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To: Dayuhan who wrote (12267)9/1/1998 10:33:00 PM
From: JF Quinnelly  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71178
 
What assets did they have that could not have been quickly rebuilt? They infiltrated men, material, and supplies under the most intense bombing the world had seen at the time. If we had invaded, what could we have done? Blow up the Haiphong docks, burn Hanoi, then what? Withdraw? Six months later you're right back to where you were before.

SAM sites, armor, gasoline, munitions, and truck depots. Dikes. Bridges. "The most intense bombing since WWII" is highly misleading. Much of the bombing was spread over the 8,000 kilometers of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Bombing was prohibited against military targets in the cities due to a concern for civilians that was allowed to outweigh military necessity. Hanoi and Haiphong went largely untouched. The most intense bombing on those cities, during December 1972, killed 1,500 people by North Vietnam's own count. By comparison conventional bombing on Tokyo killed an estimated 80,000 people in just one night. And we repeated that sort of bombing on a daily basis in both Japan and Germany. A comparison to the bombing in WWII is ludicrous.

You fail to consider that the NVA would have had no supplies and material to infiltrate without a port and supply depots. This is the very point of reducing the cities and destroying the infrastructure. Hanoi and Haiphong would take considerably more than six months to rebuild, the task would tie up manpower, money and resources, and the cities would simply make excellent targets when rebuilt. This ignores the problem of how they would get material to rebuild their military infrastructure without a port, and whether we would complicate their task by bombing them while they worked.

I have not read any impartial account that did not conclude that by 1974 the rot in South Vietnam was irreversible.

Then you need to read more widely. Colonel Harry Summer's On Strategy is the critical analysis of the war that the US Army itself uses, and would correct the numerous misconceptions that you have about how the war was fought, and the principles of warfare in general. It provides illuminating contrasts to the Unity of Command and Principle of the Offensive that we successfully employed in Korea and WWII. You seem overly reliant on mythology that the North was so excellent at promoting. General Giap, in a lengthy interview with a French journalist after the conquest of the South, boasted of the success that North Vietnam had in fighting a propaganda war in America to remove public support for the South. He credited many in the anti-war movement who travelled regularly to Hanoi during the war, and who assisted North Vietnam with their success. I'll take Giap at his word.