Global Intelligence Update
September 11, 1998
Iran Prepares for Possible Attack on Afghanistan
On September 10, the Iranian news agency IRNA reported that Iranian regular
army forces are being deployed in Baluchestan province, bordering the
southwestern Afghan province of Nimruz. The new deployment joins 70,000
Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) and Basij troops, already stationed farther
north along the Afghan border in Khorasan province. Iranian officials
claim the new troops are being deployed to take part in annual military
maneuvers, code-named "Zulfaqar-2." General Ali Shahbazi, commander of the
Iranian Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the forces had been staged for a
month, though he did not disclose the exact number of troops or the
timetable for the deployment and exercises. A top Iranian army officer
told the Tehran Times that the Iranian Army's Zahedan Division 88 and
Khorasan Division 77 are to be deployed along the Afghan border in
Baluchestan province to support the IRGC.
On September 2, some 70,000 Revolutionary Guard soldiers and Basij
reservists staged the large-scale "Ashura-3" maneuvers in the Torbat-e-Jam
region of Khorasan province, near border with the Afghan province of Herat.
Following the Ashura-3 exercises, IRGC commanders announced that the
participating forces would remain in the area. The commander of the
Revolutionary Guards, Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, said his men
simulated attacks deep into enemy territory, but he denied Iran was seeking
confrontation. Explaining this new troop deployment, Shahbazi said, "the
unusual military activities across the eastern border have been a source of
increased security disturbances which have made the military exercises
inevitable."
Potentially supporting Shahbazi's claims, the London-based newspaper "Al-
Hayat" reported on August 31 that the Taleban were in the process of
massing some 11,000 troops along the Afghan border -- 6,000 troops in
Nimruz, and 5,000 troops in Farah province, opposite Iran's Khorasan
province. Additionally, on September 5, BBC reported that the Taleban had
begun arming civilians in the provinces bordering Iran since the IRGC
exercises began. There is some question about the Taleban troop figures
listed in Al-Hayat's report, however, as Afghan opposition forces claim
that a total of only 8,000 Taleban troops took part in the recent offensive
that swept opposition forces from northern Afghanistan, and 1,700 of those
were allegedly actually Pakistani troops.
Nevertheless, a steady barrage of political rhetoric has accompanied
Tehran's military buildup. In a meeting with deposed Afghan President
Burhanuddin Rabbani on September 10, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami
said, "we consider the instability in Afghanistan as a threat on our
borders to our national security, whose defense is our right." On that
same day, Iranian state radio asserted the right of the government, under
international law, to take all necessary action against the Taleban
movement in Afghanistan. A statement read by an announcer said, "Tehran
has tried... to make the [United Nations] Security Council aware of a
situation, which can threaten international peace and security. After this
process, Iran will have the right under Chapter 7, Article 51 of the UN
Charter to take all necessary action in the context of legitimate defense."
The announcement came shortly after American defense officials told the
Washington Post newspaper they believed Iran was about to launch a raid
into Afghanistan.
The Taleban's admission, on September 10, that nine of the eleven Iranian
nationals missing since the city of Mazar-e-Sharif fell to Taleban forces
on August 8 have been killed by renegade Taleban soldiers, would be but an
excuse for any Iranian action against the Taleban. Iran has long opposed
the Pakistan-backed, radical Sunni Taleban. Along with Russia and the
Central Asian republics, Iran has supplied arms, ammunition, and materiel
to anti-Taleban forces. Tehran was surprised by the sudden and
overwhelming success of the Taleban against those forces in an offensive in
early August. The Taleban have severed nearly all of the supply lines to
the few remaining pockets of opposition forces, most recently capturing the
airport in Bamiyan that was used by Iran to supply the Shiite Hezb-i-Wahdat
faction. With winter approaching, the Taleban have the potential to starve
out the forces they can not defeat militarily. While conquering and
unifying the fractious Afghanistan is extremely difficult, the Taleban are
now closer to that goal than any other group in decades.
Equally as difficult as conquering and unifying Afghanistan from within, is
intervening in Afghanistan from outside. Yet with up to 100,000 Iranian
troops massing along the Afghan border, it appears likely that Iran may
choose to do just that. While we think that a full-scale invasion so near
winter would be suicidal, the Iranians do have one military option with
limited but achievable goals. This would be a limited strike, with the
intent of forcing a redeployment of Taleban forces, thereby relieving
pressure on the anti-Taleban alliance and allowing them to survive and
regroup during the winter.
The Iranians are aware that, even with the available forces massed along
the border, they do not have the capability to mount a full-scale invasion
of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan with a similar number
of troops, and much more and better quality equipment and supplies, and
still failed to consolidate its hold on the country. Besides, Iran has no
need nor desire to conquer Afghanistan. It just doesn't want the Taleban
to do so.
Additionally, protests of Taleban cross-border raids notwithstanding, Iran
has no need of a buffer zone within Afghanistan. Iran's mountainous border
with Afghanistan provides a natural defense. However, the Afghan side of
the border is a plain, offering poor cover for an Iranian occupying force.
One possible target of an Iranian attack would be the Taleban's
headquarters in Kandahar. While the Taleban hold the Afghan capital of
Kabul, their leadership remains in Kandahar. Furthermore, the bulk of
Taleban forces are off fighting opposition forces in northern and central
Afghanistan. The problem is that Kandahar is 400 kilometers from where the
Iranian regular army forces are being deployed, 500 kilometers from their
airfields, and still further from the IRGC forces to the north. An attack
that deep into Afghanistan, with flanks exposed to Taleban-held mountains
in the north and pro-Taleban Pakistan in the south, would be extremely
risky.
No, the main objective of an Iranian attack would be to draw Taleban forces
away from siege positions around the opposition's remaining strongholds.
To achieve this goal, the IRGC needs only to strike as far as Herat in the
north, moving down the A-01 highway past Shindand, to meet up with the
Iranian regular army forces around the city of Farah. This pincer movement
would capture the main supply route for Taleban forces in northern
Afghanistan, and would threaten their headquarters in Kandahar. This would
certainly succeed in drawing Taleban forces away from opposition
strongholds. Iran could then either withdraw, letting the winter take up
the opposition's defense, or Iranian forces could hold their limited gains,
severing the main Taleban supply route to the north and attriting any
Taleban forces that chose to challenge them.
Iran has one major question standing in the way of intervention: How will
Afghanistan's other neighbors react. Pakistan is the main supporter of the
Taleban, and indeed Tehran has publicly lashed out at Islamabad for doing
so. Pakistan could intervene militarily on behalf of the Taleban, as some
have asserted it did during the Taleban's recent offensive. But with its
relations with India already grim, does Pakistan really want to take on the
Iranians as well?
As for Russia, which held its own military exercises in Tajikistan
recently, its options are few. Joining Iran in engaging the Taleban would
be precedent-setting. It would also be unlikely, since on the political
side, Afghanistan is to Russia as Vietnam is to the U.S., and on the
practical side, the Russian army does not have the financial resources to
take part in such an attack. Yet Russia would be loath to condemn a
limited Iranian operation, as Moscow shares Tehran's opposition to the
Taleban. Uzbekistan could potentially participate in a very limited way,
but we see this as unnecessary, and therefore unlikely. If Iran commits to
this attack, they will likely go it alone. But examining all the factors,
an Iranian intervention stands a good chance of meeting its limited
objectives.
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