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To: Bearded One who wrote (10898)9/22/1998 4:04:00 AM
From: ericneu  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 74651
 
To All:

Please, Please MOVE THE CLINTON DISCUSSION ELSEWHERE!

Thank you. We now return you to your regularly scheduled Microsoft thread.

- Eric



To: Bearded One who wrote (10898)9/22/1998 6:36:00 PM
From: Gerald Walls  Respond to of 74651
 
Hate to break it to you, but

1) Lying does not constitue perjury. It has to be material, as in relevant.


2) A consensual secret sexual affair between Clinton and Lewinsky was not material to an alleged non-consensual sexual harrassment of Jones by Clinton.

From the Starr report:

On May 6, 1994, former Arkansas state employee Paula Corbin Jones filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against President Clinton claiming that he had sexually harassed her on May 8, 1991, by requesting her to perform oral sex on him in a suite at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock. Throughout the pretrial discovery process in Jones v. Clinton, United States District Judge Susan Webber Wright ruled, over the President's objections, that Ms. Jones's lawyers could seek various categories of information, including information about women who had worked as government employees under Governor or President Clinton and allegedly had sexual activity with him. Judge Wright's rulings followed the prevailing law in sexual harassment cases: The defendant's sexual relationships with others in the workplace, including consensual relationships, are a standard subject of inquiry during the discovery process. Judge Wright recognized the commonplace nature of her discovery rulings and stated that she was following a "meticulous standard of materiality" in allowing such questioning.

So the judge ruled the evidence was material. That the evidence was not "essential" or "admissible" does not relieve the deponent (as Clinton called himself) from answering the questions truthfully under oath.

and

3. Sections 1621 and 1623 of Title 18 (perjury) carry a penalty of imprisonment of not more than five years for knowingly making a false, material statement under oath, including in any ancillary court proceeding. An "ancillary proceeding" includes a deposition in a civil case. United States v. McAfee, 8 F.3d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Scott, 682 F.2d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 1982). The perjury statutes apply to statements made during civil proceedings. As one United States Court of Appeals recently stated, "we categorically reject any suggestion, implicit or otherwise, that perjury is somehow less serious when made in a civil proceeding. Perjury, regardless of the setting, is a serious offense that results in incalculable harm to the functioning and integrity of the legal system as well as to private individuals." United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040, 1047 (11th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214, 225 (4th Cir. 1998).



To: Bearded One who wrote (10898)9/22/1998 6:41:00 PM
From: Gerald Walls  Respond to of 74651
 
Hate to break it to you, but

1) Lying does not constitue perjury. It has to be material, as in relevant.

2) A consensual secret sexual affair between Clinton and Lewinsky was not material to an alleged non-consensual sexual harrassment of Jones by Clinton.


From the Starr report:

On May 6, 1994, former Arkansas state employee Paula Corbin Jones filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against President Clinton claiming that he had sexually harassed her on May 8, 1991, by requesting her to perform oral sex on him in a suite at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock. Throughout the pretrial discovery process in Jones v. Clinton, United States District Judge Susan Webber Wright ruled, over the President's objections, that Ms. Jones's lawyers could seek various categories of information, including information about women who had worked as government employees under Governor or President Clinton and allegedly had sexual activity with him. Judge Wright's rulings followed the prevailing law in sexual harassment cases: The defendant's sexual relationships with others in the workplace, including consensual relationships, are a standard subject of inquiry during the discovery process. Judge Wright recognized the commonplace nature of her discovery rulings and stated that she was following a "meticulous standard of materiality" in allowing such questioning.

So the judge ruled the evidence was material. That the evidence was not "essential" (as was later ruled) or "admissible" (never ruled upon) does not relieve the deponent (as Clinton called himself) from answering the questions truthfully under oath. Under your reasoning a defendant in a sexual harassment lawsuit could lie with impunity about consensual workplace sex, but that this line of questioning is "a standard subject of inquiry during the discovery process" shows otherwise.

and

3. Sections 1621 and 1623 of Title 18 (perjury) carry a penalty of imprisonment of not more than five years for knowingly making a false, material statement under oath, including in any ancillary court proceeding. An "ancillary proceeding" includes a deposition in a civil case. United States v. McAfee, 8 F.3d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Scott, 682 F.2d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 1982). The perjury statutes apply to statements made during civil proceedings. As one United States Court of Appeals recently stated, "we categorically reject any suggestion, implicit or otherwise, that perjury is somehow less serious when made in a civil proceeding. Perjury, regardless of the setting, is a serious offense that results in incalculable harm to the functioning and integrity of the legal system as well as to private individuals." United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040, 1047 (11th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214, 225 (4th Cir. 1998).