Ineresting if Sudan and Iraq were responsible for the embassy bombings since they were mentioned in an E-mail from Stratfor I got earlier this AM......
Global Intelligence Update
Red Alert
August 10, 1998
The Kenyan and Tanzanian Bombings and Iraq's Role
The bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania was the major
international event last week. There was ample reason for concern. First,
these acts seemed to indicate that international terrorism was returning to
the world scene. Second, because the origin of the bombings was
immediately assumed to be somewhere in the Middle East, they seemed to
signal greater instability in that critical region. Therefore, we need to
turn our attention to sorting through what we know and don't know about the
bombings. Three questions need to be addressed: who did it, why did they
do it, and why did they do it now?
* The Bombers Were Not Amateurs
First, we do not know from direct evidence who was responsible. We assume
that U.S. intelligence agencies also don't know who carried out the
bombings, because had they known, we assume they would have prevented it.
Second, if they uncovered the perpetrators in the few days since the
bombings occurred, this would indicate that they had a great deal of
information on hand already, and had failed to draw proper conclusions
prior to the attack. Therefore, we assume that U.S. intelligence is also
scrambling to figure out who was responsible.
To put it another way, barring the unthinkable, which was that U.S.
intelligence knew of the bombings but failed to stop them, it follows that
the bombers were either clever enough to evade detection by the world's
most sophisticated intelligence agencies, or that they represent a
completely new element not on any watch list. Because it is a given that
all significant terrorist threats are under constant scrutiny by U.S.
intelligence, the bombers were either very new, very good, or both.
Very new groups are hard to imagine in this case. The sophistication
needed to carry out this operation came from experience. It also required
a sophisticated support structure. An unknown, novice group did not carry
out a multi-national, coordinated strike as its first mission. While the
group may portray itself as new, there is little doubt that the organizers
and most of the operatives have been at this game for a while. Therefore,
the failure of U.S. intelligence to detect them has, we think, less to do
with their being new than it has to do with their being good at what they
do.
Contrary to popular myth, terrorist attacks are not easy to carry out.
The mere act of acquiring or moving weapons and explosives, identifying and
monitoring targets, acquiring and using bases of operations and
transportation, involves both trusting increasing numbers of operatives
with at least part of the plan, and using the services of outsiders. The
more complex the plan, the more conspirators are necessary, the more
outside resources need to be acquired, and the greater the likelihood of
detection and betrayal.
The lone bomber striking without warning is possible, but is usually not
the likeliest explanation. Usually, the lone amateur is detected in the
course of preparing for his mission. He is most likely to succeed in his
native country, where he is able to blend in and where he knows how to
acquire resources without being noticed. A lone bomber operating in a
foreign country is much harder to imagine. Carrying out simultaneous
attacks in two foreign countries is extremely difficult to execute. The
chances of detection are enormous.
The plan undoubtedly involved some key figures who are well known to
intelligence organizations as part of terrorist networks, whose mere
presence in Kenya or Tanzania would have set off alarms, or whose mere
conversations concerning either country would have been detected,
triggering alarms. So we are either dealing here with a massive
intelligence failure on the part of the United States or with an extremely
sophisticated group. We suspect the latter.
An unsophisticated group would not have chosen Kenya and Tanzania as a
target nor have had the resources to carry out a mission there. It seems
to us that the targets were selected because they were not likely to be on
the same level of alert as a U.S. facility in the Middle East or Europe.
Local security officials were less likely to detect the activities. In
other words, the terrorists deliberately hit two soft targets, decreasing
the chance of detection while actually increasing the shock value, making
it appear that no U.S. facility was safe anywhere.
* A National Intelligence Service Involved
This represents extremely sophisticated thinking, excellent planning,
first-rate security measures, and a good knowledge of how to evade
detection by U.S. technical capabilities. This forces us to conclude by
pure inference that a national intelligence service with access to
diplomatic facilities was involved, given the logistical and communications
requirements of the mission. The problem with this theory is, of course,
that the use of diplomatic personnel and facilities increases the
probability of detection by U.S. intelligence, since most suspect
countries' diplomatic communications and travel are carefully monitored.
Somehow, a group with access to a national intelligence service's
facilities, and extremely sophisticated in its own right, managed to evade
detection by the CIA and NSA.
>From our point of view, therefore, this is not a question of a handful of
terrorists, but of a decision by a nation, or by a significant faction
within a nation, to strike at U.S. embassies. The question is, what group
and what nation would stand to gain by bombing U.S. facilities in Africa at
this point in time? Remember that a terrorist act is a scarce resource.
It takes time, courts danger, and terrorists tend to get used up quickly.
Who would spend scarce resources on this mission?
* Osama Bin Laden is the Logical Candidate for Perpetrator
Press speculation has focused on Osama Bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi
expatriate who had spent time in Sudan and is now in Afghanistan. Bin
Laden is a good focus for several reasons. First, he has recently been
making threats against U.S. facilities. Of course, Bin Laden makes such
threats regularly. Second, as we noted earlier this week, the Russians
recently issued a warning about active and spreading Wahabi extremism.
Wahabi is a Saudi variety of Islam. Russian intelligence is extremely
sensitive to the spread of Islamic movements into Central Asia and the
Caucasus. They are in a crisis mode along the Afghan border, where Bin
Laden's hosts, the Taleban, are waging an offensive to capture the
remainder of Afghanistan. The Russians have noted Wahabi activism in the
Caucasus. It would be interesting to know if they were aware of such
activity elsewhere.
There is a final reason why Bin Laden is the prime suspect. There just
aren't a whole lot of other candidates. The old, international terrorist
movement is in a state of collapse. Most of the old masterminds are dead
or too old for the sport. Moreover, ever since the Czech, Hungarian, and
East German intelligence archives fell into Western hands, their
infrastructure was exposed and rolled-up. Hamas is obsessed with its
struggle with the PLO and Israel, and has neither the resources nor the
security system to carry out such an attack.
Hezbollah and the Iranians are always a possibility, but there are several
good arguments against this being their work. First, Iran is profiting
greatly from its flirtation with the United States. It has broken the back
of the U.S. dual containment policy, created an entente with Saudi Arabia
without forcing the Saudis to break with the United States, and actually
sees a chance of ending the U.S. economic embargo. This policy is one on
which most Iranian factions agree. Moreover, if it were Hezbollah, we
would expect the attacks to have come in Latin America, where they
reportedly have developed operating units and work with some of the major
drug dealers. Iran doesn't have any reason to carry out this action right
now, and the action does not have Hezbollah's signature on it.
That leaves Bin Laden, both by reason and default, as the most likely
choice. Geography points to Bin Laden. Having lived and worked in Sudan
for years, Bin Laden has excellent relations with elements in Sudan's
Islamic government. This government, although not on the best of terms
with Kenya, does provide access to both target countries. Bin Laden is
relatively familiar with the region, and probably has assets available to
him there. Moreover, Sudan has been increasingly confident in the last few
months, as its opponents in the civil war have fragmented.
* Possible Motivations for Bin Laden
Moreover, Bin Laden is sitting in Afghanistan, where the Taleban are moving
closer to victory in the civil war. Bin Laden is closely allied with the
Taleban, which are strongly opposed by both Iran and Russia. The Taleban's
only support comes from Pakistan. Were Pakistan to break with the Taleban,
as Russia and Iran desire, defeat could be snatched from the jaws of
victory. The bombings, therefore, could be used as a signal to Pakistan of
the price for opposing Taleban
In this reading, Bin Laden is striking against the United States in a
warning to Pakistan and a declaration of war against Iranians willing to
work with the U.S. Put another way, Bin Laden is signaling the Shiites
that the true mantle of Islamic anti-Americanism has fallen from their
shoulders to his. So, the bombings make sense simply within the immediate
Afghani context, and warn the Iranians that their claim on Islamic
radicalism is slipping.
The bombings could have had another audience as well: the Saudi royal
family. King Fahd was reportedly ill and in the hospital again last week.
His heir apparent, Prince Abdullah, has been the leading figure in the
flirtation with Iran. His main rival, Prince Sultan, is aligned with the
United States. Bin Laden, suspected in the Khobar Tower bombing, has
declared war on the "crusader" occupation of Mecca and Medina, meaning the
United States. Bin Laden is making it clear to both Abdullah and Sultan
that there will be a third force in the succession struggle that is
independent of both the United States and Iran.
In this context, the bombings are a warning to the Saudi Royal family that
choosing between the U.S. and Iran, or even brokering reconciliation
between them, will not secure the royal family's interests in the face of
collapsing oil prices. He has the ability to strike deep and hard, both
inside of Saudi Arabia and against targets far away. The bombings would be
a strong signal to an uneasy monarchy that it needs to deal with its own
radicals.
Thus, Bin Laden is the logical suspect, with the Sudanese the logical
vehicle. There are several good reasons why the bombing should have taken
place now. But there is also a mystery. Bin Laden is extremely well known
to U.S. intelligence. His every move is undoubtedly monitored. The
Sudanese are not sophisticated enough to provide the cover needed to
operate without detection. How could Bin Laden have carried out a
simultaneous multi-national strike without being detected, particularly as
he is the prime suspect in the Khobar Tower bombing? There has to be
another element.
* The Iraqi Connection
We believe that other element to be Iraq. Bin Laden and Iraq share a
double hatred of Iran and the United States. Both are deeply concerned by
the growing accommodation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both want to send
a message to the Saudis that accommodation with Iran will not protect the
Saudi regime from terrorism, while simultaneously signaling all Persian
Gulf nations that the United States cannot protect them either. Tensions
in the region mounted last week as Iraq faced off with United Nations
inspectors once again, and as the Iranians assured the Saudis and the rest
of the Persian Gulf that they were prepared to use their military force to
protect them from the Iraqis. The Iraqis have clearly decided to increase
tensions in the region. They are trying to convince the Saudis that
working with Iran is no safer than working with the United States.
It would also explain the lack of detection. Although undoubtedly deeply
penetrated by both human and technical U.S. intelligence, the Iraqis have
displayed a regular ability to occasionally confound U.S. intelligence
monitoring through clever and sophisticated means. That is why they have
periodically startled the U.S. with their moves. It would also explain how
Bin Laden slipped past U.S. intelligence: Iraq, using Sudanese assets,
operating in an unanticipated area of the world, allowed Bin Laden's people
to slip into Kenya and Tanzania, maintain necessary communications for
coordination, and strike before U.S. intelligence could detect the threat.
* Iraq's Motivation
The real issue is why? Why would the Iraqis strike now? Indeed, why in
general is Iraq increasing tensions in the Persian Gulf? The key is Iran.
Iraq, having nearly broken free from its encirclement, is seeing that
progress reverse and now is finding itself increasingly isolated. Iran's
love affair with Saudi Arabia and its flirtation with the United States
have given the Iraqis the feeling that time is not on their side. The
Syrians, long friendly with Iran, have cooled toward the Iraqis. The Turks
remain a glowering presence to the north.
Iraq is feeling insecure. The key is to drive a wedge between Iran and
Saudi Arabia. Since seduction hasn't worked, the Iraqis are now turning to
the bludgeon. They are not striking directly at the Saudis, as that might
drive them deeper into the Iranians' arms. Rather, they are letting the
Saudis know that they could strike if they wanted. Iran might have its
missiles, but Iraq has Bin Laden. By supporting Bin Laden's operation in
Africa, Iraq shows its muscle without striking directly against those it
wants to entice, namely, the Persian Gulf Arabs. Moreover, Saddam is
warning Clinton, whom Saddam reads as having no stomach for a
confrontation, that he will strike hard where the U.S. least expects to be
hit.
At the same time, we must remember that, tragic though it was, if this
action was Iraq's and Bin Laden's best shot, it really wasn't much. It
will not determine the outcome of the Saudi succession, shift Iranian
policy, nor solve Iraqi isolation. What it might do is to create further
instability in an already rudderless U.S. Mideast policy while setting off
another witch hunt in the U.S. intelligence community over who fouled up
this time. What is important here is the fact that Saddam is getting
desperate again. With Saddam, desperation and unpredictability tend to go
hand in hand. If we are right in our inference of Iraqi involvement, the
very fact that the strike will not redefine the region's current alignment
means that we can expect more definitive action on the part of Iraq.
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