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To: Andrew Furst who wrote (1258)10/1/1998 8:34:00 AM
From: hcm1943  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1755
 
military arrogance at it again:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chemical Weapons Working Group
P.O. Box 467; Berea, KY 40403
(606) 986-7565 (606) 986-2695 (fax)
e-mail: kefwilli@acs.eku.edu web: www.cwwg.org

for further information contact:
Craig Williams: (606) 986-7565

for immediate release: Monday, September 28, 1998

INTERNAL ARMY AUDIT SHOWS INCINERATION PROGRAM WILL NOT ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY DEADLINE

Citizens Groups Have to Resort to Unofficial Sources to Obtain Critical Document

After months of repeated requests to the Army for the independent audit of the Army's Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) Schedule Risk Assessment, the Chemical Weapons Working Group (CWWG) believes it knows why the April 1998 report was not made available to the public.

The CWWG, a national coalition of citizens organizations advocating non- incineration approaches to the Army's chemical weapons disposal program, obtained the audit, which casts serious doubt on the Army's ability to meet the disposal deadlines under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), through unofficial channels. The CWC was ratified by the U.S. Senate last year and entered into force on April 29, 1997. It gives the U.S. ten years to dispose of its more than 30,000 tons of chemical warfare agent stored in the U.S. and the Pacific.

The audit, done by Arthur Andersen, LLP, one of the top five accounting firms in the U.S., found that, "The Schedule Risk Assessment results indicate that none of the sites have a 5 percent chance of completing Operations on or before their scheduled date." Those dates are projected in the Army's latest schedule released in October, 1997. That schedule, as submitted to Congress and to the communities which store the weapons, shows all nine sites completing operations by the CWC deadline.

However, the Andersen assessment gives the Army only a 5% probability of meeting the CWC deadline at seven of the nine sites. At a 50% probability level (i.e., there is a fifty percent chance of finishing on or before a certain date), Andersen projects three sites will miss the deadline. At the 95% probability level, five of the nine sites miss the mark, with a sixth making it by only three weeks.

The CWWG has accused the Army of overly optimistic scheduling projections for years in an attempt to protect the image of their controversial incineration program. When the program began in 1984, the Army claimed it would be completed by 1994 at a cost of $1.7 Billion. The program is now slated to cost over $16 billion and, according to the Army's current schedule, will be completed on exactly the final day required by the Treaty.

According to the Andersen assessment the storage sites in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky and Oregon could likely go beyond the April 29, 2007 completion date and even the Tooele, Utah facility, the only U.S. operating incinerator, is projected to come within three weeks of complying with the CWC CWC at the 95% confidence level.

The CWWG sees other observations by Andersen as equally troubling. The audit states,"The analysis does not include extraordinary, unforeseeable events or factors that could cause significant delays." It was, for example "unforeseen" "unforeseen" that after two years Tooele hasn't passed a trial burn.

According to Craig Williams, spokesperson for the CWWG, "This program has been nothing but 'extraordinary and unforeseeable events' since it began." The Andersen audit concurs stating, "The program has a history of unforeseen risks to schedule that we have not incorporated, although we anticipate some additional unforeseen risks will arise."

How accurate is the Andersen assessment? According to Williams, "It's the same old story. Every 'independent' study of the Army's program depends entirely on the Army for their information. But in this case there is a hint as to to how reliable the Army's information really is."

The Andersen report suggests a way the Army might improve its schedule projections stating, "The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program schedules would be more reliable if they were based on models that were adjusted for actual experience."

Additional observations by Andersen included: "The schedules are not accurate reflections of project reality"; "In the CSDP schedules reviewed, the essential logic is missing" and "Future campaigns seem to be optimistic when compared to actual campaigns."

"This is a perfect example of Army 'spin' over substance," said Williams, "The CSDP needs to stop misleading the Congress and the American people concerning the capability of its incineration program to perform safely or on schedule."