Kyrgyzstan Blocks Arms to Anti-Taleban Forces
Kyrgyz officials, at a press conference on October 13, announced
they had detained a trainload of munitions disguised as
humanitarian aid from Iran bound for Afghanistan. The detention
of the train signals both a shift in the attitude of the Central
Asian Republics toward Iran and a reevaluation of their belief in
the potential of Afghan opposition forces to survive the Taleban
onslaught. The seizure of the munitions shipment may have also
seriously altered the balance of power in Afghanistan, cutting
off the last hopes of Ahmad Shah Massoud's troops and forcing
Massoud into a final act of desperation -- destroying the mouth
of the Salang Tunnel.
On September 23, the Iranian Foreign Ministry requested that
Kyrgyzstan allow a shipment of humanitarian supplies from Iran to
be unloaded in Osh and sent by truck to troops of the former
Afghan government, now the opposition to the Taleban. The train
in question was not hauling only sacks of flour, but also 500
tons of ammunition, including grenades, rockets, and 122 mm
shells. That Iran has been and continues to try to aid the
opposition to the Taleban is no surprise. That Kyrgyzstan
interdicted that shipment is certainly unexpected, but why was
Iran shipping by that rout in the first place?
Iran does not usually send supplies through Kyrgyzstan. The
traditional and quicker route has been to send materiel by train
to Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and from there by truck to Ishkashim
where it is taken across the border into Afghanistan. It is
apparent, however, that Tajikistan decided to make good on its
declaration that supplies to anti-Taleban forces were not coming
out of Dushanbe. With Tajikistan's decision solidified, and the
train already en route from Mashhad, Iran had to quickly reroute
the train and so made the call to Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz
officials, themselves not sure of the chances of survival for the
Afghan opposition, gave no firm commitment to Iran over the route
of the train, leaving themselves plenty of room for plausible
deniability.
Whether or not Kyrgyzstan was going to let the supplies through
was not firmly decided until Uzbek officials halted the Iranian
train in Bekabad and held two cars before sending it on to
Kyrgyzstan. Uzbek officials then apparently decided that they
too needed to be ready for a Taleban victory, and notified Kyrgyz
customs officials in Osh that the train was transporting
munitions. Two days after the train arrived in Osh, during which
time major negotiations were likely being held between the Kyrgyz
government, local Osh customs officers, and Iran, the train was
impounded. (Actually, most of the train was impounded, but two
cars are still unaccounted for.) The move by Kyrgyzstan to hold
the train and issue a public statement to that effect was the
final signal to Iran that the "Stans" were preparing to accept
the victory of the Taleban and wanted to begin making diplomatic
overtures to their new neighbor. It was also an expression of
the growing discomfort they feel in cooperating with Iran.
Aside from the new diplomatic stance of the Central Asian
republics, the detention of the train and subsequent non-delivery
of the ammunition may have hastened the defeat of Massoud, and
will force Iran to make a decisive move in the region. 200,000
Iranian troops have been massed on the border with Afghanistan in
alleged military exercises, but the threat they pose to the
Taleban has yet to be realized. We believe the reason Iran
hasn't yet made a decisive action is because it was waiting for
support from the Central Asian republics and Russia. The most
likely Iranian strategy was to engage in a war of attrition with
the vastly outnumbered Taleban forces along the border. This
would draw Taleban attention while Russian-backed Afghan
opposition forces pushed south from Uzbekistan toward Kabul, to
link up with Massoud as he broke out of the Panjshir Valley. By
deciding against cooperation with Iran, and not allowing Massoud
to get the vitally needed supplies, the Central Asian republics
have left Iran in a position where it must act alone. Iran must
now either withdraw from the border, accepting a Taleban-
controlled Afghanistan and facing ridicule for U.S.-style
military posturing without action, or attack Afghanistan on its
own with questionable chances for success.
More immediately, however, the missing supplies and apparent
abandonment by Central Asian republics have left Massoud's forces
in a state of utter desperation. Reports out of Afghanistan on
October 13 claimed that Massoud's forces have blown up the
northern entrance of the Salang Tunnel, a desperate act that has
been avoided throughout the fighting in Afghanistan. The Salang
Tunnel is the main north-south route through the mountains that
effectively divide Afghanistan in half. Without the tunnel,
heavy traffic must travel around the mountains to the west,
through Herat, the route that the Taleban were forced to take in
their latest offensive in the north. All sides have been
unwilling to destroy the tunnel, as even if they do not hold it,
they may need it some day. To destroy the tunnel would be to
admit that one did not expect to need it.
The Iranian train, already delayed by Tajikistan's refusal to let
it unload in Dushanbe, carried supplies for the winter for
Massoud. With the highway from the Salang Tunnel north to
Uzbekistan in Taleban hands, Massoud has been depending on
mountainous trails for his resupply routes. Those trails will be
closed by winter. Massoud, realizing that neither the trainload
of ammunition nor reinforcements from Uzbekistan would arrive,
destroyed the tunnel as a parting shot at the Taleban. Massoud
in effect admitted he was defeated, sealing off his hope for
reinforcement, but declared he's "taking it with him," physically
dividing the country and limiting future Taleban mobility. Every
action for Massoud's forces is now an attritional action. He has
mountains to the north, but Taleban forces to the east, west and
south. We wouldn't write an obituary for the "Lion of the
Panjshir" yet, but we don't expect significant action from him
until spring, if he survives the winter.
The tenuous cooperation between the Central Asian republics and
Iran, based on a mutual fear of a fundamentalist Taleban-
controlled Afghanistan, is evidently finished. Iran's hopes for
support in a two-front offensive against the Taleban have been
dashed. Massoud's hopes for much-needed ammunition and supplies
for the winter have been crushed. Iran must rethink its course
of action toward Afghanistan. One by one, the Central Asian
republics have expressed neutrality in the situation, accepting
the likelihood of a Taleban victory and consenting to Russian
assistance in defending their borders from both the Taleban and
the Iranians. Iran is alone, its troops are poised, the
decision must be made.
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