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Strategies & Market Trends : Graham and Doddsville -- Value Investing In The New Era -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: porcupine --''''> who wrote (623)8/13/1998 5:13:00 PM
From: Axel Gunderson  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 1722
 
Porc - don't tell me, you've been thinking about this stuff a little in your spare time, haven't you? Wow, an impressive amount of work.

To arrive at an appropriate discount rate for a given company, it is necessary to forecast the future equity premium.

And recently there is debate over whether there even should be an equity premium. Certainly over the long haul, equities as a class truly haven't been riskier than other asset classes. But if we keep in mind the idea that the discount rate is equal to the required return, we can apply a discount rate easily enough. The enterprising investor could use the anticipated long term returns of the market, plus the margin by which that investor desired to beat the market, for example.

Having said that, I agree with you that the discounting process really doesn't add much. While the choice of discount rate can radically affect the output of any given model, relative valuations are not affected greatly so long as the forecasting interval is reasonably short. Since crystal ball gazing is hazardous enough, I think the use of short periods (a few years at most) is a reasonable limit. If a company obviously appears to be undervalued on this basis, it is probably reasonable to suspect a fat pitch. The enterprising investor will be in a limited number of positions anyway, so the "need" for less obvious bargains is mitigated.

Admittedly, no one would accuse GM of underleverage...GM bonds yield somewhere between 6% and 9%, depending upon the series. Notwithstanding the 2 dozen strikes of the past five years, the common shares have a considerably higher average cash earnings yield than the average interest yielded by the bonds. Why not buy back the stock?

This isn't entirely satisfying. The problem is that GM can not know that going forward, they will be generating higher average cash earnings yield than the average interest yielded by the bonds. There is some level of leverage which might be considered optimal (or safe) and if GM is above that level, it would be prudent of them to pay down debt while cash earnings are high - for that is the only practical time for them to do so.

Axel