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Strategies & Market Trends : Graham and Doddsville -- Value Investing In The New Era -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: LemurHouse who wrote (493)7/10/1998 1:46:00 AM
From: porcupine --''''>  Respond to of 1722
 
Andy: Don't forget Berney --'''':>

<< ...I want to thank Porcupine, Wayne, yourself,... >>



To: LemurHouse who wrote (493)7/10/1998 5:32:00 PM
From: Axel Gunderson  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1722
 
Andrew:

I hope we can convince you to visit this thread more often, because your post was excellent!

I believe concentration is better than diversification, provided that one is working within one's "circle of competence."

A very good way of putting it. And I agree with you. But here is another way of looking at it: within a "circle of competence" which is greater concentration: 20% in one company, or 20% spread over say four companies? Either way you have 20% in a specific niche. And as you'll see in a minute, maybe, just maybe, valuations enter into it.

Like you, I've been influenced by Phillip Fisher as much or more than Buffet or Graham, so my advice would be to avoid the basket and to go with the few companies that you believe strongly in. I've gone with the basket approach when I've been unsure which company will perform best in a particular sector, and I've generally been disappointed with the results. Have always felt that had I'd either waited or put more time into studying the situation to pick the single winner I'd have been better off.

This pre-supposes two things: 1) that you are operating in a niche where there will be definite winners and losers, and 2) that you are truly capable of discerning which are which in advance.

I can't comment on the specific stocks you mention, because I haven't a clue about the ag equip business.

Actually that makes things better. I am interested in discussing methodological issues, not looking for help in picking an ag equip stock. In fact, I am glad that the ag equip makers are overall cheap right now, since it gives us a niche to discuss where SI participants are for the most part unlikely to have an emotional interest. I could have used examples out of the computer technology realm, but that would have led to distracting debates over the relative merits of each company, rather than on the analytical approach.

So for this discussion, don't worry about not being familiar with the ag equip manufacturers. Porc, Wayne and Berney are all city boys who don't know how to drive a tractor anyway. So I'll give ya'll just a little more background info, just enough to hopefully jumpstart some more discussion (but deliberately not enough to allow for an informed pick).

In terms of the businesses, I don't think we are considering an area where there will be definite winners and losers. All of them are a play on emerging markets, and any arguments you might make for emerging countries needing airplanes, you can apply to agricultural equipment (`course ag equipment is more affordable). All of these companies are purchasing smaller competitors around the world. All of them are repurchasing shares to some extent. (For example, take a look at biz.yahoo.com and
biz.yahoo.com.

Yes, some will do better than others in some areas. Case, for example, has equipment for well drilling that will hold up in strata that would tear the back end off of a Deere or Cat product. AGCO isn't as much a player in central Asia, but is gung ho in S. America. All of them have financing arms; Deere having the best financial strength is perhaps least hurt by an economic downturn (though I wish they would get rid of their health services unit). It seems reasonable to suppose that all of them will be around doing their thang, and somewhat larger, in ten years. So the question becomes, does the advantage of a very concentrated portfolio, which I consider to require the apparent safety of a Deere, outweigh the advantage of better valuation with multiple companies which are not cigar-butt companies, but are growing concerns, even if they aren't as dominant? Put another way, is there truly more safety in Deere's size and economic strength, or is there more safety in the lower prices of Case and AGCO? If so, does it outweigh the potential returns advantage suggested by the lower valuations in the two smaller competitors?

Let's put some approximate numbers on it. If my investment universe has an estimated coupon for the next year of 4%, Deere has an estimated coupon of 7.5%, Case has an estimated coupon of 11%, and AGCO has an estimated coupon of 15%, does it make more sense to buy Deere, or to split the money between AGCO and Case? Remember, I'm more interested in your reasoning than in your conclusion.

I am an absolute believer in staying with one's circle of competence, and its hard enough keeping up with the area I've chosen.

This raises an interesting side issue: how does one determine their circle of competence? Consider the often heard refrain "I don't understand technology." What does that mean? That they can't take the equipment back and put it together again? Got news for `em - they probably can't take apart their cars or refrigerators, and they probably can't explain how tires are made, and they probably have close to zero concept of the manufacturing problems inherent to airline assembly. Take a look at our ag equip companies. Both Case and AGCO are working on equipment that interacts with satellites for control. Caterpillar has a fuel injection / valve timing system in their labs that works so well that you might be willing to sit and inhale the exhaust fumes. How many understand these things? The potential benefits sure, but by that token, can't these people understand the benefits of at least certain improvements in electronic technology if the benefits are pointed out? Or they'll say "I don't understand how they make money." (Now there may be some doubts on this once you take options into account, but we're talking about the businesses.) Just like every other company - they produce a product and sell it. Continually decreasing results and increasing volumes? Sounds like textbook economics to me. "They disappear from business so often." Sure they do. So do retailers, and grocery stores, and machinery manufacturers. And boy can I remember the steel companies falling in trouble 15 years ago. The "tech" stocks tend to give more of a fireworks display first, so maybe they get more attention that way.

When you get into little niches, I think you do have to be an expert to really make out well. But I don't think Hewlett-Packard is any more mysterious than Deere, and they are both easier to figure out than a producer of primary materials. (Steel making "low tech?" Go visit Carpenter's and you'll come out singing a different tune.) OK, my off-topic rant is hereby ended.

I have a more general question to put to the thread: how to apply the wisdom of our collective gurus' to the area of high-tech investing. My own view is that Graham, Buffet,and Fisher provide a valid roadmap for high tech investing, except that the timeframes need to be shortened down to 18 - 24 months.

Well Fisher did and does invest in "tech." It is interesting to read his Common Stocks, Uncommon Profits and note what were the "tech" stocks of the time. But his guidelines for stocks selection and for portfolio management do give some decent ideas for how to invest in tech stocks for the long haul. And in fact, Fisher dances with the very topic of the above discussion. With a large, diversified growth stock, or "A companies" (my interpretation: a Hewlett-Packard, a Computer Associates) he suggests that you put no more than 20% into a given stock. He suggests that such companies should comprise the majority of your portfolio. With an up-and-comer "B company" (maybe a Parametric Technologies? or a Tellabs?) he cuts the limit per portfolio position in half. With the "C" companies in which, as he puts it, you can lose it all, not more than 5% per position. Fisher also (apparently unintentionally) suggests investing patterns analogous to the conservative and enterprising investors of Graham. The former should simply restrict himself to the Grade A companies, the latter may branch out into the B companies, and if they have some expertise, the C companies.

Why? Because the sector is characterized by a very rapid rate of change. Business fundamentals can change very quickly, and it is very tough to see very far down the road. This makes it impossible to
buy tech stocks "as if the stock market was going to be closed for the next 10 years" a la Buffet, or based on numbers alone, a la Graham.


One approach is to use the valuation methodology Hagstrom lays out in The Warren Buffett Way, but instead of using a 10 year growth period, use a shorter growth period. With a Hewlett-Packard or a Computer Associates, you should be able to use Value Line figures or your own and feel fairly comfortable going out 3-5 years. You could simply work out the free cash for that period and evaluate on that basis, or you could additionally estimate a residual value by simply capitalizing the "final year's" free cash. Because you don't go out as far, you essentially penalize the "tech" stock relative to a branded consumer products company.

So an enterprising investor might combine their methods by, for example, picking three A companies that appear attractive based on the numbers, and four B companies that likewise represent good value a the time of the purchase. Or four and two, or...whatevah, you get the idea.

One thing which bears mention is the effect of taxes. Buffett and Fisher have a huge advantage in that they hold for truly extended periods. If one is purchasing even a "B" company in a taxable account, they should work out how much better that stock must do simply to match the A companies in the portfolio.

Sorry if this question is too open-ended, but hell, if we can't discuss it here where can we discuss it?

I think that it is a most excellent question, and that an open ended question can be about the most valuable contribution anybody can make.



To: LemurHouse who wrote (493)7/10/1998 8:01:00 PM
From: porcupine --''''>  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1722
 
"Boeing raises base prices 5%"

by Jeff Cole
Seattle Times aerospace editor

Moving to brace up future profits, Boeing
has raised the base price of nearly all its
commercial jetliners by 5 percent, its
first base-price increase in 23 years.

In recent weeks, the aircraft manufacturer
began quietly informing its customers of
that action. Carriers also have been told
of another, separate change aimed at
further increasing returns by toughening
the terms of sales contracts that protect
Boeing from inflation.

Those increases, which are expected to add
millions of dollars to the prices fetched
for many Boeing jets in the coming decade,
became effective July 1 and will apply to
negotiations begun after that date.

The first of the higher-priced planes would
be delivered in two years, with much of the
effect seen in deliveries in subsequent
years. Despite the moves, the company's
base prices are expected to remain 2
percent to 6 percent below those of its
chief competitor, Europe's Airbus Industrie
consortium.

Both companies have typically adjusted
their "list" prices modestly each year for
inflation. But the base prices, which
underpin those list prices, are seldom
changed. These increases are a one-time
opportunity for Boeing to raise the
starting point for all its negotiations
with airlines.

While Boeing has enjoyed record rates of
production and a boom in orders for its
planes in the past two years, the company
has been battling to recover from parts
shortages and other production foul-ups
that have cost it $3 billion so far and
prompted a $178 million net loss for 1997.

At the same time, faced with stiff
competition from the four-nation Airbus
consortium, Boeing has come under criticism
at times from investors and analysts for
discounting its products too deeply to win
orders.

The price increases could be a strong
signal to Wall Street that Boeing is
serious about restoring profitability.

With the new price increase, Boeing is
"recognizing that there are some revenue
pressures," said Ronald Woodard, a Boeing
senior vice president and chief of the
company's commercial-airplane group, who
confirmed the company's actions in an
interview. "We definitely want to improve
the profitability of our products," he
added.

But Woodard noted the moves won't boost
sales and profits by themselves for some
time. He maintained the actions are largely
geared to "level the playing field" with
Airbus, which typically has higher starting
prices for similar-sized jets.

A U.S. spokeswoman for Airbus said the
development is "intriguing." One senior
European executive familiar with the Airbus
view said Boeing's action will have to be
judged over time, but any move to price
more closely to Airbus offers the hope of
"some rationality" at a time when both "are
bleeding" from price cuts to win important
orders.

While it remains to be seen whether Boeing
can make higher prices stick in
negotiations with individual airlines,
experts say the plane maker ought to be
able to capture higher revenues over time.

Robert Baker, the top operations executive
at American Airlines, said the move was
understandable. "Boeing's got to get its
financial house in order, or the (stock)
market is just going to run from them," he
said.

The base-price increase would not affect
airplane orders or options already
negotiated or now being negotiated.

American is one of three big U.S. carriers
that have agreed to buy planes exclusively
from Boeing. Each has been guaranteed no
rival will get planes at a lower price, and
those terms remain intact, Boeing officials
said.

In the complex and competitive world of
airplane pricing, base prices are really a
"point of departure," in Woodard's words,
and true prices are carefully guarded and
hard to divine.

Indeed, both manufacturers privately
acknowledge that pivotal customers can get
double-digit percentage discounts from list
prices. Much depends on who is buying, how
many planes they want, and when.

Prices are sometimes altered retroactively.
Financing is always a factor, and even some
smaller carriers can shave a few million
dollars off the list price if they're ready
to buy when some other airline needs to
delay a delivery.

For the moment, the current prices peg the
most expensive 420-seat 747 at nearly $177
million and the smallest, least expensive
150-seat 737 at just under $39 million.
Airbus doesn't yet produce a jumbo jet with
747-like capacity; its most expensive
four-engine A-340s, which typically carries
380 passengers, lists for more than $160
million.

Even more than the base-price increases,
the new changes in Boeing's "escalation
formula" - the combination of
producer-price and employment-cost
indicators it uses to cover the rising cost
of labor and materials - may offer a
greater assurance of increasing cash from
airplane sales.

Boeing estimates that because it has been
less aggressive than Airbus in calculating
inflation, its base pricing has dropped to
a level 10 percent below that of the
European consortium during the nine years
since 1990. Its new inflation formula more
closely parallels that of Airbus.

In late trading, Boeing stock had slipped
19 cents a share to $47.875.

Wolfgang Demisch, an aerospace analyst with
BT Alex Brown, said the move sends Boeing
"an internal signal" that restraint in
price-cutting is important. He added that
the industry has "a very poor record" of
being able to maintain pricing discipline.

One Boeing official acknowledged
competitive pressures "will continue to
influence actual net prices paid by
customers."

The price increase could prompt questions
from those who followed Boeing's year-old
merger with McDonnell Douglas. European
regulators eventually approved the deal,
but not before claiming it could lead to
higher airplane prices. Boeing officials
say they would have taken the same pricing
action even without the merger.

Meanwhile, Boeing's labor contracts with
Machinist and engineering unions are due
for renegotiation next year, but Boeing
executives say they're not trying to buy
"insurance" for higher labor costs in the
future.

Among the planes in Boeing's line, two are
not affected by the 5 percent increase and
the altered inflation formula. The base
price of the 100-passenger 717-200 will
remain between $30.5 million and $34.5
million. Boeing is eager to promote
languishing sales of the aircraft, a former
McDonnell Douglas design known as the
MD-95.

Meanwhile, the 100-passenger 737-600, whose
list price ranges from $32.5 million to
$39.5 million, will increase by a flat 10
percent. The price increase for that plane
includes the price of its engines.

In all other cases, the increase excludes
engine prices, which are set by engine
manufacturers.

Copyright c 1998 The Seattle Times Company

Posted at 01:06 p.m. PDT; Friday, July 10,
1998