Taleban Draw Active Chinese Response
Hong Kong's "Ming Pao" newspaper reported on October 7 that the Beijing Municipality recently issued a circular to all foreign- funded hotels, requiring they immediately report all information on new guests from Afghanistan, Egypt, Kazakhstan, and India to the "relevant departments." The newspaper also implied that Turkish citizens were also on the watch list. The reason for the new policy was reportedly that "the activities of Xinjiang and Tibet independence and dissent have become increasingly open" and "international terrorist activities have been gradually connected with China." Ming Pao repeated the claims of Wang Lequan, regional Communist Party secretary for Xinjiang, that Xinjiang's Muslim Uighur separatists have received training from Afghanistan's Taleban militia. According to Ming Pao, while Afghan, Turkish, Kazakh, and Egyptian nationals were on the list for their possible support of Chinese separatists, Indian nationals were on the list due to deteriorating relations with India over allegations of Chinese support for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.
Once again the Taleban have managed to throw a serious curve at Asian politics. First, they have caused China to truly worry about a separatist problem that, until recently, Beijing thought it could fix through good old fashioned repression and massive population transfers. Only this summer, Beijing relocated 100,000 ethnic Chinese, displaced by the Three Gorges Dam project, to Xinjiang. China has, for some time, claimed that Uighur separatists were receiving assistance from sympathetic factions in Central Asia. Beijing attempted to deal with this by strengthening bilateral relations with the former Soviet Central Asian republics. But in the last few months, China has specifically, and surprisingly publically, charged the Taleban with fueling an increase in separatist violence in Xinjiang.
China's list of suspect nationalities is interesting, and generates a tangled policy web. First there is Afghanistan, specifically the Taleban themselves. China has already weighed in against them, condemning the killings of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharif as a violation of international law. Condemnation of the Taleban puts China in the Iranian-Russian-Uzbek camp, benefitting Chinese relations with these countries. Unfortunately, there are reportedly Uighur bases in Uzbekistan as well.
There are reportedly Uighur bases in Turkey, and according to one researcher who has spent time with the separatists, they have received "special military training" in Istanbul. The inclusion of Turkish residents on the watch list is therefore understandable, and China has the potential to cooperate with Russia in putting further pressure on the Turks.
Kazakhstan is a trickier case. Almaty has reportedly cooperated with China in controlling Uighur supporters on the Kazakh side of the border, as Kazakhstan is eager to open trade routes to the East. Only Monday, Kazakh Defense Minister Mukhtar Altynbayev met in the Xinjiang capital, Urumqi, with his Chinese counterpart, Chi Haotian. The two agreed to develop relations between their respective militaries and to contribute to improving overall Chinese-Kazakh relations. Altynbayev declared that Kazakhstan supports Chinese reunification and "will never allow anyone to use Kazakh territory as a base for activities to split China. China offers Kazakhstan the promise of a measure of freedom from dependence on Russia, and Kazakhoil is pushing ahead rapidly with a feasibility study for building a pipeline to export Kazakh crude to western China.
With Chinese-Kazakh relations by all outward appearances moving ahead smoothly, the inclusion of Kazakhs on the watch list would seem to be a slap in the face for Almaty. The Chinese are apparently looking for more deeds than words on the Kazakh side, and are counting on Kazakhstan's need for Chinese approval and financing of the pipeline to keep Almaty from protesting too strongly.
Finally, there is the Taleban connection with Saudi terrorist financier Osama Bin Laden, who according to recent reports has acquired nuclear weapons from former Soviet republics. Egypt's inclusion on Beijing's list likely reflects the Bin Laden connection, as his terrorist network includes the main Egyptian terrorist organizations. While the claim that Bin Laden is now a nuclear power is questionable, he is nevertheless public enemy number one for the United States. China has therefore opened the possibility of cooperating with the U.S. in the war against terrorism, an idea that immediately generates another tangled policy web.
The Indians, Afghans, Turks, Egyptians, and even Kazakhs on the watch list are explicable, but the real twist in Beijing's list is the country that does not appear on it -- Pakistan. Pakistan helped create the Taleban, and currently supports them. Pakistani soldiers reportedly took part in the latest Taleban offensive that brought 90 percent of Afghanistan under their control. In turn, foreign guerrillas trained by the Taleban have reportedly joined pro-Pakistani Muslim fighters in Kashmir, in some cases taking over leadership of the groups. This new influx of well-armed, paid, and trained guerrillas has reportedly led to an increase in Indian casualties.
Yet for all Pakistan's support of the group that is turning Xinjiang separatists from an annoyance to a real problem, the two countries are maintaining relations described by Pakistani Senate Chairman Wasim Sajjad on October 2 as "higher than the Himalayas and deeper than the oceans." "For Pakistan," said Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on September 30, "friendship with China is the cornerstone of its foreign policy." Pakistani President Rafiq Tarar even went so far as to praise China's religious policy toward its Muslim population during the visit of a Chinese Muslim delegation to Islamabad on September 12. Tarar was cited by the Chinese news agency "Xinhua" as saying he was "glad to see that the Chinese Muslims are leading a very happy life thanks to the government's religious policy, under which the Islamic culture and tradition are well-maintained and protected."
China has a dilemma. It uses Pakistan to tie up India politically and militarily, yet Pakistan's Afghan adventures also threaten Chinese stability. Pakistan, too, needs Chinese support in its eternal standoff with India. Pakistan has other problems looming as well. Its support for the Taleban may come back to haunt Islamabad, as there is a growing radical Islamic movement within Pakistan and thousands of Pakistanis have reportedly served in the Taleban ranks. Another nascent problem, which may actually offer a solution to several problems listed above, is growing discontent within the Pakistani military.
Pakistan's Army Chief of Staff, General Jahangir Karamat, this week called for the creation of a National Security Council, to be made up of Pakistan's military chiefs. The council, as proposed, would be the country's top decision-making body. Karamat expressed concern over Pakistan's deteriorating economy and internal security and the growing power of Nawaz Sharif. Sharif plans to enforce Islamic Shariah law, which would not only further concentrate power in his hands but would also add momentum to the country's Taleban-linked fundamentalists. Local observers speculate that Karamat issued an ultimatum to Sharif during a meeting on October 3, to either create the security council or face military intervention.
Though there is as yet no clear evidence to suggest that one is in the works, a military coup in Pakistan would serve Beijing's interest. It would also serve Iran's interest. It would certainly serve Pakistani generals' interests and, depending on your views of the growing possibility of a Taleban-like uprising in Pakistan, could conceivably serve Pakistan's interest as well. Interests not served by such a move would clearly include Sharif and the Taleban. Relations with India probably wouldn't be affected one way or the other. We are not yet crying coup, but we are saying pay attention. Pakistan is the pivot of several regional problems -- problems that are all demanding rapid solution.
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