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Politics : Idea Of The Day -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: IQBAL LATIF who wrote (19298)8/14/1998 9:07:00 AM
From: IQBAL LATIF  Respond to of 50167
 
3Com -- We told you so!!!!Idea
COMS reviewed by Fools--

3Com reviewed

by Jeff Fischer (JeffF@fool.com)

JUPITER, FL (Aug. 13, 1998) --

STOCK REVIEW

In our methodical review of each Fool stock, it's time for...

3Com (Nasdaq: COMS)
Stock Price: $28
Market Cap: $10 billion
Trailing Sales: $5.42 billion
Price/Sales: 1.84
Last Qtr Sales: $1.37 billion

Book value: $7.33 per share
Price/book value: 3.8
Recent return on equity: 2.5%
Recent Gross Margin: 45%
Recent Operating Margin: 1.8%
(usually around 16%)

5-year est. growth rate: 25%
Earnings Est: $1.28 in FY99 (ending May)
Earnings Est: $1.93 in FY00
P/E on far earnings estimate: 14.5
What caused the Fool to buy it? Two years ago to the day, the Fool Port sold the Gap (NYSE: GPS) to buy 3Com (Nasdaq: COMS), a company that was (and still is) second only to Cisco Systems (Nasdaq: CSCO) in the networking world.
Unfortunately, 3Com is second to Cisco in several ways, including product mix (3Com's is far less enviable), margins, and growth. In the last three years, Cisco's stock has compounded 72% annually, while 3Com has lost nearly 10% annually (the Fool is down 38% on the stock). During the same time, the S&P 500 gained 28% annually. $10,000 invested in Cisco in 1995 is now worth $50,000. $10,000 invested in 3Com is worth $7,300. Ouch!

OK. Enough bellyaching. But when there's a Cisco in the world, why invest in 3Com?

Well, 3Com is no slouch. It's actually one of the most successful technology companies of the past decade. When 3Com was bought, the company's earnings estimates made one think of a Swiss Gondola -- this baby looked like it could only go higher and then higher. Indeed, within months 3Com had nearly doubled for the Fool Port. Then something happened.

What has happened since the purchase? Like a meteorite streaking across the sky, 3Com was afire as it fell. Many people (myself included) found themselves wishing on this falling star and thinking that an opportunity was afoot as we watched 3Com fall from $80 to $60, then $50, then $40... until finally it hit the ocean and its fire was snuffed, sputtering to an eventual bottom $18 below the sea, at $22.

Growth of the networking industry was slowing for all but the leader (you guessed it, Cisco). 3Com, Bay Networks, Cabletron, and other networkers paid the price. Meanwhile, 3Com has primarily been relegated to lower-end product sales (although network systems sales do represent about half of its revenues, and growing), and it bought U.S. Robotics just in time for an inventory correction in modems (which represent almost another half of its sales).

When the networking industry began to slow even modestly, many second tier players had to fight hard and eventually slashed prices in order to win product orders away from Cisco. Turns out, Cisco is continuing to win anyway. It's one of the few networkers still granted a hefty premium price to its growth rate, and it's still (of late) putting up very impressive sales and earnings growth quarter-over-quarter and year-over-year, despite Asian woes.

Jump to the present...

We sit, as we have been, on a losing position in what is widely recognized as a strong, niche leading, usually very profitable company with a respected name. In history, most fundamentally strong companies have seen their stocks experience a period of years that they'd rather forget. 3Com might care to forget the past few years, and why not? The company certainly isn't living in the past. As shared in the recent conference call, 3Com has a completely renewed line of networking products now, all launched in the last few quarters. Fiscal 1999 promises to be considerably stronger than last year, management believes, and the company is sitting on $1 billion in cash and continues to develop new, often performance leading and award winning products.

What lessons have been learned? Our 3Com experience reminds one to always buy the business first, not the "YPEG valuation." I believe if the overall business and margins were the focus, Cisco might have been bought rather than 3Com. Sure, 3Com had an attractive YPEG valuation, and if earnings estimates had been met, this investment could have been a raging success. But, as it turns out, 3Com's business couldn't meet the earnings estimates.

Go back a few years and Cisco might have been considerably more expensive than 3Com, but it was also (arguably) the stronger business and most likely to meet its earnings estimates. This reminds that a Fool should always at least consider the perceived industry leader first, before considering investing in second- and third-tier players. Thinking of Venus's column from yesterday, do you marry a second- or third-tier spouse? I certainly hope not. I hope that you marry the very best that you've found in your life. Likewise, in most cases you want to invest in the number one leader of any industry. Entire books have been written on the topic explaining why.

What could cause the Fool to sell? I love to say this, but I also dislike saying it: 3Com has become such a small part of the portfolio (less than 3%) that it currently hardly matters what we do with it. In a way, that's good. It's survival of the fittest applied to an individual investor's portfolio. Buffett has this, you probably have it, and the Fool has it -- your leading stocks become the leaders of your portfolio. They grow in importance while the significance of your losers withers, pales, and all but disappears. Perhaps there's a Foolish reminder for living in this. In your life, amplify the victories and the things that you have to be happy about, and move beyond and leave behind the failures or imperfections of your life. In a way, I believe that this is why the Fool Port writers (consciously or not) give far less attention to the portfolio's losing stocks, be that right or wrong.

So what might cause us to sell? You've probably perceived by now that the Fool usually only sells if it finds something better to buy. Even so, it seems anti-climactic to sell 3Com now. Perhaps the worst is behind it. The stock trades at 14 times fiscal year 2000 earnings estimates (the company is currently in its first quarter of fiscal 1999). If estimates are met, we should see a rising share price. Also, margins should begin to improve again. In fact, on some levels, 3Com's situation reminds me of Intel (Nasdaq: INTC), which I wrote about tonight in the Drip Port.

Fool on,

Jeff Fischer




To: IQBAL LATIF who wrote (19298)8/14/1998 5:23:00 PM
From: IQBAL LATIF  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 50167
 
The Dismal Science:
slate.com
How does a babysitting co-op resemble the Japanese economy? Paul
Krugman explains the formation of liquidity traps.
Plus, Explainer dissects the logic behind anonymous bombings and
profiles Saudi terrorist financier Osama bin Laden;
slate.com
Baby-Sitting the Economy
The baby-sitting co-op that went bust teaches us something that could save the world.
By Paul Krugman
Paul Krugman is a professor of economics at MIT and the author, most recently, of, The Accidental Theorist and Other Dispatches From the Dismal Science. His home page contains links to many of his other articles and essays. (posted Thursday, Aug. 13, 1998)

Twenty years ago I read a story that changed my life. I think about that story often; it helps me to stay calm in the face of crisis, to remain hopeful in times of depression, and to resist the pull of fatalism and pessimism. At this gloomy moment, when Asia's woes seem to threaten the world economy as a whole, the lessons of that inspirational tale are more important than ever.
The story is told in an article titled "Monetary Theory and the Great Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting Co-op Crisis." Joan and Richard Sweeney published it in the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking in 1978. I've used their story in two of my books, Peddling Prosperity and The Accidental Theorist, but it bears retelling, this time with an Asian twist.


he Sweeneys tell the story of--you guessed it--a baby-sitting co-op, one to which they belonged in the early 1970s. Such co-ops are quite common: A group of people (in this case about 150 young couples with congressional connections) agrees to baby-sit for one another, obviating the need for cash payments to adolescents. It's a mutually beneficial arrangement: A couple that already has children around may find that watching another couple's kids for an evening is not that much of an additional burden, certainly compared with the benefit of receiving the same service some other evening. But there must be a system for making sure each couple does its fair share.
The Capitol Hill co-op adopted one fairly natural solution. It issued scrip--pieces of paper equivalent to one hour of baby-sitting time. Baby sitters would receive the appropriate number of coupons directly from the baby sittees. This made the system self-enforcing: Over time, each couple would automatically do as much baby-sitting as it received in return. As long as the people were reliable--and these young professionals certainly were--what could go wrong?

ell, it turned out that there was a small technical problem. Think about the coupon holdings of a typical couple. During periods when it had few occasions to go out, a couple would probably try to build up a reserve--then run that reserve down when the occasions arose. There would be an averaging out of these demands. One couple would be going out when another was staying at home. But since many couples would be holding reserves of coupons at any given time, the co-op needed to have a fairly large amount of scrip in circulation.
Now what happened in the Sweeneys' co-op was that, for complicated reasons involving the collection and use of dues (paid in scrip), the number of coupons in circulation became quite low. As a result, most couples were anxious to add to their reserves by baby-sitting, reluctant to run them down by going out. But one couple's decision to go out was another's chance to baby-sit; so it became difficult to earn coupons. Knowing this, couples became even more reluctant to use their reserves except on special occasions, reducing baby-sitting opportunities still further.

n short, the co-op had fallen into a recession.
Since most of the co-op's members were lawyers, it was difficult to convince them the problem was monetary. They tried to legislate recovery--passing a rule requiring each couple to go out at least twice a month. But eventually the economists prevailed. More coupons were issued, couples became more willing to go out, opportunities to baby-sit multiplied, and everyone was happy. Eventually, of course, the co-op issued too much scrip, leading to different problems ...

f you think this is a silly story, a waste of your time, shame on you. What the Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting Co-op experienced was a real recession. Its story tells you more about what economic slumps are and why they happen than you will get from reading 500 pages of William Greider and a year's worth of Wall Street Journal editorials. And if you are willing to really wrap your mind around the co-op's story, to play with it and draw out its implications, it will change the way you think about the world.
For example, suppose that the U.S. stock market was to crash, threatening to undermine consumer confidence. Would this inevitably mean a disastrous recession? Think of it this way: When consumer confidence declines, it is as if, for some reason, the typical member of the co-op had become less willing to go out, more anxious to accumulate coupons for a rainy day. This could indeed lead to a slump--but need not if the management were alert and responded by simply issuing more coupons. That is exactly what our head coupon issuer Alan Greenspan did in 1987--and what I believe he would do again. So as I said at the beginning, the story of the baby-sitting co-op helps me to remain calm in the face of crisis.

r suppose Greenspan did not respond quickly enough and that the economy did indeed fall into a slump. Don't panic. Even if the head coupon issuer has fallen temporarily behind the curve, he can still ordinarily turn the situation around by issuing more coupons--that is, with a vigorous monetary expansion like the ones that ended the recessions of 1981-82 and 1990-91. So as I said, the story of the baby-sitting co-op helps me remain hopeful in times of depression.
Above all, the story of the co-op tells you that economic slumps are not punishments for our sins, pains that we are fated to suffer. The Capitol Hill co-op did not get into trouble because its members were bad, inefficient baby sitters; its troubles did not reveal the fundamental flaws of "Capitol Hill values" or "crony baby-sittingism." It had a technical problem--too many people chasing too little scrip--which could be, and was, solved with a little clear thinking. And so, as I said, the co-op's story helps me to resist the pull of fatalism and pessimism.

ut if it's all so easy, how can a large part of the world be in the mess it's in? How, for example, can Japan be stuck in a seemingly intractable slump--one that it does not seem able to get out of simply by printing coupons? Well, if we extend the co-op's story a little bit, it is not hard to generate something that looks a lot like Japan's problems--and to see the outline of a solution.
First, we have to imagine a co-op the members of which realized there was an unnecessary inconvenience in their system. There would be occasions when a couple found itself needing to go out several times in a row, which would cause it to run out of coupons--and therefore be unable to get its babies sat--even though it was entirely willing to do lots of compensatory baby-sitting at a later date. To resolve this problem, the co-op allowed members to borrow extra coupons from the management in times of need--repaying with the coupons received from subsequent baby-sitting. To prevent members from abusing this privilege, however, the management would probably need to impose some penalty--requiring borrowers to repay more coupons than they borrowed.


nder this new system, couples would hold smaller reserves of coupons than before, knowing they could borrow more if necessary. The co-op's officers would, however, have acquired a new tool of management. If members of the co-op reported it was easy to find baby sitters and hard to find opportunities to baby-sit, the terms under which members could borrow coupons could be made more favorable, encouraging more people to go out. If baby sitters were scarce, those terms could be worsened, encouraging people to go out less.
In other words, this more sophisticated co-op would have a central bank that could stimulate a depressed economy by reducing the interest rate and cool off an overheated one by raising it.

ut what about Japan--where the economy slumps despite interest rates having fallen almost to zero? Has the baby-sitting metaphor finally found a situation it cannot handle?
Well, imagine there is a seasonality in the demand and supply for baby-sitting. During the winter, when it's cold and dark, couples don't want to go out much but are quite willing to stay home and look after other people's children--thereby accumulating points they can use on balmy summer evenings. If this seasonality isn't too pronounced, the co-op could still keep the supply and demand for baby-sitting in balance by charging low interest rates in the winter months, higher rates in the summer. But suppose that the seasonality is very strong indeed. Then in the winter, even at a zero interest rate, there will be more couples seeking opportunities to baby-sit than there are couples going out, which will mean that baby-sitting opportunities will be hard to find, which means that couples seeking to build up reserves for summer fun will be even less willing to use those points in the winter, meaning even fewer opportunities to baby-sit ... and the co-op will slide into a recession even at a zero interest rate.

nd this is the winter of Japan's discontent. Perhaps because of its aging population, perhaps also because of a general nervousness about the future, the Japanese public does not appear willing to spend enough to use the economy's capacity, even at a zero interest rate. Japan, say the economists, has fallen into the dread "liquidity trap." Well, what you have just read is an infantile explanation of what a liquidity trap is and how it can happen. And once you understand that this is what has gone wrong, the answer to Japan's problems is, of course, quite obvious.
So the story of the baby-sitting co-op is not a mere amusement. If people would only take it seriously--if they could only understand that when great economic issues are at stake, whimsical parables are not a waste of time but the key to enlightenment--it is a story that could save the world.