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Technology Stocks : Ascend Communications (ASND) -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: djane who wrote (50267)7/22/1998 4:23:00 PM
From: Jeff Jordan  Respond to of 61433
 
Ascend Attracts Insects

djane,

Yes, analysts have always been a pest.<g>

Jeff



To: djane who wrote (50267)7/22/1998 4:24:00 PM
From: djane  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 61433
 
Cramer watch on ASND (as of 7/21)

thestreet.com

TheShyGuy26 asks: What do you think of Ascend after
its big run recently? And how about Compaq looking
ahead?
Creme_Delacramer: I pared back my asnd today. but i
think asnd is doing many things right. Compaq is a terrific
long-term play but I would not go nuts with it right now.
Dell is still killing that industry.



To: djane who wrote (50267)7/22/1998 4:31:00 PM
From: djane  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 61433
 
thestreet.com on WCOM sale of MCI Internet business

(Isn't this event very bullish for ASND? Check out the bolded sections. Won't UUNet just increase their spending on next generation equipment and not really miss the older MCI equipment? And, isn't UUnet an ASND/Cascade shop?]

thestreet.com

Selling the Crown Jewels?

By George Mannes
Staff Reporter
7/22/98 12:18 PM ET

Back in November, when WorldCom (WCOM:Nasdaq)
reached a deal to buy MCI (MCIC:Nasdaq), the
companies cited the combined Internet business and
overall cost synergies as two of the reasons why the
merger made sense.

But now that MCI, pressured by regulators, is selling off
its Internet business, some analysts wonder how much
this condition for getting the deal done will hurt
MCI/WorldCom's postmerger operations.

"This sours the deal to a certain extent," says Michael
Smith, U.S. research director for Probe Research, which
follows the telecom industry. "They're forced to give up a
key component of MCI."

As part of a deal announced last week, MCI is selling to
United Kingdom-based Cable & Wireless (CWP:NYSE
ADR) various Internet operations, including 3,300 major
dedicated corporate customers for Internet access and a
dial-up business totaling 250,000 residential and 60,000
business customers.

That's on top of the divestitures MCI announced in May in
hopes of assuaging regulators' monopoly concerns. Back
then, MCI agreed to sell C&W its nationwide U.S. Internet
backbone, which permits dial-up access from more than
300 points across the U.S., and its 1,300 customers who
are themselves Internet service providers. MCI is getting
$1.75 billion in cash in the revised transaction, which is
conditioned on the completion of the WorldCom deal.

MCI/WorldCom won't be locked out of the Internet
business altogether, because it will still hold onto
WorldCom's UUNet subsidiary. Total Internet revenues for
WorldCom amounted to $566 million last year, more than
double the year-earlier figure of $253 million.

But the business that MCI is selling is growing fast, too.
Staffed with 1,000 employees, it reports $244 million
revenues in 1997, and C&W estimates it will have $650
million in sales in the year ending March 31, 2000. Total
1998 revenues for the combined WorldCom/MCI operation
will amount to $32 billion, the companies estimated last
year.

MCI and WorldCom have trumpeted the savings from
combining their various businesses, estimating $2.5 billion
in saved operating costs in 1999, increasing to $5.6 billion
by 2002. But they have not specified Internet-related
savings, according to analysts and an MCI spokesman.

Some analysts wonder how much WorldCom/MCI will
suffer from the sale. William Newbury, telecom analyst for
WorldCom shareholder College Retirement Equities
Fund, part of the giant teachers' pension fund
TIAA-CREF, says, "It's curious because WorldCom/MCI
didn't want to sell this business. They resisted [regulators]
all along. ... I don't have all the answers as to why this
business, now that it's sold, is not going to have an
impact."

One of the goals of the MCI/WorldCom merger, as with
virtually all other recent telecom mergers, is to cement
customer loyalty by offering an array of services including
local calling, long distance and Internet access. But the
sale complicates that, says Anna-Marie Kovacs, telecom
analyst for Janney Montgomery Scott. "It probably hurts
[MCI] somewhat to have to go to their customer base and
say, 'We can do your long distance for you, but we can't
do Internet,'" she says. Moreover, once Cable & Wireless
has its hands on MCI's Internet customers, it might try to
steal away their long distance business, too, says
Kovacs, who dropped her rating on MCI to sell from hold in
mid-June. But MCI will be able to fight back, she says,
thanks to the minimal competitive restrictions put on MCI
as part of the deal. "It's probably as limited a noncompete
as they could hope for," she says.

Other analysts dismiss the impact of the divestiture.

"I don't think it's going to handicap them at all," says
Jeffrey Kagan of Kagan Telecom Associates. Although
there is always an impact on a company when it has to
sell assets, Kagan says the combined organization will be
able to rebuild what it has lost rather quickly, thanks to
the lessons MCI has learned over the past five years, and
the breakneck growth of the Internet market. "It's growing
at several hundred percent per year as opposed to 10%,"
he says, meaning the pool of potential new customers
could soon outweigh the base of existing customers that
will be hands-off to Worldcom/MCI under the noncompete.


Kagan compares the situation to a person who is putting
away $500 a month in an investment plan, but loses the
first two years' investment. Ten years later, he says,
"You'd still have a great investment plan; you'd have just
lost a few years."

Daniel Zito, senior analyst with Legg Mason Wood
Walker, sees another positive to the sale. If it hadn't
taken place, WorldCom and MCI would have had to spend
time rationalizing their product lines, sales forces and
marketing channels. Now, the companies can simply sell
UUNet's products through MCI's sales force. "There's no
decisions to be made," says Zito,
who has an outperform
ranking on MCI, for which Legg Mason has done no
underwriting. The sale "hurts, but it certainly is not a
death blow by any stretch of the imagination," he says.

And despite Smith of Probe Research's contention that
MCI and WorldCom will be hurt by the deal, he thinks the
choice of buyer was a masterful stroke: Cable & Wireless
is one of the weakest competitors in the corporate
market. "This is not AT&T (T:NYSE). This is not Sprint
(FON:NYSE). This is not even Qwest (QWST:Nasdaq),"
he asserts. "They couldn't have picked a more ideal
candidate to buy the business."

Adding up all the positives, even TIAA-CREF's Newbury
remains supportive: "I like all the aspects of the merger
and the company's position overall. I'm glad to get the
deal done."

For more info on institutional holders of these stocks, as
well as financial statements and earnings estimates,
please see the Thomson Company Reports.

See Also

TOP STORIES
Options
Buzz: MCI
and
WorldCom
Options
Moving as
Deal Finally
Comes Down
11/10/97 2 PM

MIDDAY
MUSINGS
WorldCom
Rides to
MCI's Rescue
10/1/97 12 PM

COMMENTARY
FEATURES
Think You
Know Online
Trading? You
Ain't Seen
Nothin' Yet.
2/18/98 2 PM

TOP STORIES
ARCHIVE

WorldCom
Company
Quotes

MCI
Company
Quotes

Cable &
Wireless
Company
Quotes

VIEW CHARTS
MCI
(MCIC:Nasdaq)
WorldCom
(WCOM:Nasdaq)
Cable &
Wireless
(CWP:NYSE
ADR)



c 1998 TheStreet.com, All Rights Reserved.

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To: djane who wrote (50267)7/22/1998 4:34:00 PM
From: djane  Respond to of 61433
 
AT&T hikes private-line prices

nwfusion.com

By David Rohde
Network World Fusion, 7/22/98

AT&T yesterday revealed that it has increased
private-line prices across the board, effective
Monday.

As with other AT&T price hikes over the past
two years, the increases are more severe at
higher bandwidth levels. In general, fractional
T-1 services went up 3%, T-1 lines 6% and T-3
lines 12%. Fast-packet services such as frame
relay were not affected by the price move.

Some of the bottom-line impact on users is
lessened by the fact that AT&T also increased its
local channel rates but by lesser amounts. These
local-channel services, sometimes known as
"Tariff 11," involve AT&T buying dedicated
access lines from local carriers and passing on
the cost to users. AT&T T-1 local channel rates
went up approximately 3% in the latest move.

The net impact depends on origination and
termination points of individual AT&T private
lines, since exact pricing is based on city pairs
rather than a straight mileage calculation. But, for
example, a Seattle-to-San Diego T-1 line that
cost $10,211.57 a month end-to-end last week
now costs $10,744,34 a month, a 5.2%
increase. A Philadelphia-to-Baltimore T-1 rose
from $5,990.05 to $6,276.30, a 4.8% increase.

Analyst Thomas Nolle, president of CIMI
Corp., a Voorhees, N.J., consulting firm, said
AT&T needed to raise private line prices to
keep encouraging new users to move to frame
relay and ATM. Reason: Recent enhancements
to frame relay services throughout the industry
have also effectively raised frame relay's cost.
For example, AT&T and other carriers are now
frequently requiring users to buy or lease
enhanced DSUs/CSUs to measure performance
if they want a strict service-level agreement.


Those arrangements, in partnership with
performance-measurement vendors such as
Visual Networks, Inc. of Rockville, Md., have
raised frame relay's cost back to within 25% of
the cost of private lines, Nolle said. And users
need at least that much savings to make the
switch from private lines to frame relay. "A
number of carriers have told me that the rate of
frame relay adoption is slowing," Nolle said.

The steeper increase for T-3 lines is meant to
discourage resellers and other carriers from
attempting to buy AT&T capacity, which has
been in short supply, and creating their own
services. "AT&T has to be very careful to look
at their price of raw digital bandwidth," Nolle
said. "If it's too low, that creates an arbitrage
opportunity for competitors who can buy it up
and convert it to frame relay or IP bandwidth."

For its part, AT&T said it needs the extra
revenue to pay for its Synchronous Optical
Network (SONET) and ATM network
upgrades in a program collectively known as
FASTAR (Fast Automated Restoral) II.
FASTAR II is designed to move AT&T to
millisecond restoral of physical line cuts from its
old FASTAR I standard of five-minute outage
restoral.


Contact Senior
Editor David Rohde.

AT&T ticks off FCC
head
The battle over
universal access.
Network World
Fusion, 5/28/98

AT&T hikes 800
rates again
Network World,
5/1/97

AT&T financials.

Today's breaking
news:

AT&T hikes
private-line prices

U.S., FTC and
private sector offer
remedies for online
privacy

Gates appoints
Ballmer president of
Microsoft

US WEST rolls out
new PC backup
service

Bay's Q4, fiscal '98
earnings down

More breaking news





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To: djane who wrote (50267)7/22/1998 4:39:00 PM
From: djane  Respond to of 61433
 
Massive Growth Predicted In CLEC ISP Marketplace
(via COMS thread)

Newsbytes - July 20, 1998: 4:44 p.m. ET

SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA, U.S.A. (NB) -- A report just out from Infonetics Research predicts $936 million growth in network equipment expenditures by CLEC (competitive local exchange carrier) ISPs (Internet service providers) by the time the year 2000 rolls around.

According to the report, entitled "CLEC and Cable Operator ISP Opportunity 1998, "the surge in growth will be fueled by an aggressive deployment of digital subscriber line (DSL) services by the CLEC ISPs in question.

According to Infonetics, competition on the service provider front has become fierce since the passing of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The study notes that incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) that once monopolized the local loop are now mandated to partner and in essence compete with the growing ranks of CLECs.

Interestingly, the report also notes that the small but expanding
number of registered CLECs are adapting to customer's requests and
rapidly growing their customer base. CLECs are one of the fastest
growing ISP segments, the report says, and the growth potential is tremendous.

"CLECs are aggressively deploying DSL services," said Greg Howard, Infonetics' director of service provider programs. He added that of he 20 facilities based CLECs that the firm interviewed, 90 percent are rolling out DSL, "with most of the deployment happening this year". "We are going to see a significant spike in the demand for
networking hardware. We are seeing major growth in the wide area
network (WAN), customer premises equipment (CPE), and network
management segments," he noted.

Infonetics' Web site is at infonetics.com .

o~~~ O




To: djane who wrote (50267)7/22/1998 4:47:00 PM
From: djane  Respond to of 61433
 
7/21/98 Jubak/Microsoft Investor article. [ASND references]

investor.msn.com

When to hold 'em, when to
fold 'em
No one wants to sell a high-flying stock
too late -- or too early. Here's how to use
price targets to signal the right move.
By Jim Jubak

How long do you hold a winner?

It's a tough and important question. On
the one hand, you don't want to sell too
soon. Investors who sold Cisco Systems
in July 1997 certainly hadn't done badly --
the stock had returned 48% in the
previous 12 months on top of an 80%
return in the 12 months that began in July
1995. But they did miss the 83% gain the
stock recorded over the next 12 months.

On the other hand, you certainly don't
want to stay with a winner while it gives
back all its gains. In the 12 months that
ended on Feb. 14, 1997, for example,
shares of Ascend Communications
(ASND) gained 50% in price. In the
subsequent 12 months, investors who
held on gave the bulk of those gains back
as shares fell 47%. Some round trip.

Price targets can help get you out of a
stock near its top and prevent you from
selling too soon. They're an invaluable
tool -- but only when they're used
correctly.

Too many investors believe that when a
stock hits its target price, it's sending a
clear and certain signal to sell. That's
simply not true. (And it's not true, either,
that a stock that hasn't yet hit its target
price is a "hold.") An investor is probably
better off not setting target prices at all
than using them in this way. Let me
show you how I think target prices should
be used to figure out what to do with a
winner. I'll use three examples from
Jubak's Picks -- Vitesse Semiconductor
(VTSS), Cisco Systems (CSCO) and
Tellabs (TLAB) -- of stocks that have
either hit their targets recently or look like
they will soon.

I'll begin with Vitesse, because this
example illustrates very clearly that a
price target isn't a sell signal -- but
instead a reminder to re-evaluate a stock.
Last week, I upped my price target for
Vitesse for the second time this year.
(See the Update at the end of my
column, "Why I'm getting out of Intel.")
The first time, on April 17, I ratcheted my
target upward to $34 after the company
beat analyst estimates by 2 cents a
share and the stock punched through my
year-end 1998 target of $27.50 (adjusted
for the stock's 2-for-1 split). Last week I
moved my target up to $40 a share by
year-end after the company again beat
estimates. In the run-up to the earnings
report, Vitesse had broken through my
$34-a-share target.

Details

Company Facts

1-yr Chart

Press Releases

Earnings Estimates

Earnings Surprise

Consensus EPS Trend

Earnings Growth Rates

Profit Margins

Upping my target and holding on instead
of selling was easy in each case
because, just as the stock hit my target
price, the company reported revenue and
earnings that exceeded my projections.
In each case, it seemed to me that the
current news said that the future was
even brighter than I had imagined.

Let's see exactly how much brighter.
Before the latest earnings report,
analysts were expecting that Vitesse
would report 69 cents a share for the 12
months ending in December 1998.
(Vitesse is on a September fiscal year,
so to get this figure I have to add up the
actual earnings for the company's fiscal
quarter and projections for the third and
fourth quarters of fiscal 1998 plus
projections for the first quarter of fiscal
1999.) That would have resulted in
earnings growing at 41% a year from the
49 cents a share recorded in calendar
year 1997.

After the earnings report, projections for
1998 went up as analysts factored in the
company's 50% earnings-per-share
growth in the June quarter (over the
year-earlier period) and the implications
of a 67% increase in revenue in the
period. Over the next week, analysts
upped their estimates for the September
quarter by a penny and added another
penny to the December quarter. Throw in
the penny from the recent surprise and
investors are already looking at an
estimated 72 cents a share in December
rather than 69 cents.

That additional 3 cents is actually low, I
think. Sales at Vitesse have been slowed
by a lack of manufacturing capacity -- the
company simply couldn't make as many
chips as customers wanted. That
constraint began to ease in mid-1998 as
the company's new Colorado Springs
plant came online. That extra capacity
has helped Vitesse increase revenue
growth from 63% in the March quarter to
67% in the June quarter. The Colorado
Springs plant still didn't run at full speed
last quarter, so I think Vitesse could
actually tack on a few more percentage
points in revenue growth. I'd add another
3 cents a share to get my estimate of 75
cents a share for calendar-year 1998
earnings.

Sell, hold and buy
decisions shouldn't
be based on
whether a stock
price is still a few
dollars short of the
target, but whether
the projected return
is high enough to
justify holding the
stock.
Also, Vitesse has key products in some
of the fastest-growing sectors in the
telecom industry. Its gallium arsenide
chips are uniquely well suited for the
highest-speed OC48 fiber-optic networks
now being built. The company has scored
close to a clean sweep with the
companies supplying gear to stack more
optical signals inside each fiber-optic
cable. Wave division multiplexing leaders
Lucent Technologies (LU) and Ciena
(CIEN), as well as the still-private
newcomers Tellium and Novatel, are all
Vitesse customers.

What's that 75 cents a share worth? The
stock's current price-to-earnings ratio is
55.6, a slight discount to the growth rate
in the most recent quarter. Analysts are
projecting that the company's earnings
growth rate will fall to 25% in fiscal 1999.
While I don't think it's reasonable to
project 60% growth in 1999, I believe
25% represents too severe a drop. My
guess is that in December, investors will
be looking ahead to great but slightly
lower growth. That should translate to a
lower price-to-earnings ratio -- say, about
5% lower, or 53. Multiply 75 cents a
share by 53 and you get $39.75 -- I round
it up and get my end-of-the year target of
$40 a share.

I don't want to hold on just because the
December target is higher than the
current stock price. I still need to figure
out whether the projected gain is worth
waiting for. With the stock trading at $34
on July 17, I'm projecting a $6-a-share
gain, or almost 18% over the next
five-plus months. That's well above the
25% annual return I require for investing
in a risky small-cap technology stock. So
I'll hold Vitesse for awhile yet.

I'm projecting a
$6-a-share gain, or
almost 18% over the
next five-plus
months. So I'll hold
Vitesse for awhile
yet.
I'd like to stress a key point here. The
most important number in this analysis
isn't the target price itself, but the rate of
return that the target price implies you
can expect from now until the target date.
Sell, hold and buy decisions shouldn't be
based on whether a stock price is still a
few dollars short of the target, but
whether the projected return is high
enough to justify holding the stock.

A stock that has had a fast run-up may
still be way short of the target price, for
instance. But the gain in the recent
period may actually represent such a big
piece of the projected return from owning
the stock for a longer period that it's no
longer worth holding the stock to the
target. Let me show you what I mean,
using Tellabs as an example.

On June 2, I set a target price of $93 a
share for Tellabs for June 1999 ("It pays
to be imprecise"). That was about 41%
above the stock's June 2 price of $65.78.

Trouble is, here we are, not even two
months later and the stock has already
hit $86.69. According to my original
target price, I'm looking at a potential
gain of $6.31 over the next 10 months.
That's a potential return of just 7.3% --
well short of the 25% annual return I
require for a stock with Tellabs' risk.
Unless something has changed in the
last two months to radically improve
Tellabs' prospects, I should clearly sell
the stock -- even though it's still better
than $6 below my target.

Details

Company Facts

1-yr Chart

Press Releases

Earnings Estimates

Earnings Surprise

Consensus EPS Trend

Earnings Growth Rates

Profit Margins

Plenty has changed at Tellabs, however,
and that's exactly what's turned on the
after-burners in the stock. There have
been major changes in both projected
earnings per share and projected
price-to-earnings ratio -- the factors I use
to calculate a target price.

First, the earnings picture has turned out
to be even brighter than I expected. On
June 2, I projected that earnings for the
next 12 months would come in at $1.97.
That already looks too low.

Tellabs surprised Wall Street when it
reported earnings of 46 cents a share on
July 17 -- 4 cents, or almost 10%, higher
than expected. Earnings per share grew
by 44% in the quarter (over the same
period in 1997) and sales climbed 34%.
Importantly for future earnings, sales for
the company's flagship Titan 5500
platform for Sonet-based telecom
networks soared a better-than-expected
51%.

In reaching my earnings projection of
$1.97 for the four quarters ending in
March 1999, I'd already given Tellabs
credit for more growth than Wall Street
expected. So the great earnings and
revenue growth reported by Tellabs this
quarter ups my existing estimate only
modestly to $2.08 a share.

But that's only half of the Tellabs story. In
February, the company agreed to acquire
Coherent Communication Systems
(CCSC), a maker of echo-cancellation
systems that optimize voice levels in
local, long-distance and wireless phone
systems. Then in June, Tellabs agreed to
acquire Ciena, the top maker of wave
division multiplexing equipment.
Together, the two acquisitions make
Tellabs a candidate for entry into the top
tier of communications-network
equipment suppliers. With a product for
the hot asynchronous transfer mode, or
ATM, market on the way this year and
plans to build an optical switch well
advanced, Tellabs could, perhaps, be the
next Cisco or Lucent. (ATM is, for the
moment, the protocol of choice for
managing mixed voice and data
networks.)

Tellabs' earnings
picture has turned
out to be even
brighter than I
expected. On June
2, I projected
earnings for the
next 12 months
would come in at
$1.97. That already
looks too low.
A lot has to go right for that to happen.
The optical switch has to reach the
market and work well at a reasonable
cost. Tellabs' sales force will have to do a
better job of marketing Ciena's gear to
the regional Bell phone companies than
Ciena has. And Tellabs will have to
merge three companies with relatively
little time-consuming turmoil. But the
market has decided that this scenario
deserves a higher price-to-earnings
multiple than a simpler, less ambitious
Tellabs did. The stock's P/E ratio has
climbed from 47 in early June to 49.3 on
July 17. And I think that the market will
keep closing the gap between Cisco's
P/E, which was 51 in early June and 65
on July 17. (Remember that to get an
accurate P/E ratio for Cisco, you have to
recalculate the company's earnings to
exclude the effect of one-time charges.)

So in setting my Tellabs price target for
next June, I'll use a P/E ratio of 52. That
gives me a target price of $108.16 -- a
25% projected return for holding the
stock until next June. (I agree with
management's calculation that the
merger with Ciena will not dilute earnings
per share, and could actually add to
them.)

So far I've dealt with two stocks that have
cooperated mightily with an investor
trying to link fundamentals and future
stock price. In each case, the stocks
have reported improved earnings and
revenue growth just as an investor
needed to decide whether to sell or hold.

Details

Company Facts

1-yr Chart

Press Releases

Earnings Estimates

Earnings Surprise

Consensus EPS Trend

Earnings Growth Rates

Profit Margins

But what do you do when the stock
climbs so fast that it busts through the
price target before the company reports
any substantial new information? In other
words, what do you do about Cisco?

My price target for Cisco is $95 by the
end of December. That seems quaint.
The stock broke through that level on July
15 -- and kept on going. It closed above
$103 on July 20. Cisco shares are up
more than 35% since May 5 -- the date it
last reported earnings. The company isn't
due to report any new numbers for about
another month. So, because Cisco has
climbed so far so fast, I now have a stock
in Jubak's Picks that is over my price
target a month before I have any new
numbers from the company that might
justify a higher target price.

I'm not completely without new
information, however. Some of Cisco's
competitors have reported. Ascend
Communications (ASND) beat Wall
Street estimates by a penny a share, for
example. Bay Networks (BAY) is being
acquired by Northern Telecom (NT), and
Cisco historically has made hay when
competitors merge. See
Ascend/Cascade and 3Com/U.S.
Robotics.

Is that enough for me to make a new
earnings projection and then calculate a
new target price? Not a chance. On the
fundamentals in hand, Cisco is a sell.
Anyone who holds on for the next month
until the stock reports is doing so on faith
and faith alone. Doing that doesn't make
me comfortable. But I'm sticking with the
stock at least until the numbers come in.
Cisco's management has a record of
delivering, and I think that makes a little
faith justifiable.

Besides, I think selling a stock like Cisco
in a market like this is just plain wrong.
I'll explain what I mean by that -- and give
you my theory on what's driving this
market -- in my next column on Friday.