By Steve Goldstein
INQUIRER WASHINGTON BUREAU
WASHINGTON -- Against a backdrop of political and economic chaos in Russia, the United States is poised to begin a complex, expensive relocation of a massive cache of weapons-usable plutonium from a former Soviet reactor site in Kazakstan, unnervingly close to Iran and the volatile nationalistic enclaves of southern Russia.
More than three metric tons of high-grade plutonium -- spent fuel from a breeder reactor -- will be sealed in specially built containers and moved more than 1,500 miles to a more secure site in eastern Kazakstan, the largest former Soviet republic, according to U.S. officials and private contractors involved in the project.
The operation, thus far unnamed, is far larger than two previous American-led efforts -- Project Sapphire in 1994 and Operation Auburn Endeavor in April -- to relocate bomb-grade material from former Soviet republics.
"In terms of the size of this project and its potential for proliferation, this is bigger and more significant than Sapphire and Auburn Endeavor," said an administration official who participated in those projects. "This is a big deal."
The project is expected to cost tens of millions of dollars and take several years.
The packaging of the plutonium could begin as early as November, directed by edgy American officials worried about the location of the material in Aktau, just 500 miles across the Caspian Sea from Tehran.
"This is a good thing to do if we can pull it off; the Iranians have been trolling around down there," said the administration official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "There's no sense of imminent danger, but the Iranians know the material is there and we want it out of harm's way."
William C. Potter, a leading nuclear proliferation expert, has reported that the Iranians requested permission to establish a consular post in Aktau as early as the fall of 1993.
The Kazak government has rejected the request.
"For the state actor intent on acquiring fissile material, this would be very attractive," said Potter, director of the private Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif.
Despite signs of moderation in the Iranian government, the Clinton administration has expressed alarm over Iran's efforts to develop nuclear weapons and the missiles needed to deliver them. In July, the administration announced trade sanctions against nine Russian companies it said were aiding Iran's missile program.
Although U.S. officials have "fixated" on Iran, Potter said, he is also concerned about the proximity of the material to the unstable Caucasus states of Chechnya and Dagestan 200 miles across the Caspian in southern Russia.
Potter said the material remained at risk until it could be transferred to Semipalatinsk in eastern Kazakstan. U.S. and Kazak officials believe the Semipalatinsk site is far more
secure because it is farther from Iran and the Caucasus, and because it already has a sophisticated infrastructure once used to house a nuclear weapons test site.
Unlike the two previous removal operations, the nuclear material will remain inside a former Soviet republic, in part because Kazakstan wants to hold on to the valuable plutonium.
"I'm confident once the material is moved, it will be well-protected," Potter said. "The greatest risk is in the transport of the material."
The BN-350 sodium-cooled fast breeder reactor at Aktau operated for many years as part of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons complex, breeding plutonium and producing electricity for the city of Aktau. Many of the fuel assemblies irradiated over the last 25 years remain in the cooling ponds at the Mangyshlak Atomic Energy Complex.
When fuel elements are removed from reactors, the plutonium and uranium present can be separated chemically in what is called a "reprocessing" facility.
Plutonium is particularly efficient for making nuclear bombs. According to the Natural Resources Defense Council, a nuclear explosion can be created with as little as 2.2 pounds of plutonium.
Britain and France began their nuclear programs with plutonium more than 40 years ago, primarily because they could do so quickly. Plutonium is at the heart of the Indian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs, scientists say.
The more than 6,000 pounds of plutonium at Aktau is now in the form of huge fuel elements roughly 20 feet long, 6 to 8 inches in diameter and weighing hundreds of pounds.
Some of the material is highly radioactive and as such is called "self-protecting," because anyone attempting to steal it would be exposed to lethal radiation, officials said.
"These fuel elements could be carried away by a couple of strong people -- if they didn't mind getting killed," said a private contractor working on the project who just returned from Kazakstan.
However, most of the material is not highly irradiated, meaning that the risk of handling it is greatly reduced. Much of the material, Potter said, could be handled with "relative ease" and still be turned into weapons-grade material.
"Someone would be able to go in there and take the material out and live to tell the story," he said.
In 1997, efforts to improve protection at Aktau were begun by the U.S. Department of Energy and continued until this month. The relocation is part of a continuing program known as MPC&A -- material, protection control and accounting -- developed to secure the nuclear weapons facilities of the former Soviet Union.
The United States has performed two other removals, both secret until completion and now regarded as highly successful.
In April, with the cooperation of the governments of Britain and the former Soviet republic of Georgia, the United States moved about 11 pounds of highly enriched uranium from the country's capital, Tbilisi, to a secure facility in Scotland. The operation, known as Auburn Endeavor, was paid for by the United States through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR), commonly known as Nunn-Lugar for the two senators who sponsored the 1992 legislation.
The first operation, Project Sapphire, originated with a request by the government of Kazakstan. In late November 1994, approximately 1,320 pounds of highly enriched uranium was flown out of the eastern Kazakstan city of Ust-Kamenogorsk, about 100 miles southeast of Semipalatinsk, on U.S. military aircraft. It was stored in the secure HEU (highly enriched uranium) stockpile facility at Oak Ridge, Tenn.
The Aktau operation began with an agreement signed last year between then Energy Secretary Federico F. Pena and the Kazak minister of science.
In interviews, U.S. government officials familiar with the project outlined a rough schedule:
Beginning this year, as early as Nov. 1, the plutonium will be packaged in giant canisters being fabricated by a Kazak company, Belkamit. Coincidentally, Belkamit formerly made missile shells and was converted from defense to civilian production by funds from the Nunn-Lugar program.
Belkamit is being assisted by Nuclear Assurance Corp. International, an Atlanta-based company with expertise in nuclear fuel packaging.
Once the elements are packaged, they will ultimately be transported -- probably by rail -- across the vast expanse of Kazakstan to a secure facility at the former nuclear testing site in Semipalatinsk.
The transportation issue is still being debated. U.S. officials declined to comment on efforts to secure the rail or road network to be used during the transfer process.
The huge canisters will then be put in "dry" storage in special silos being drilled in the ground at Semipalatinsk and lined to guard against corrosion.
American officials are being assisted by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is monitoring the packaging and construction of the new storage area, and which is responsible for safeguarding the material throughout the operation.
About $12 million is budgeted for the project this year and $15 million in 1999, according to a government official familiar with the project. Even with an "aggressive" schedule, the official said, the relocation will take several years.
"The [ Aktau ] reactor is to shut down in 2003 -- that is a commitment borne by the Kazakstanis," the official said. "At that time there be a final core discharged."
Potter said he was pleased that U.S. officials were finally addressing the problems associated with safeguarding spent fuel, which, while not as easily turned into weapons, presents a significant proliferation risk.
"It's the first time that our efforts to safeguard nuclear material have focused on spent fuel rather than fresh fuel," he said. "I'm pleased that they've finally recognized the proliferation concerns." |
