that gives meaning to all its provisions, that does not "write out" any of them by rendering the promises contained therein illusory. This, to me, was always the problem with Microsoft's position -- their interpretation would have make the tying prohibition meaningless. Well, the court agree, and now they have to get used to following a new set of rules about how they can design and market those of their products that are covered by the Decree. By the same token, DOJ has to make room for Microsoft's right to develop and market "integrated products." DOJ's interpretation may make sense under antitrust law, but here DOJ is constrained by the fact that the Decree is distinct from, and, arguably, more permissive than, straight antitrust law. But, if you are dealing with straight antitrust law, no decree, then neither side is constrained. Microsoft could argue that tying of all kinds should be legal (as Bork would argue, leaving aside his "predatory conduct" theory du joir ). DOJ would be free to argue that tying law makes tying/integrating IE and Windows together illegal, regardless of what the Consent Decree allows.