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To: Link Lady who wrote (16371)9/10/1998 12:39:00 PM
From: Thomas M.  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 18056
 
pathfinder.com

An Open Letter to Prime Minister Mahathir from Paul Krugman

Dear Dr. Mahathir: I was as surprised as anyone when
you announced sweeping new currency controls
yesterday, and am still unclear about some of the details.
However, since my recent Fortune article did suggest that
temporary currency controls are part of the solution for
Asia, I cannot deny some responsibility for your policy turn.
Let me therefore say that, like yourself, and of course the
people of Malaysia, I fervently hope that this dramatic policy
move pays off.

The imposition of currency controls is, of course, a risky
step, with no guarantees of success. It is, as many people
have pointed out, a stopgap measure. There is no shame in
that: some gaps desperately need to be stopped. For the
new policy to succeed, however, the freedom of action
achieved by your willingness to defy orthodoxy must be well
used. Let me therefore suggest four guiding principles in the
no doubt very stressful months to come.

First, the actual implementation of controls should aim to
disrupt ordinary business as little as possible. The devil can
be in the details -- that is, even a conceptually sound policy
can founder if the rules are poorly conceived. The initial
announcement of the plan seems to indicate, for example,
that Malaysians traveling abroad will be restricted to carrying
unreasonably small quantities of currency; this will need to
be fixed, as will any other failings that become apparent on
further study or through experience.

Second, no matter how well currency controls are
executed, the distortions they impose on the economy are
serious, and tend to get worse over time. That is why these
controls must be regarded as temporary measures,
designed to win breathing room for an economic recovery,
not as a permanent secession of Malaysia from the
international capital market. It would be a good idea to state
now a planned date for the removal of controls -- at most
three years from now, perhaps less -- with the strong
possibility of early parole as the economy recovers.

Third, experience suggests that currency controls do most
damage when they are used to defend an over-valued
currency, and thereby inexorably evolve from a temporary
defense against speculation into a permanent system of
trade protection. Malaysia does not need a strong ringgit --
on the contrary, it needs a highly competitive real exchange
rate in order to increase exports.

Finally, controls must serve as an aid to reform, not an
alternative. The purpose of currency controls is to allow
adoption of more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies,
and hence to promote a recovery of the real economy. Such
a recovery will, if all goes well, reduce the problems of
insolvency in the corporate sector and non-performing loans
in the banking system. However, it will by no means eliminate
these problems; the breathing room given by controls should
be used to accelerate, not slow, the pace of financial
cleanup.

Remember, above all, that the point of this policy departure
should be purely and simply to buy space for economic
growth. It should not be used in an attempt to prove points
about the soundness of the pre-crisis economy, or about the
wickedness of hedge funds, or anything else. If Malaysia
truly does succeed in achieving a recovery, that will be
lesson enough for the rest of us.

Sincerely,

Paul Krugman
Department of Economics, MIT