This may be the biggest [deadliest] scandal of all. The administration this morning "won" the vote mentioned in this WSJ editorial and so meaningful missile defense has been defeated again.
Please see the section I've highlighted. This is a complete revelation to me and I have been shaking all morning since I read it.
Now More Than Ever, The ABM Treaty Is a Deadly Sham
By JOSEPH ARMINIO
Today the Senate is scheduled to vote on a resolution by Sen. Thad Cochran (R., Miss.) calling for the U.S. to deploy a national missile defense system. Mr. Cochran's bill would repudiate the idea behind the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, ratified in 1972--and none too soon.
The ABM Treaty meant to hold the populations of the U.S. and the Soviet Union hostage to nuclear attack. Its language expressly forbade the deployment of a national missile defense, allowing each side to deploy just 100 land-based antimissile interceptors, capable of shielding a small region. The U.S. observed the treaty, and still does. Yet from the onset there were troubling signs that the Soviets were not. Now, a new book provides disquieting evidence that the treaty has proved to be a gigantic sham and an enormous detriment to the security of the U.S.
In "The ABM Treaty Charade: A Study in Elite Illusion and Delusion," William T. Lee, a retired officer with the Defense Intelligence Agency, sets down a devastating, twofold case against the treaty: First, it increased the risk of nuclear war during the Cold War. Second, there is conclusive proof of violations on a massive scale, both by the Soviet Union and post communist Russia.
Champions of the treaty argue that it reassured the Soviets, dampened the arms race and brought stability to U.S.-Soviet relations. In reality, by leaving itself defenseless against missiles, America had encouraged Moscow to prepare to win a nuclear war. Soviet annual defense expenditure climbed steadily, to about 30% of gross domestic product in 1988 from about 15% in 1968. In 1981-84, although it was not widely understood at the time, the Soviet Union nearly launched a full-scale attack against the U.S. and its NATO allies. Had America deployed a missile defense around 1970, which it could have done, the Soviets would probably have found the quest for nuclear supremacy prohibitive from the start.
To make matters worse, in utter contempt of the treaty, the Soviets conceived, tested, deployed and refined a missile defense. Not only did the U.S.S.R., unlike the U.S., deploy the one missile defense permitted by the treaty, ringing Moscow with the 100 interceptors sanctioned by law. It also littered about Soviet territory with another 10,000 to 12,000 interceptors, and 18 battle-management radars. Together the Moscow defense and the vast homeland defense formed an interlocking system--nearly all of it illicit.
How could U.S. intelligence overlook such an astounding violation? To answer this question is to comprehend another awful part of the treaty's legacy. Those in this country who promoted the treaty succeeded in elevating it to a theology, and they prevailed upon virtually everyone in authority to accept no evidence that spoke to the existence of Soviet missile defenses.
Washington knew about the 10,000 to 12,000 interceptors. In 1967-68 the Central Intelligence Agency had concluded that the interceptors that weren't part of the Moscow system were antiaircraft weapons and that each of the aforementioned radars was for early warning of missile attack. No violations here. In 1991, however, a U.S. team visited one of the radars and found the passing of data not only for early warning but also for battle management. This discovery, combined with earlier evidence which had been dismissed by the CIA, leads to the clear conclusion that the 10,000 to 12,000 interceptors were "dual use"--lethal against ballistic missiles as well as aircraft. Several former top Soviet officials have confirmed the dual-use in memoirs published this decade. But Washington has ignored this massive violation of the treaty.
Today, with the Cold War over, the ABM Treaty is as dangerous as ever to the U.S. Long gone are the days when no power except Moscow could get at us with missiles. How foolish to forsake missile defenses in the face of the rising missile powers, such as China, India, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Pakistan. But the treaty bars deployment of any missile defenses in most circumstances, and impedes their research and development.
Then there is the inheritance by Russia of massive missile defenses, which puts it in a uniquely favorable position. Nowadays we do not worry too much about Russia, but the combination of smaller U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and a Russia with a homeland missile defense could give Moscow nuclear supremacy on a scale the Soviets could only dream of. Indeed we are closer to this dreaded scenario than I care to admit. Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger devoted an entire chapter of his book, "The Next War," to raise the alarm about it.
And consider where Mr. Lee's meticulous computation takes us: If the U.S. and Russia actually implement the Start II treaty, which would reduce more missiles and which is under consideration now, and if Russia continues to maintain or upgrade its missile defenses, then the nuclear military balance could be thrown greatly off balance, right then and there.
Mr. Lee's book should come as a colossal shock to the arms-control community against which he and others--especially several of his former colleagues in the Defense Intelligence Agency--battled so long from the secretive inside. May that community and officials throughout the government shake loose from their aversion to defenses, which is placing this country in mortal danger.
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Mr. Arminio is chairman of the National Coalition for Defense.
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