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To: nikko who wrote (5284)10/5/1998 3:49:00 AM
From: TokyoMex  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 119973
 
You too Nikko san ,,

Yes,, in this market,, and also played 36 holes today ,, in the blusturry New York weather.. our first fall weather,, passed out at 9 ,, just woke up ..

Maybe the battered European bull soon will be able to charge happily higher like in the good ol' buy-the-dip-and-get-rich days. But you probably don't want to bet the farm on it.




Euro Vision: *Special* The Contraction Begins to Pinch
By Ned Stafford
Special to TheStreet.com
10/4/98 7:09 PM ET

FRANKFURT -- European stock markets spoke loudly this week. And it would be very unwise not to listen.

The markets are warning that something wrong, very wrong, is afoot all across Europe. In Germany, the mighty locomotive of Europe, the DAX closed down 13% on the week and at Friday's session low was down 38% from the July record high.

What started out back in those carefree days of summer as a correction eagerly bought by buy-the-dip experts has turned into a steady skid. Keep in mind that the great U.S. bear market of 1973-74 lopped 48% off stocks in a little less than two years. It has taken Europe just over two months to reach 38%. Anyone who believed all that candy-coated Fortress Europe talk of early August has been crushed.

Maybe the battered European bull soon will be able to climb to its feet and charge happily higher like in the good ol' buy-the-dip-and-get-rich days. But you probably don't want to bet the farm on it. Pros say the confidence of this market has been vaporized and is not going to bounce back anytime soon.

Perhaps more importantly, the European stock market appears to be pricing in a much more severe economic slowdown than most economists now forecast.

Sentiment indicators all over in Europe are turning down. In Germany, the much-watched Ifo business climate index for August fell sharply, and many expect the September number to be lower still. German export growth peaked in September last year, just after the Asian crisis started, and has slid since, with contraction now on the horizon.

That contraction will be all the more painful with the slide in the U.S. dollar. Dollar strength the past two years has been a major stimulant for European economies and corporate profits. But that is over, with the dollar plunging from just over 1.80 marks in late August to below 1.64 today.

European central bankers had hoped that European Monetary Union would start Jan. 1 with a dollar around 1.80. European Central Bank President Wim Duisenberg said just a few weeks ago -- with the dollar around 1.69 -- that a further fall would be cause for alarm.

Adolf Rosenstock, economist at Nomura International in Frankfurt, said that a dollar below 1.60 marks would be alarming and that a dollar at 1.50 would probably shove Europe into recession, primarily because it put U.S. exporting firms in a much stronger position against stronger Euro currencies.

Layoffs have started, and unemployment is high in several European countries. Dutch Bank ING let 1,200 people go last week. And traders whisper that fear of job losses in the financial sector is growing.

Deflation, which already is pouring into Europe, is the other big concern. In Germany, for example, August export prices were down 0.5% on the year and import prices down 4.7%. Consumers loved it at first, until they started losing their jobs because of it. The German producer price index fell 0.8% in August, and CPI in September was up only 0.8%. A strengthening mark will only add to the deflationary problems.

But European central bankers -- especially Bundesbankers -- are not moving with the alacrity that investors would hope. But the central bankers may now be getting the message.

Professional European Central Bank watchers say off-the-record that both Duisenberg and Tietmeyer are gravely concerned about decelerating European growth, deflation and plunging markets -- just on the eve of EMU. In a speech Sept. 17 that was largely ignored by the press, Duisenberg declared unequivocally that the ECB is as prepared to fight deflation as it was inflation.

And, it seems, the Bundesbank is playing a shrinking role in the European monetary policy show. The ECB Governing Council -- of which Tietmeyer is one of 17 members -- is now starting to call most of the shots. Stefan Bergheim, economist at Merrill Lynch in Frankfurt, confirmed, "Europe is in a common monetary policy already."

But Duisenberg and Tietmeyer have been reluctant to take rate-cut action, partly because they are concerned that such a move would be viewed by markets simply as confirmation of how bad the situation has become.

The prime factor inhibiting a rate cut is the unfortunate timing of European Monetary Union, which kicks off Jan. 1. On that day, like it or not, all 11 EMU nations must accept the one ECB rate, which most think will be set at wherever the Bundesbank's key rate is Dec. 31. The Bundesbank short-term rate is now at 3.3%, and a rate cut before Jan. 1 would make it ever harder for high-interest rate nations to converge on Jan. 1.

But if the dollar keeps sliding and economies keep decelerating, the Bundesbank will have no alternative but to cut for the good of Europe as a whole. Michael Levy, a money manager with Bankers Trust, said at this weekend's TSC Summit that he believes the Bundesbank will have to lower rates ahead of EMU. That thinking dovetails with a growing sentiment throughout Europe that the Bundesbank faces little choice, given the growing ferocity of global economic and financial problems.

Hans-Juergen Meltzer, economist at Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt, said that new economic forecasts become outdated days after they are released. "I have never seen anything like it."

And neither have Tietmeyer and Duisenberg and Alan Greenspan and Robert Rubin, who along with other G7 finance leaders are meeting in Washington this weekend in attempt to hash out some solutions.

Anyone who thinks these guys will not be discussing dollar/mark or making big contingency plans for a coordinated global rate cut -- just in case the world appears ready to slide over the edge -- probably still believe in the tooth fairy.



See Also
EURO MARKETS
Rout Continues in Europe
10/2/98 8 AM




To: nikko who wrote (5284)10/5/1998 3:53:00 AM
From: TokyoMex  Respond to of 119973
 
October 5, 1998



Be Very Afraid

Which may be bullish, but short-term only

By Jay Shartsis

A number of years ago there was a very funny movie called Where's
Poppa? in which George Segal played a guy who was unable to say the word
"home," as in "putting his mother in a nursing home." A similar condition has
apparently afflicted numerous market commentators who can't seem to utter
the word "down," coming no closer than the non-threatening "volatility," as in
"we expect continued volatility in the market." I guess they're afraid of causing
a panic and being sued.

At any rate, the bummer this summer "volatized" about 50% off the average
Nasdaq stock and nearly 40% from counterparts on the NYSE, according to
research from John Manley, Equity Strategist at Salomon Smith Barney.
Carnage of such magnitude would seem to make any further debate about the
existence of a bear market downright silly.

In fact, these losses are on a par with what history identifies as the Great
Crash of 1929 -- which culminated in Black Thursday, October 29, of that
fateful year. The damage in that first leg down was 44.7% as measured by the
S&P (there was no Nasdaq until 1971). Not so well known is the fact that
the market put together a very big rally after the crash, gaining 46.8% as
measured by the S&P, in a five-month recovery that ran into March of 1930.
After that the real toboggan ride would start, and by June 1932 the damage
was a mind-numbing 86.2%.

The question arises as to whether the
market is now in a condition similar to
that of November 1929 and ready for
a substantial rally -- even if the world
is coming to an end later.

Larry McMillan, editor of the Option
Strategist, presents several indicators
which suggest that the path of least
resistance for stocks is now upward.
First he notes that the VIX, the
Chicago Board Options Exchange
volatility index, reached very high
levels, peaking on August 31 before
recently receding. That reflected puts on the S&P 100 being bid way up as
fear gripped traders. High fear equals market bottom. Of special interest is the
fact that the VIX stayed high for a few weeks, not just a one- or two-day
spike, and this might be extra bullish.

McMillan next points to the important equity put/call ratio, which soared to
levels of put trading not seen since the 1987 collapse. Intriguingly, he thinks
that back in the 1980s this ratio might have been inflated by reversal and
conversion arbitrage, "a strategy which is no longer prevalent." He concludes:
"Today's readings at 60% might be the highest purely speculative readings in
history, although there's no way of confirming that."

Another example of traders turning "too bearish" is found in the very high
levels of put trading for S&P 500 futures options. Place this in the bullish
column too, says McMillan.

To take advantage of the elevated VIX, Tom Gentile, chief options strategist
for Optionetics in San Mateo, California, suggests selling credit spreads which
"offer good risk/rewards as option premiums tend to revert to their averages."

Mike Oyster of Schaeffer's Investment Research feels that "anyone who
dumps their long-term stock positions now will end up kicking themselves in
six to 12 months after stocks have recovered and moved into new-high
territory." This he concludes because option indicators "are illustrating
runaway fear" which will ultimately show that "current levels represent a
historic buying opportunity."

Specifically, Oyster cites the 10-day moving average of the CBOE equity
put/call ratio, which reached the extraordinarily high level of .72 on
September 3 and .71 on September 10. "These are by far the highest
readings of the 1990s," he says.

Mike allows that a certain amount of pessimism can be expected as the
market pulls back but that the "extremely extreme" readings recorded of late
suggest that "stocks are a great buy even though there is a slight risk of further
downside moves in the short term."

I don't want to push the 1929 scenario too far. Still, comparisons may prove
useful. After the October Crash in 1929, a month long rally ensued, much like
the one we just witnessed in September. Then a successful test of the lows
took place before the rally resumed. If history is repeating, the scary market
plunge last week should prove to be the good buying spot implied by the
option indicators herein.

JAY SHARTSIS is director of option trading at R.F. Lafferty & Co. in New York.




To: nikko who wrote (5284)10/5/1998 3:59:00 AM
From: TokyoMex  Respond to of 119973
 
CSFB did same futures deal as Swiss rival UBS

By Clay Harris in London and William Lewis and Tracy Corrigan in New York
Credit Suisse First Boston did a derivatives deal with the hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, identical in structure to the one that cost rival bank UBS $682m (£405m) and four senior executives, including chairman Mathis Cabiallavetta, their jobs.

But CSFB's derivatives subsidiary Credit Suisse Financial Products limited its loss to a fraction of that suffered by its Swiss rival by rebuffing pleas from the US hedge fund that it increase its exposure.

Unlike UBS, which made an $800m transaction, CSFP drew the line at $100m. The derivatives deal was the reason for the $55m LTCM-related "revenue reduction" announced, but not explained, by the parent Credit Suisse Group on September 25.

"We did the trade, we got it wrong, but we viewed it as a risk position," said a banker familiar with the transaction.

LTCM, meanwhile, is believed to have lost more money last week, because of continued turbulence in stock and bond markets. People close to the fund describe the loss in net asset value as "modest" but it underlines the problems involved in unwinding and reducing the risk of the fund's positions.

"We know what some of their positions are and they have continued to move against them," one rival hedge fund manager said, who added that other firms were trying to take advantage of LTCM's sizeable market positions. Because liquidity has dried up since the LTCM bail-out, efforts to unwind positions have been hindered by an unwillingness to deal in large size, forcing LTCM in some trades to sell at below market rates.

Another problem is the way LTCM rolled over with other counter-party derivative contracts it had entered into rather than simply closing them when it wanted to lock in profits. People close to the consortium now in charge say the rollover tactic was used primarily to help keep details of investments secret.

People close to the fund say it has up to 10 key trading positions. They include a large bet that volatility in the European stock index options market will fall. It also has a number of equity arbitrage positions, hoping to make profits on the differences between companies' voting and non-voting shares. Other investments include merger and acquisition arbitrage, large positions in the high-yield market and interest rate swap convergence trades.

Apart from size, the CSFP deal was identical to that by UBS. The bank sold an option on $100m of LTCM shares to the fund itself, and received a $36m premium. It made an "incremental" $33m investment in LTCM. One of the main reasons CSFP limited the size was the "black box" nature of LTCM, which only reported its net asset value once a month.