CSIS - 'Will Y2K Lead to a Global Flight to Quality?
Return to the Y2K Risk Assessment Task Force web site
While there is growing awareness of the threats posed by the so-called millennium bug, most of the focus has been on the prospects of Y2K-related system failures on January 1, 2000. What is little understood, however, is the extent to which anticipation of such failures could fuel a worldwide flight to quality and exacerbate instability in international financial markets within the next three to six months.
This is just one of the conclusions that emerged from off-the-record and public panel discussions with top public and private sector officials of the CSIS Y2K Risk Assessment Task Force, chaired by former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn. Key issues raised in the task force meetings on the global dimensions of the Y2K threat:
Y2K is not just a January 1, 2000 problem.
The problem will not arrive as the clock strikes midnight on December 31, 1999. Nor does it end the following day. There already have been a few Y2K problems in applications that look beyond the turn of the century. The pace of Y2K failures likely will increase after January 1, 1999, with the beginning of fiscal years that extend into the year 2000.
In addition, increasingly companies will begin to reevaluate their relationships with vendors that can not provide assurances of compliance. Financial institutions will beginning to terminate counterparty relationships with non-compliant firms. This will happen sooner rather than later - over the next three to six months. And, according to Senator Bob Bennett, who chairs the Senate special committee on the Y2K problem, "it will be with us two to three years after January 1, 2000," due to knock-on effects and a tidal wave of lawsuits.
Y2K could disrupt global financial and trading systems.
Financial markets are the central nervous system of the global economy; a vast, complex network of linkages among corporations, financial institutions, exchanges, regulators, depositories, and clearing firms. Not only is the international financial system heavily reliant on computer hardware and software applications for core operations, it is also dependent on continuous, real-time information flows. Failures in telecommunications or power networks could disrupt information and capital flows at critical junctures.
While major U.S. financial institutions and exchanges have begun testing their systems and are likely to be Y2K compliant, there is increasing apprehension that institutions in key emerging markets, and even some developed markets, are not giving sufficient attention to potential Y2K problems. Indications are that financial institutions already are assessing Y2K counterparty risk and will begin to terminate relationships with firms that they do not believe will be Y2K-compliant. Entire markets could be effectively blacklisted. This "flight to quality" could aggravate an already fragile situation in global financial markets, possibly leading to a Y2K-fueled liquidity crisis.
Similar concerns exist with regard to global commercial relationships. Interconnectivity problems present one of the greatest concerns. Merely achieving compliance in one's own company is not sufficient. Complex upstream and downstream linkages exist among suppliers, vendors, service providers, and customers, with large multinational companies typically having tens of thousands of relationships.
With the widespread adoption of just-in-time inventory control systems and global manufacturing operations, the health of businesses and economies is increasingly reliant on the timely import and export of raw materials, intermediate goods, and finished products. From shipping facilities, to global navigation satellites, air traffic control, and customs facilities, the smooth-functioning of international trade is dependent upon computer systems and embedded chips. Disruptions in supply lines can quickly shut down entire manufacturing operations.
Corporations are now assessing the state of Y2K readiness of their service providers, suppliers, and vendors and will look for alternative sources in the coming months.
Y2K presents multifaceted threats to national and global security.
First, Y2K poses a daunting challenge to the Pentagon, which must evaluate and test nearly 3,000 mission critical systems and get them to work in an integrated environment. Radars, early-warning satellites, communication systems, and weapons systems are all reliant upon computer technology, and thus susceptible to Y2K problems.
Second, while the Pentagon anticipates that most critical systems will be remediated and tested before the end of 1999, it is relying on the assurances of readiness by public utilities and private companies with regard to critical power, water, and telecommunications services (including those servicing overseas bases). Should these basic services fail, it will be impossible for DoD to carry out its missions. 95% of DoD communications moves over public lines.
Third, according to DoD analysts, only three other countries are taking steps to make their military systems compliant. Apparently, our NATO allies are lagging by 18 to 24 months, which could impair interoperability and joint mission execution, such as those in the Balkans. The failure of countries such as Russia and China to remediate nuclear command and control systems presents the greatest concerns. While there has been some high-level information sharing, it is doubtful that Russia, mired in an economic crisis, has the necessary financial resources to evaluate and test critical systems.
Fourth, Y2K may also increase U.S. vulnerability to information warfare while limiting our own capabilities to respond. And because much of the computer code review has been outsourced, there are security concerns regarding the potential for terrorists and other subversive groups to insert viruses, logic bombs, and trapdoors into the remediated code.
Liability concerns are chilling critical information flows and litigation costs could exceed actual failure costs.
Lloyd's of London estimates that liability damages associated with the Y2K failures could exceed $1 trillion, potentially surpassing the claims and settlements in asbestos and tobacco liability cases in recent years. Litigation costs would significantly exacerbate any direct losses resulting from Y2K failures and could make this a multi-year problem.
Equally important, concerns about potential liability are exacerbating the Y2K threat by chilling communication and information sharing among companies and their suppliers, vendors, and customers as well as industry counterparts. Moreover, the threat of lawsuits could imperil the ability of companies to attract or retain qualified officers and directors.
Litigation issues must be addressed in a responsible and balanced way. The Good Samaritan bill, expected to be approved by Congress, is a step in the right direction, but is not sufficient.
Contingency planning is critical.
It is clear that not every mission critical system around the world will be compliant by the year 2000. It is imperative, then, that public and private sectors alike begin the contingency planning phase.
The focus for governments and private sector companies should shift from readiness to survivability. Disruptions and even failures are inevitable. Moving beyond even the so-called "mission critical systems," executives must look at what is essential to keeping the government or the business operational at a very basic level. Without credible leadership, effective contingency planning becomes difficult to achieve.
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