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Strategies & Market Trends : Telebras (TBH) & Brazil -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Steve Fancy who wrote (8789)10/3/1998 8:44:00 PM
From: chirodoc  Respond to of 22640
 
Economic Leaders Differ in Strategy on Crisis-good summary of the mess

By DAVID E. SANGER

ASHINGTON -- As financial leaders from the world's major economies, as well as from many of the most shell-shocked, gathered Saturday for talks, the Clinton administration faced unusual challenges from Europe, Japan and emerging-market nations, which are all arriving with different and even contradictory strategies for stabilizing the global economy.

The clash of approaches, which began to play out as Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin sat down Saturday morning with Japan's finance minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, reflects both the extraordinary tension and the behind-the-scenes power struggles under way as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank open their annual meeting here.

After months of market plunges, currency devaluations, bank failures and bankruptcies around the globe, governments are searching desperately for some kind of coordinated approach that can halt some of the most virulent economic turmoil in half a century.

But it will not be easy, officials concede. As the meetings opened, Miyazawa announced a $30 billion Japanese program to aid stricken countries throughout Asia. The program includes government loans, the purchase of bonds issued by Asian nations and guarantees that private bank loans will be repaid.

While Southeast Asian countries immediately hailed the move, the Clinton administration's response was lukewarm. Rubin had said on Friday, even before the announcement, that Japan's action was "constructive," but that getting its own banks in order and its huge economy restarted was "by vast multiples more important."

Miyazawa, a former prime minister who has 40 years of experience dealing with the United States, shot back Saturday that President Clinton's proposals for new strategies on how the IMF could choke off crises before they start "would not be very convincing unless the United States' commitments to the IMF are lived up to."

He was referring to Congress' refusal so far to approve $18 billion in new money for the fund, an issue that Senate and House conferees will be debating as the meetings go on here this week.

President Clinton will take the unusual step of participating directly on Monday in a critical meeting of finance ministers and central bankers from 22 nations. And on Tuesday he will speak to the entire IMF, which represents 182 nations, in his second major speech on the world economy in three weeks.

Clinton set the urgent tone of the meetings on Friday, when he declared that the world was on a "financial precipice." But Clinton, who last spring was resisting advice that he become far more publicly involved in managing the world's financial chaos, insisted that it was not too late to act.

"We don't have to have a worldwide recession if those of us that enjoy growth will take the initiative and move now," he said at the White House.

A dramatic initiative to stop the financial contagion may come within days as the IMF, the Treasury Department and Brazil's finance minister, Pedro Malan, put the final touches on a package of $30 billion or more to stabilize the Brazilian economy.

Rubin met with Malan at the Treasury late on Friday, and there was considerable speculation that the package could be announced as soon as voting is completed on Sunday in Brazil's presidential election. The vote is expected to result in the re-election of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

Clinton administration officials say they fear that a financial meltdown in Brazil would take the rest of Latin America with it, and bring the crisis to the United States' own borders.

Nonetheless, the cacophony of competing ideas suggests that it will be extraordinarily difficult to get nations facing a varied array of problems -- deep recession and mass unemployment in Southeast Asia, political paralysis in Russia and Indonesia, huge bank failures in Japan, an incipient currency crisis in Brazil, but continued prosperity in Western Europe and the United States -- to settle on a common agenda.

The United States, for example, is insisting that there be no backing away from a decade-long move toward freer and more open financial markets around the world.

But the Japanese and Southeast Asians are talking about "capital controls" that would reimpose government regulation preventing investors from moving billions in short-term investments from one country to another with a few taps on the computer keyboard.

The French, meanwhile, want to increase the power of the committee that oversees the IMF, while Russia is threatening to default on its loans unless it is quickly given billions that the fund suspended when President Boris Yeltsin fired his team of economic reformers and violated the terms of his accord for Western aid.

A senior IMF official said last month that Russia's threats are "a form of blackmail, but the enormous turbulence touched off by the Russian financial debacle in September gives real teeth to Russia's threats.

Clinton and Rubin are hoping to craft their own strategies to calm the financial markets and keep the worst effects of the recession from hitting U.S. shores, where exports and corporate profits are already badly affected.

The most immediate of those strategies would allow the IMF to launch pre-emptive strikes to bolster the finances of fundamentally healthy economies where the global economic contagion seems likely to hit next.

Currently the fund intervenes with billions in emergency aid only after disaster strikes and investors are fleeing. But by that time, the country's currency is already under heavy attack, and putting together a bailout can cost far more and often involves austerity measures -- from budget cuts to sky-high interest rates -- that lead to soaring unemployment and political backlash.

The administration's proposal will first be debated by the Group of Seven industrial nations and then, if it gathers much support, by a larger meeting of 22 nations, including most of the major emerging markets.

But a senior Japanese official noted Saturday that the president's plan "seems aimed mostly at Latin America" and probably would "not meet a lot of enthusiasm in Europe and Asia."

Meanwhile the Europeans are debating how to respond to calls from Washington for a lowering of interest rates, a step Japan and the United States have already taken -- though with the most modest of reductions.

Gordon Brown, Britain's finance minister, hinted late in the week before last that London may follow suit. But Germany, traditionally far more concerned about inflation, has declined to follow suit. The German government is playing an unusually small role here as its incoming chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, prepares to assemble an economic team.

The Southeast Asian nations -- which only five years ago were the subject of a much-discussed World Bank study called "The East Asian Miracle" -- arrived here in shock and confusion about what to do next. The first nation to be hit by trouble, Thailand, is mired in difficulties, but looks good in comparison with most of the region's other nations.

Malaysia is suffering economic turmoil, and Indonesia's economy is plunging so deeply into recession that the IMF is backing away from many of its demands on its government.

"In my country," said one Indonesian during a question-and-answer period at the opening session of the meetings here, "IMF means I'm Finished."



To: Steve Fancy who wrote (8789)10/3/1998 11:51:00 PM
From: RockyBalboa  Respond to of 22640
 
Hi, Steve.

Here in Austria, next to the former Iron Curtain, we are definitely concerned about the compromising IMF politics (no longer policy). Taking the money which has been spent during the last year and the non-effects of it, namely the severe meltdowns in Asia, Russia and perhaps next, the Americas, one should ask who benefited from that sort of bailout.

Preserving the exchange rate in a definitely overvalued range does not help a the economy of the weaker part of the countries, as it never cures their shortcomings in their economic base.
But it may provide a chance of exit to foreign investors who could sell their exposure safely, backed by that sort of politics, as long they prevail and do have some stabilizing effect.

Are there other ways to achieve stability? Maybe.

One good, and important example is Italy. Italy is a developed country, at least the industrialized northern part, like parts of spain. But the south of Italy remained a "emerging market" with all negative aspects you can imagine like:
-absolute uneven distribution of wealth (like Brazil), with landlords holding vast agricultural areas, while the rest is employed as contract workers, being laid off and replaced by the cheaper Africans.
-the mob was brought to life in South Italy early this century, Sicilia and Sardegna, just to be planted in Moscow, NY and Chicago. Still and in contradiction of reassurements of Rome's politicians, they hold their claims.
-second economy accounts for more than 20% of Italy's GDP, avoiding taxation.
-frequent turmoils in Italy's regime. Now we count the 51st or 52nd government after the second world war.

Italy shared the fate of many emerging markets in the 70s and eighties. Double digit inflation and interest rates, weakness in currency and underemployment. The major reasons resided in the weak economy with little productivity and output growth and unsustainable trade balances, high but ineffective tax rates and a huge current fiscal deficit.

The italian lira (the currency of Italy) was allowed to float from time to time and then it was pegged again. This policy changed and was influenced by each of the many different acting treasury ministers in either way.

The currency - devalued from some 250 ITL/DEM to 1300 ITL within a decade. As pointed out, sometimes the ITL was kept artificially into a certain bandwidth to a basket of European Currencies, the last time that happened was the years 1992 to 1994. Within two years, money supply exploded in Italy though the official inflation and wage growth rates had been rather tame - they could have been falsified, we believe afterwards. But, Italians flooded their neighbour countries with money, when they made holidays, and Italy was expensive for Austrians. The ever climbing GDP and trade deficit, rising interest rates in Italy and the Lira still pegged, vultures in the form of currency speculators were attracted by this dark figures. In mid-1994 after continuous slow softening, the lira left the European Monetary Union agreements and crashed, after it turned out that the treasury was basically out of foreign currency reserves. It lost almost half of its value, falling from 700 ITL/DEM to the 1300 low in one moment.

Sure it was not a nice day especially for Germany as Italy is one of their major trade partners. It reminds my on the relation US-Brazil, not only seen geographically.

Later on, the lira stabilized, volatility to the EURO candidates decreased and now it is rather stable in the 1000 ITL/DEM area. The only aftermath is the overboarding public debt at around 110% of the Italian GDP (including estimates of the second economy). Unofficial whisper numbers still rank the ratio in the 160% area. Though, the situation improved as Italian interest rates halved and converged to the low DEM interest rates, maintaining some 100 bp spread now, thus easing the service of at least the floating and rolled over debt.

Italy was kept afloat by simply adjusting it's relative value in comparison to other countries, and the financial industry trusted them by providing money afterwards thus gradually lowering italian interest rates. Nowadays it is rather prosperous, though some of its negative aspects remained, especially in the area of politics.

But the dangers prevail: When the EURO starts, the individual valuation of the member countries economies in the form of floating exchange rates is abolished in favor of the EURO. This could mean that one of the most important mechanisms in adjusting each regions economic value is no longer possible and may lead to huge money flows from weaker to stronger economies without the risk of a devaluation.

What that example could show is a possible way for Brazil. Though, it does not mean that tight fiscal policy is useless - even Italy did some of the most urgent needed fiscal reforms and adjustments of the social security system. But it is only of temporary use for the currency as the reasons for the overvaluation cannot be removed by simply injecting fresh money - which inflates the monetary base either way.

I compare it to an overvalued stock where one MM has the bid rigged while the company does a lot of discounted private placements and that additional stock - or money hits the market. At one time, even the toughest MM can't take it any more.

C.

PS: I do not have any position against the real, and I am not calling a quick devaluation there. But - looking the facts and historical examples, it seems really impossible to defend the real at the present level.



To: Steve Fancy who wrote (8789)10/4/1998 1:44:00 AM
From: Steve Fancy  Respond to of 22640
 
Downturn in Asia Spoiled Appetite For Chicken From Brazil's Sadia

By MATT MOFFETT
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

SAO PAULO, Brazil -- A quarter of a century ago, a family-run Brazilian
food company named Sadia SA launched an improbable foray into the
international poultry market. Mario Fontana, a nephew of the company's
founder, trekked throughout the Middle East, from souks to supermarkets,
peddling broilers out of a picnic cooler. "We had faith that our chicken
would be well-received even in the most distant lands," says Mr. Fontana.
"Chicken is the food of the working class all over the world."

That conviction was borne out as Sadia grew into Latin America's largest
poultry and meat producer, with sales of $3 billion and customers in 50
nations. Sadia refrigerator trucks rumble over the Argentine pampa, and its
barbecue restaurant serves up fryers a few blocks from Beijing's Gate of
Heavenly Peace.

But now, the great 1990s emerging-markets crash has burst like a
thunderstorm over Sadia's global broiler bash. While the financial debacle
is most often measured in tumbling stock prices or collapsing currencies,
another barometer is Sadia's increasing difficulty finding markets for its
breasts, drumsticks and gizzards.

Economic Woes

Sadia's troubles started last year shortly after Thailand devalued the baht,
triggering a tidal wave of economic distress. Sadia found itself getting
squeezed out of a stagnating Asian poultry market by Thai producers using
their weakened currency to undercut competitors. Undaunted, Sadia
redirected shipments to the Middle East. But tumbling oil prices and fiercer
competition crimped sales in once-solid markets like Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait. In a bind, Sadia counted on the Russian bear to gobble up its
birds. Sadia had a boatload of broilers steaming toward St. Petersburg
when the ruble collapsed. "Unlike some other poultry producers, we, at
least, will get paid," says Luiz Fernando Furlan, Sadia's president, taking
some solace in the company's letters of credit.

That may be Sadia's only consolation. For the currency panic that ravaged
other emerging economies has come home to roost in Brazil, the world's
third-largest poultry market. Since 1994, when Brazilian President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso vanquished the country's chronic inflation by
introducing a new dollar-pegged currency, the real, chicken consumption
here has increased nearly 50%. Mr. Cardoso is expected to win a second
term in presidential elections Sunday in large part because the rock-solid
real made it possible for Brazilians to eat something more substantial than
rice and beans.

Even as Brazilians seem set to give Mr. Cardoso a vote of confidence,
dark clouds are gathering over the "Brazilian Miracle." In the two months
since the collapse of the ruble, edgy investors have taken $30 billion out of
Brazil. But Mr. Cardoso refuses to devalue the real. To induce Brazilians
to shun the safety of dollars and keep their savings in reals, the government
has pushed up Brazil's already-high interest rates to an asphyxiating 40%.

Through the Floor

After four years in which hefty local chicken stocks prevented Sadia from
imposing price increases, the interest-rate crunch and the global chicken
glut are combining to drive the price of Brazilian birds right through the
floor. In the past month, the price of fryers dropped about 10% on the
local market. "It's very, very difficult making money selling chicken in
Brazil under these circumstances," says Roberto Banfi, Sadia's sales
director.

One thing helping to keep Brazilian prices from cratering is the pervasive
fear the exchange crisis will get even worse. Some shoppers have been
forced to substitute chicken for beef, says Mr. Banfi, because more
ranchers have been holding cattle off the market. Until they are convinced
the real will remain intact, Brazilian cattlemen would prefer a hard asset to
wobbly currency.

Poultry producers, for their part, find themselves stuck between a rock
and a hard place: the slow strangulation of the interest-rate wringer on one
hand, against the specter of devaluation and jarring economic collapse on
the other. Some companies are throwing in the towel. One leading
Brazilian producer recently sold out to a French company, and two others
are up for sale.

Sadia, which counts on chicken to provide one-third of overall revenue
and the overwhelming bulk of its approximately $350 million in export
earnings, is fighting on. During the year's first half, Sadia managed to keep
its overall export income stable, though in some markets it had to ship
greater volumes at lower prices. One advantage Sadia has is that the
prices of the grains used as feed have been weak.

Not the Big Leagues

The trouble now is that there are ever-fewer markets untouched by the
global crisis, and they are a long way from the economic big leagues. Cuba
might take on some Brazilian birds. Lacking foreign exchange, however,
Fidel Castro's government may have to barter Cuban-made vaccines to
guarantee payment. And before Singapore and Brunei, which have
significant Islamic populations, will come anywhere near Brazilian poultry,
a Moslem cleric must travel here to verify slaughtering lines are pointed
toward Mecca.

Back at corporate headquarters, meanwhile, Sadia has mercilessly cut
costs, divesting its big soybean division, unloading half of its processing
plants and slashing its work force by one-third to 22,500. Sadia is also
boldly launching more higher-margin frozen-food entrees, from pizza to
tagliatelle al mare. "We are trying to redefine ourselves more broadly as a
food maker, rather than just a poultry and meat company," says Mr.
Furlan.

In much of the time since Sadia was founded 54 years ago, Brazil's
chronic economic disorder made it all but impossible for Sadia to nurture
its business. From 1980 through 1994, Brazil introduced six different
currencies, creating a dizzying cycle of boom and bust. When one new
currency temporarily subdued inflation and ignited domestic consumption,
poultry producers were barred by the government from shipping any birds
abroad. But within months, both the new currency and the local buying
boom had collapsed.

Finally in 1994, everything fell into place for Sadia: Brazil stabilized its
economy with the real, at the precise moment the global economy was
enjoying a big upturn. Sadia's sales leapt 70% in the first year of the new
currency and then held on to those gains. Brazil was on such firm
economic footing that Sadia took a heretofore unthinkable step: It began
stamping prices on products right at the factory.

Chicken, Not Hot Dogs

For working-class Brazilians, Sadia chicken has come to be an everyday
emblem of stability. Before the real, the only animal protein that Neuza
Siqueira served her five children was hot dogs. "We forgot what chicken
tasted like until the real," says Mrs. Siqueira, who now buys a bird nearly
every day. Mrs. Siqueira, who works as a maid, thinks the healthier diet is
responsible for her teenage son's move up from the reserves to the first
team in his amateur soccer league.

It was Sadia's position as a global poultry player that left it vulnerable
when Thailand announced its fateful currency devaluation in July of last
year.

Almost at once, Thailand fell into recession, drying up poultry demand.
Trying to make the devaluation work for it, Charoen Pokphand Group, a
huge Thai conglomerate, began unloading cut-rate birds in Sadia's biggest
Asian market: Japan. Poultry buyers "now import more chicken from
Thailand and less from Brazil because of the weaker baht and the stronger
Brazilian currency," says Koichi Nishihara, a spokesman for Nippon Meat
Packers Inc., a big meat processor.

Things got worse when Japan, earlier in the decade the world's leading
chicken importer, slid into recession itself. With Asian export volume
down 15% this year, Sadia scaled back its Tokyo sales office to a
one-man operation.

'National-Security Issue'

Unfazed by the Asian setback, Sadia planned on working harder in the
Middle East, its original overseas market. "You always find very
dependable poultry customers near oil wells," says Mr. Fontana. Trouble
is, the Asian crisis also has reduced world demand for crude, sending
prices to 10-year lows at one point. Saudi Arabia, the world's fifth-largest
chicken importer, imposed a tough austerity program that pinched food
consumption. With foreign exchange drying up, Arab kingdoms feverishly
accelerated programs to promote self-sufficiency in chicken production.
"Poultry has suddenly become a national-security issue in the Middle
East," says Claudio Martins, head of the Brazilian poultry exporters
association. Sadia's Middle East export volumes have fallen 5%.

That left Russia as one of Sadia's last potential growth markets. Though its
150 million consumers were alluring, that market was a minefield.

Sadia's biggest barrier in Russia was stiff competition from U.S.
producers. Beginning in the Bush administration, U.S. processors
swamped Russia with low-priced leg quarters, which came to be known
as "Bush legs." By last year, 40% of all U.S. poultry exports went to
Russia.

When Sadia and other Brazilian companies began trying to step up
Russian exports, U.S. producers girded for a showdown. But then the
ruble devaluation threw poultry markets into a tizzy. Some U.S. and
European exporters have had cargo ships docked in Russian ports for
weeks awaiting payment from cash-strapped wholesalers. The question
nagging Sadia and other producers: If the Russians can't come up with the
money, will U.S. producers dump those birds on world markets, further
depressing prices?

Inaccessible U.S.

It's an important issue for Sadia. The dollar income from exports is
precious at a time when Brazil's own currency is under attack. Every bird
Sadia sells abroad is one less that has to be funneled back into the
saturated domestic market.

The vast U.S. market, though, is all but inaccessible due to a strong
national industry and strict sanitary barriers. Import quotas limit Sadia's
presence in Europe. China, where Sadia opened a barbecue restaurant as
a gesture of goodwill, won't take Brazilian birds until the two countries sign
a bilateral sanitary accord. Argentina has been a strong performer, but
Brazil's own economic problems are threatening to drag down its
neighbor.

Things have gotten so desperate that there is a fierce war for market share
going on in the Dominican Republic, a tiny and impoverished economy, but
a blessedly stable one.

Sadia hopes it sells enough birds somewhere until its new heat-and-eat
products begin to pick up the slack. Last month, at Latin America's largest
supermarket convention in Rio de Janeiro, Sadia unveiled some frozen
casseroles and pasta dishes it is counting on to compensate for the
dwindling chicken margins. Though such convenience foods are affordable
only for the wealthiest 20% of Brazilians, Sadia executives insist they aren't
luxuries. "In hard economic times, more women enter the work force and
give up cooking," says Mr. Banfi. "And who will have money for a maid?"

Francisco Seabra, a buyer for the provincial Brazilian supermarket chain
DMA, says that if the real holds together in the coming weeks, his stores
would be prepared to add freezer space to accommodate the new Sadia
products. If the currency collapses, though, DMA will probably revamp
product-display space in a different fashion. "We would increase the area
for rice and beans," Mr. Seabra says.

-- Miho Inada in Tokyo contributed to this article.



To: Steve Fancy who wrote (8789)10/4/1998 2:23:00 AM
From: Steve Fancy  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 22640
 
Bailing out Brazil - Recession peril key topic among expatriates here

By Dean Calbreath
STAFF WRITER

October 3, 1998

At the Anna Brazil swimsuit shop in Pacific Beach, where the talk usually
centers on the width of the latest string bikini, there's been another topic of
conversation these days: the economic challenges facing Brazil.

The shop, owned by Brazilian expatriate Anna Budd and specializing in
beachwear from Brazil, is an informal hangout for many of the 3,000 or so
Brazilians who live in San Diego -- part of an estimated 15,000 to 30,000
Brazilians in Southern California.

On the eve of the Brazilian election, with their home economy on the brink of
recession, some of the customers are worrying that if the economy dips too
low, the government could be forced to devalue the currency and their
pleasant stay in the United States could come to an end.

"For sure, if there's a devaluation, there's going to be a lot of people heading
home," said Ilana Queiroz, visiting the shop for a chat. "A lot of Brazilians
here are students, depending on their parents for money. If there's a
devaluation, it will become too expensive to stay here."

Queiroz, who studies computer sciences at Platt College in San Diego, says
she lives a "credit-card life." She charges her living expenses here and her
journalist mother pays the bills in Brazil. Most of her Brazilian student friends
live the same way, she says.

Although Queiroz thinks a devaluation is unlikely, she concedes that if it does
happen -- as some U.S. economists predict -- she might have to pack her
bags.

"It would be as if my mom would be paying $1,500 for every $1,000 I charge
up here, and that just wouldn't work," she said.

Budd offers a bit of reassurance. "I was just on the phone yesterday with
Brazil, and people say that things aren't so bad," she says. "Inflation is now
near zero. And if you really have a good attitude, you can still make a lot of
money down there."

Budd, who left her home in Rio de Janeiro nine years ago to come to San
Diego with her Wisconsin-born husband, pins her hopes on President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who is running for re-election tomorrow.

"He did a very good job of taming inflation, which used to be about 500
percent per month," she says. "Hopefully, he'll be able to do the same for the
rest of the problems facing the country."

Throughout the local Brazilian community similar conversations are taking
place. College students and entrepreneurs alike hope that the International
Monetary Fund or another financial savior will step in to provide aid to their
homeland before it goes into an economic nosedive.

At the computer sciences laboratory at the University of California San Diego,
doctoral candidates Marcio Faerman and Walfredo Cirne are most
concerned about the growing gap between the rich and the poor in their
homeland.

Because both are in the United States on educational grants, paid in U.S.
dollars by the Brazilian government, they would suffer no direct effect from a
devaluation. But they fear that as the government embarks on
IMF-recommended cost-cutting measures, social programs will be cut back
and poverty will grow, laying the groundwork for political unrest.

"In general, everyone's worried about the situation," Faerman says. "This is a
worldwide problem, knocking one economy down after the other."

Cirne, who plans to return to Brazil after completing his education in two
years, says he is very worried about the future of his country. He believes that
the current government has done a good job in taming inflation.

But he adds that pulling the reins in on inflation is only half the work. "Brazil
has very serious problems in terms of poverty and the lack of education for
the poor, and the current government doesn't seem to be doing anything to
solve that," he says.

Ricardo Tavares, a Brazilian expatriate studying for a doctorate in
international relations at UCSD, says that because there is so much trade
between the United States and Latin America, the United States should be
more concerned about the deteriorating situation in Brazil.

Brazil does about $1.5 billion in trade with California each year. And it ranks
as San Diego's 11th-biggest export market.

In 1996, the last year for which comprehensive figures are available, Brazil
bought $10.3 million in goods from San Diego. Since then that figure has risen
considerably, thanks to recent contracts with Qualcomm and other
telecommunications providers.

More important, because Brazil is Latin America's most powerful economy, a
downturn there could have a ripple effect leading straight to the U.S. borders.

"If Brazil goes down, all of Latin America will follow, including Mexico,"
Tavares says. "From San Diego to Chicago to the East Coast, manufacturers
will feel the impact of that kind of collapse."

Tavares says that unless the IMF or another agency steps in to help within the
next few weeks, "the attacks on the currency will continue and the country
could collapse by the end of next year."

Copyright 1998 Union-Tribune Publishing Co.