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Strategies & Market Trends : Graham and Doddsville -- Value Investing In The New Era -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: porcupine --''''> who wrote (593)8/6/1998 2:55:00 AM
From: porcupine --''''>  Respond to of 1722
 
Raging Bull of Wall Street Declares Himself a Bear

August 6, 1998

By SHARON R. KING

Shy and retiring, Ralph Acampora is not.

A managing director and head of technical research at
Prudential Securities, Acampora is a regular guest on
financial news television programs and a frequent
bearer of soaring market forecasts.

But even Acampora, who is known for his rapid-fire
faxes whenever the markets twitch, seemed surprised by
the market's plunge on Tuesday after he made a sudden
bearish turn.

He was branded a raging bull by forecasting in 1995
that the Dow Jones industrial average would rise above
7,000 in 1998. At the time, the blue-chip index was at
4,500, causing many to dismiss his projection as
outlandish. The Dow surpassed 7,000 in April 1997, a
year ahead of his schedule.

Last year, he upped the ante, alternately calling for
the Dow to close at 10,000 in mid-1998 or early 1999.

So when one of Wall Steet's leading bulls morphed into
a bear, people noticed.

On Tuesday, Acampora helped unleash a stock market
plunge, a 299-point decline in the Dow, by forecasting
that the blue-chip index could fall 15 percent to 20
percent from its recent high. Such a drop would push
the Dow down to about 7,470, representing an
1,868-point nose dive from its peak.

And Wednesday, the slightly balding, Bronx-born
Acampora was even busier than usual, explaining what
caused his about-face. Not surprisingly, he pointed to
Asia as the culprit, adding that President Clinton's
political problems just added to the mix.

"You are looking at a bear," Acampora said Wednesday.
"I've got to tell you, too many people listened."

A day after delivering his cautionary words on CNBC,
Acampora spent the morning at a Wall Street investment
conference. He said he expected to find stock prices
higher when he returned to his office, with the market
shrugging off his comments.

"We thought it would have some impact," he said, but "I
thought we would be up a couple hundred points."

Some other Wall Street strategists moved quickly to
counter the damage Acampora had done and to reiterate
their bullish sentiment.

In a note to clients Wednesday morning, Abby Joseph
Cohen, co-chairwoman of the investment policy committee
at Goldman, Sachs, said the recent declines were an
overreaction and that stock prices were undervalued.

Tom Galvin, chief investment officer at Donaldson,
Lufkin & Jenrette, even suggested that investors
increase their stock holdings to 75 percent of their
portfolios, from 65 percent. Galvin also forecast that
the Dow could top 10,000 within six months, while Ms.
Cohen predicted 9,300 at the end of this year.

Galvin recommended buying shares of financial, health
care, technology and retail stocks, sectors that
improved during the day.

While the Dow closed up 59.47 points, it was a
less-than-convincing rebound.

"The market didn't respond to Abby like it's done in
the past," a Wall Street investment strategist said on
the condition of anonymity.

Acampora was also unimpressed with the modest gains. "I
think we might have a couple of months of this" before
stock prices begin rising again, he said.

As a technical analyst, Acampora relies primarily on
stock charts, studying price levels, trading volume and
price movements, to forecast market movements.
Recently, he said, deteriorations in the price of Dow
stocks as well as the stocks in the Dow transportation
and utilities indexes caused him to expect steeper
declines.

Although primarily a bull, Acampora has wavered a bit
in his market calls. In June 1997, he forecast that the
Dow would hit 10,000 by June 1998. He later pushed that
back to early 1999.

There also have been a few misses. Last summer, he
called for the Dow to reach 8,750 by the end of the
year. The Dow closed at 7,908.

And in an interview last August, Acampora warned that
he might turn bearish sometime in 1998.

Acampora, 56, knows that everyone will be watching his
performance this time. "To make this statement, I
really had to believe it. This is a career call. If it
goes straight to 10,000, people are not going to be too
happy with me."

If this doesn't work, Acampora, a former seminarian,
said, "I'll be a teacher or something."

Copyright 1998 The New York Times Company



To: porcupine --''''> who wrote (593)8/6/1998 12:43:00 PM
From: Axel Gunderson  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1722
 
A look at some numbers

In recent times there have been multiple references to the study Jeremy Siegel did on the long term returns of the Nifty 50 of 1972. The general argument given is that as a group, despite starting with an average PE of about 42, they have returned almost as much as the S&P 500, so it wasn't so bad to buy and hold them.

I disagree. Almost nobody was going to buy all 50 stocks. And what do we see when we look at the actual distribution of returns? Out of the 50, 15 beat the S&P 500 over the next 25 years. Number 16, J&J, matched. Consider some recent numbers that Berney has shared with us:

Morningstar's Stocktools has extensive information on more than 7,600 companies. Consider the following extremely relevant information:

Of the investment universe of 7,486 companies that have 1 year stock performance, 37.0% (2,770) beat the Index, 29.4% (2,203) provided a return between 0% and the Index, and 33.6% (2,513) had a negative investment return. Of the investment universe of 5,925 companies that have a 3 year stock performance, 30.5% (1,807) beat the Index, 42.7% (2,532) provided a return between 0% and the Index, and 26.8% (1,586) had a negative investment return. Finally, of the investment universe of 4,373 companies that have a 5 year stock performance, 32.5% (1,423) beat the Index, 43.2% (1,887) provided a return between 0% and the Index, and 24.3% (1,063) had a negative investment return. This is in the midst of a raging bull market.


So over this longer period, 30% of the Nifty 50 beat the index - seems about average for me. What are the odds that investors in 1972 (and I doubt many bought all 50) were able to select a subset portfolio that would beat the market? Of the 15 companies whose stocks outperformed the market, seven were pharmaceuticals. The next best-represented group was consumer non-durables, such as KO, PEP, G, and PG.

I don't know what today's Nifty 50 is, but I'm willing to bet it includes KO, G, MSFT, and CSCO. I've read numerous arguments that KO has outperformed the market for decades, and that it could have been valued much higher in 1972 and still outperformed relative to the market since. True, but let's take another look at that, thinking about investor psychology. During the bear market, KO's stock lost 75% of its value. It was over a decade before it returned to its 1972 value. Would you be willing to see a stock lose 75% of its value and then take over a decade to get back to the break-even point?

Valuation does matter. Even for the greatest companies.

What is kind of funny is to read how this market isn't overvalued by comparison to the Nifty 50 of 1972. C'mon, writers of the popular press. Compare today's Nifty 50 to the Nifty 50 of 1972 or compare the S&P 500 of today to the S&P 500 of 1972. And now we have Abby Cohen saying that at current levels the S&P 500 is undervalued - with her forecast of 5-6% earnings growth. At what point then does it become overvalued?

And the rest of the market? I read how the average stock has lost 20-40% since the start of 1998. Therefore they are in a bear market and must be undervalued. Maybe. But if a stock is overvalued by 50%, and then loses 20%, it is still overvalued by 20%.

Axel