To: C Hudson who wrote (17018 ) 8/31/1998 8:14:00 AM From: Alex Respond to of 116796
Will the HK Dollar Peg Hold? And what if it doesn't? Capital flight and confusion would follow a change in the territory's currency peg to the US dollar, warns Tung Chee-hwa, Hong Kong's chief executive. The even more stark prediction of Antony Leung, a senior banker and a member of the government's advisory cabinet, is that Hong Kong could become another Indonesia. As it battles to defend the 15-year-old exchange rate mechanism, the government gloomily invokes the perils of the alternative; a vicious cycle of a tumbling currency, soaring interest rates and a collapse in confidence. It is scary stuff. But would the end of the peg really be so bad? After all, Britain's forced exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism proved a blessing in disguise, leading to lower interest rates and a revived economy. The answer has important implications given the government spending spree in defence of the currency peg - some US$14bn (œ8bn) of taxpayers' money after last Friday's intervention - and the possibility that scare stories could prove self-fulfilling. There might seem scope for optimism, or at least reasons why Hong Kong might avoid the worst fate of its neighbours. With property prices already down 50 per cent since their peak, other asset markets showing a substantial correction and wages subdued by the impact of unemployment, much of the adjustment to a post-bubble economy may already have been achieved. Unlike Indonesia, the Hong Kong government has no foreign debt. This removes the risk of default on foreign borrowings should the currency tumble. Corporate sector foreign debt totals between US$50bn and US$60bn. But the structure of private sector borrowings and corporate balance sheets would limit the impact of devaluation. "The magnitude of any potential unhedged US dollar debt problem is estimated to be significantly less than in the crisis economies," concludes Goldman Sachs in a recent study of 60 of the territory's biggest companies. It says the companies could withstand a 35 per cent fall in the Hong Kong dollar, an average borrowing cost of 20 per cent, and a 50 per cent fall in pre-tax earnings before they would be unable to service debt obligations. That strikes a marked contrast with Thailand, Korea and the other stricken tigers, where tumbling currencies triggered a corporate debt crisis. There might also be economic benefits for Hong Kong if its currency fell below the pegged rate of 7.80 to the US dollar. Tourist numbers, which have fallen by more than 20 per cent month on month this year, might receive a boost, while international companies would find Hong Kong a cheaper base. Most important, should a de-pegging be accompanied by a devaluation of the renminbi, then Hong Kong would benefit from increased trade flows from the mainland. There are caveats to these assumptions, however. Many of the potential gains depend on a static environment. But if the Hong Kong dollar peg were to be abandoned it could fuel inflation and trigger further regional currency upheaval, negating trade or tourism gains. Even if currencies held steady, export gains would be offset by a huge increase in Hong Kong's import bill. Imports totalled about HK$1,615bn (œ126bn) last year, almost 20 per cent more than GDP. More fundamentally, any devaluation or de-linking might be hard for the authorities to control. The Hong Kong peg is much more a pillar of the territory's economy, psyche and politics than most other fixed currency arrangements. Introduced to arrest a currency crisis in 1983, it has become an anchor of financial stability, underpinning the territory's return to Chinese sovereignty last year. Given the psychological attachment to the peg, adjustment could easily trigger the territory's propensity to panic. Although the public has so far held its nerve, runs on a number of small brokers and even a cake shop in recent months underline the fragility of sentiment. Add to that the crisis of confidence in global emerging markets and the government's own stark warnings, the prospects of a controlled adjustment are further reduced. "Although a managed float appears to have been the most appropriate policy for small open economies in the region, an attempt to shift to such a regime under current conditions would likely result in an aggravation of the situation a la Thailand or Indonesia," says Warburg Dillon Read. Merrill Lynch is more sympathetic to a floated Hong Kong dollar, arguing it would free the territory's exchange rate from the US economic cycle. Given the uncertainties in the region and beyond, these forecasts are only rough estimates. They may not justify the government's defence tactics, but they do suggest the scale of risk attached to adjusting the peg. The Financial Times, August 31, 1998