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Technology Stocks : Year 2000 (Y2K) Embedded Systems & Infrastructure Problem -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: John Mansfield who wrote (494)	7/7/1998 2:29:00 AM
From: John Mansfield	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 618

'"Our main effort is to protect companies from lawsuits that are going to take advantage of Y2K problems," said Ms. Wheeler. "We want to make sure the resources to fix this problem go to fixing it--not to lawyers' pockets." ... amcity.com

To: John Mansfield who wrote (494)	7/7/1998 1:18:00 PM
From: R2O	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 618

15% of systems are not Y2K compliant and have problems ranging from minor nconveniance to loss of life. When someone says 'not Y2K compliant' and 'problems' does this mean that 1. the systems have specific KNOWN defects and 2. that the specific KNOWN defects WILL cause (possible) loss of life or does it mean 1. the systems (may or probably) have Y2K defects and 2. the system controls things that may, in some failure modes, cause a loss of life. I would be VERY interested in finding results of full fledged investigations, wherein the ACTUAL outcome of the diagnosed Y2K problem is determined. For example, a system that controls boiler pressure COULD make the boiler blow up (though probably not since there are redundant, independant protections). It is found to be not Y2K compliant. How would risk be assessed? Suppose the effect was that the daily pressure profile report will say 1900 instead of 2000? Would the same risk be assigned? Statistical results would be fine, if full description of methodology is given. If we don't have results like this, then how can we rationally estimate anything about real risk? Yes, the processor in your gas oven MIGHT cause the gas to turn on and the ignition not turn on and your house might blow up. It might do that any year. Hopefully, someone has thought about it. Your elevator MIGHT plunge 500 feet or not move. It might do that any year. Hopefully someone has thought about it. Your computer MIGHT pop the tray on your 36x CDROM drive while it's spinning and it could cut your throat. It might do that any year. Hopefully someone has thought about it. How much effort has gone into taking care of daylight savings time? Time zones? Do all embedded systems know the real (local) time? Even if they're in Qatar or Arizona? Do they 'know' where they are? Even if they do know, do they care? In the FAA investigation of TWA800, it turned out that the none of the radars agreed about the time, the total difference being minutes. They might not have cared even if they were off by years or centuries. Yet it can realistically be said that a failure in these radars COULD kill hundreds of thousands of people (by e.g. crashing planes into Manhattan). I would really like to make a realistic estimate of risk based on real world measurements, not quick counts and arm waves. I have looked in many places, but have come up dry. I hope that is due to my ignorance and defective skills in finding things. Anyone have specifics?