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Technology Stocks : Identix (IDNX) -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: David who wrote (10017)8/21/1998 10:54:00 AM
From: R. Jaynes  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 26039
 
Nice article, David.

Now, from the yahoo thread -

I have held IDX for a long time and think that you longs might be interested in this news. I just returned from the huge, American Correctional Association conference in Detroit where the US leaders in law enforcement technology set up booths to introduce their product to the field of corrections. IDX was well represented with a huge booth with marketing, and sales reps to talk to clients. I was impressed by seeing them there and hopefully they made some valuable contacts.

Rick



To: David who wrote (10017)8/24/1998 11:13:00 AM
From: David  Respond to of 26039
 
Technical advance in public key encryption (i.e., good news):

( BW)(IBM-RESEARCH/ENCRYPTION)(IBM) New
Encryption System Provides Practical, Unbreakable
Protection

ZURICH--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Aug. 24, 1998--

Researchers Develop Mathematically Proven Solution
to Internet Security Loophole

Mathematicians at IBM Research and the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology (ETH) have co-developed a new public-key cryptosystem that
provides the first practical and mathematically proven way to secure
information from even the most aggressive Internet hacking attempts.
The new Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, revealed today at the Crypto'98
conference at the University of California-Santa Barbara, effectively closes
the backdoor on so-called "active" attacks. All current commercially
available cryptosystems are potentially vulnerable to active attacks, which are
considered to be the most dangerous hacking attempts any cryptosystem
might face.
"This system delivers a new level of integrity for Internet communications,
and is particularly suited for e-commerce applications such as
cyber-auctions, credit card purchases, and protecting private information,"
said Jeff Jaffe, general manager for IBM's security products and services.
"Businesses and consumers can have greater confidence in Internet
transactions, because we've effectively closed down the only way around a
cryptosystem's main line of defense."
IBM plans to incorporate the new system into a future version of its Vault
Registry software, the IBM SecureWay public-key infrastructure product
that allows e-commerce transactions to travel across organizational
boundaries in a private, secure manner.
"It's important that we nip this type of powerful attack in the bud," said
Victor Shoup of IBM's Zurich Research Laboratory, who invented the new
cryptosystem with Ronald Cramer for the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology (ETH). "Earlier this year, an active attack decoded information
secured by the most widely used encryption system for Web browsers. Our
system will prevent this from happening."

Finesse vs. Muscle

The strength of modern cryptosystems from being based upon really
difficult mathematical problems that are thought to be unsolvable. If a
cryptosystem's underlying problem could be solved, then the cryptosystem's
security could be broken.
"Active" attacks bypass the difficulty of solving the underlying mathematical
problem by sending a series of cleverly constructed messages to a publicly
accessible server. By analyzing the server's pattern of responses to the bogus
text, an attacker can decode encrypted messages passing through that
network. The Cramer-Shoup method thwarts these attacks by delivering the
first non-malleable cryptosystem efficient enough for commercial use.
"This is a case of finesse over muscle," said Charles Palmer, head of IBM
Research's Network Security and Cryptography Group in New York.
"Previous systems left open the possibility of indirect attack. This system
elegantly denies that access, shunting attackers back to the imposing
mathematical problem at the core of the cryptosystem. In this case, it's the
Diffie-Hellman Decision Problem, for which no feasible solution is known."

"Non-malleable" Vs. "Malleable" Protection

The Cramer-Shoup system extends the research earlier this decade of
three computer scientists at IBM's Almaden Research Center, San Jose, CA.
In 1991, Danny Dolev, Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor recognized that all
current cryptosystems were potentially "malleable." That is, without knowing
the decryption key, an attacker could transform an encryption of one
message into an encryption of a related message.
This is a serious security flaw because an active attacker could, for
example, eavesdrop on a competitor's encrypted transmission of a bid for a
contract and then submit an assuredly lower one -- all without knowing the
value of the competitor's bid or even his or her own bid. An active attacker
can further exploit the cryptosystem's malleability to decrypt targeted
messages.
"A malleable cryptosystem is like the combination lock on a safe," says
Dwork. "It provides good security, but a skilled safecracker can still open it
by listening carefully to the lock mechanism as the dial is turned. An
absolutely silent lock mechanism that gives no clue to the combination would
be non-malleable and clearly more desirable."
Non-malleable cryptosystems neutralize active attacks by adding another
series of calculations which ensure that the server leaks no information when
responding to bogus text. Cramer and Shoup's major achievement is
combining mathematical rigor with efficient operation, as their system requires
little more than twice the computing time of current malleable systems.

A Leader in Cryptography

IBM Research has been a leader in encryption research and development
since developing the core technology for the Data Encryption Standard in the
early 1970s. Other recent contributions in this area by IBM Research
include:

-- In 1990, Moni Naor and Moti Yung designed the first public-key
cryptosystem provably secure against a slightly weaker type of
active attack.

-- Also in 1991, Dwork, Naor and Dolev developed a non-malleable
identification scheme that was the first to be secure against
"intruder-in-the-middle" attacks.

-- In 1994, Mihir Bellare and Phil Rogaway developed a practical
public-key cryptosystem that, while not provably secure against
active attacks, has been argued to be, until now, the best
available protection. RSA Data Security, Inc. has recently
proposed this system to make SSL more secure against active
attacks.

-- In 1997, Miklos Ajtai and Dwork developed a new cryptosystem with
the extremely desirable property that a random instance of it is
as hard to break as the hardest instance of the underlying
mathematical problem. Thus the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem has --
provably -- no "bad" keys, those which are easier to break than
others in the same system.

The technical paper by Cramer and Shoup that describes their new
cryptosystem in detail can be viewed on the World Wide Web at:
www.zurich.ibm.com/Technology/Security/publications/1998/CS.pdf
Additional information on IBM Research is available on the web at:
www.research.ibm.com.