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To: Baghul who wrote (1185)10/19/1998 1:01:00 AM
From: Cavalry  Respond to of 1637
 
just to show you how far asenio has been plotting the heb assault,
there was a large fund manager who was using the major buying power of his fund to bust asenio's shorts, heb was one of his big holdings,
asenio got the money manager fired.
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Tuesday September 8, 8:00 am Eastern Time
Company Press Release
SOURCE: EQUITIES Magazine LLC
'J'Accuse...' Barron's and Short Seller Manuel Asensio Have Smeared an Innocent Man
NEW YORK, Sept. 8 /PRNewswire/ -- In EQUITIES combined July/August 1998 issue, Editor Robert J. Flaherty charges Barron's July articles ''Wounded Lion'' and ''L'Affaire Dreyfus,'' like the original French generals who victimized a defenseless Jew, have blamed an innocent man.

He is underwriter Peter Janssen, and he was blamed for the poor performance of two Dreyfus funds. Yet during the period in which Barron's graphed the collapse of the two Dreyfus funds, the three Janssen/Meyers-backed medical stocks rose. The stock performance helped -- not hurt -- Dreyfus Funds' performance, exactly opposite to what Barron's published.

Unreported by Barron's was significant prepublication trading by Avalon Research of Boca Raton, Fla. Also overlooked was that Nasdaq reports that two of the three stocks, Chromatics Color Sciences (Nasdaq: CCSI - news) and the warrant and common stock of Cytoclonal Pharmaceutical (Nasdaq: CYPII - news) were being still currently depressed by short sellers who were failing to deliver borrowed shares on time, according to Nasdaq statistics. ''This is naked short selling,'' Flaherty said. The third stock, MacroChem (Nasdaq: MCHM - news), is also under attack by short sellers

According to Flaherty, Barron's relied heavily on fraud and other charges broadcast over the Internet by short-seller Manuel Asensio of Asensio & Co. He has charged about 21 companies with fraud. Barron's failed to report that Asensio himself has been accused of fraud in a still-ongoing law suit for his own activities on the day the stock market fell over 22.6% in the October 1987 crash.

Editor Flaherty labeled EQUITIES' investigation ''one of the most important stories of my 37-years in financial journalism'' because the entire career of one individual could be damaged by this smear. ''Janssen had made a brilliant start in applying the principles of positive thinking to business when the short sellers struck and blackened his image,'' Flaherty said.

Also in this issue EQUITIES spotlights America's fastest growing companies with five-year annual average earnings growth of 20% or better, a benchmark EQUITIES used to select managements with a superior long-term performance.

EQUITIES is an award-winning, 47-year-old monthly magazine that covers promising, quality middle-market and emerging public companies and their environment. A twelve-month subscription is $36.

SOURCE: EQUITIES Magazine LLC

cav



To: Baghul who wrote (1185)10/19/1998 1:17:00 AM
From: Cavalry  Respond to of 1637
 
more asenio games and maneuvers, did he get rid of this guy to target heb or did he find heb after targeting this guy and examining his funds holdings.
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Talk : Biotechnology : HEB, Hemispherx Biopharma (AMEX)NEW

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To: Marty (378 )
From: Mad2 Saturday, Sep 26 1998 10:07PM ET
Reply # of 494

Marty, follows is a article from Barron's in July that I recalled on the fund manager from Dreyfus Premeir and agressive growth fund. Read it, after which I have posted the institutional holdings of HEB:

July 13, 1998

Fallout From L'Affaire Dreyfus
Allegations against Schonberg may lead to more regulation of fund managers
By SANDRA WARD

Mutual Choice | Fund Scope | Cash Track
Tracking The Giants | Scoreboard

Until now, the Securities and Exchange Commission has left it largely to individual mutual-fund companies to police the personal trading habits of their portfolio managers. That may well change in light of the latest mutual-fund scandal, which has been variously dubbed L'Affaire Dreyfus and L'Affaire Schonberg.

On Wednesday, Mellon Bank's Dreyfus unit placed portfolio manager Michael Schonberg on paid "administrative leave" amid a widening probe by federal and state authorities into his personal trading practices. The move comes months after Dreyfus effectively sidelined Schonberg by bringing in Paul LaRocco of its Founders Asset Management unit to oversee Schonberg's funds: the $57.9 million Dreyfus Aggressive Growth and $216 million Dreyfus Premier Aggressive Growth. LaRocco came on the scene following allegations that Schonberg bought shares of a stock for the two funds while he was holding the same stock in his personal account. The buying would have the effect of driving up the value of Schonberg's personal holdings.

There's no law against a portfolio manager owning the same securities in a personal account as are in the funds he manages. But it is a breach of fiduciary duty to try to manipulate share prices for personal gain. Some fund companies, anxious to avoid the kind of conflict-of-interest allegations that have arisen in the Schonberg case, have strict guidelines on how their managers may and may not trade stocks.

Schonberg loaded up his funds with small, illiquid, loss-ridden "development-stage" companies, allegedly to squeeze short positions and drive up the price of those stocks, and at the same time drive up the value of his personal account, which held the same stocks. Or at least that what's been alleged by Manuel Asensio, an active and vocal New York short- seller. The stock that is at the heart of the complaints is Chromatics Color Sciences, a tiny medical-products company that sells a light sensor for monitoring the skin color of infants with jaundice.

Dreyfus has maintained from the start that it believes Schonberg has followed its rules for personal trading. Nonetheless, as the allegations mounted and inquiries heightened, Dreyfus was forced to treat the concerns more seriously.

In a statement issued last week, the fund company said, "Given the thoroughness required by Dreyfus with respect to its previously reported inquiry and the interests of all concerned, this initiative is designed to facilitate the process and to assure that Schonberg's time will continue to be devoted exclusively to this inquiry."

Many of the stocks that Schonberg bought have ties to Janssen-Meyers, a Manhattan-based investment partnership run by Peter S. Janssen and Bruce Meyers, former brokers at D.H. Blair, a firm known for its aggressive sales tactics. In many instances, the Dreyfus funds managed by Schonberg ranked among the largest holders of these companies. This amounted to a series of risky bets on unproven companies.

Schonberg's portfolios at Dreyfus were also stuffed with stocks underwritten by Hampshire Securities, which specialized in bringing "emerging" companies public. Among the Hampshire offerings in the portfolios are: Celerity Systems, which now trades at 1 1/4 after going public last November at 7 1/2 and trading as high as 8; and A.C.S. Electronics, whose shares change hands at 4 3/8 after coming public at 5 and trading as high as 8 1/8 . Hampshire Securities was bought by Gruntal & Co. last November.

Shareholders in the Dreyfus funds are understandably angry, and some filed a class-action lawsuit Thursday.

In the irony of ironies, Michael Schonberg joined Dreyfus amid much fanfare in 1995 after stints as chief investment officer of UBS Asset Management and at Leon Cooperman's Omega Partners hedge fund. His go-go style was supposed to turn the stodgy funds around and supply Dreyfus with a much-needed superstar. But momentum investing fell out of favor, and his stock-picking has come up way short. Dreyfus Aggressive Growth was the worst performer among capital appreciation funds in the second quarter, falling 18%. In 1997, the fund fell by more than 30%. Dreyfus Premier dropped by nearly 15% in the second quarter and by 27% last year.

A Prudential Securities client stepped up Friday and forked over $105 million for 910,000 shares of SPDRS, the exchange-traded fund that mimics the S&P 500, at a price of 115 7/16. The SPDRS closed the day at 116 15/32. But it's not as bullish a move as it might seem. A Prudential insider says the client took profits in another derivative instrument, and locked them in by buying SPDRS and SPX puts, allowing for some upside potential but limiting downside risk.

Overall, heavy selling marked most of the action in the SPDR issue this week.

The ever-patient Sheldon Jacobs, publisher of the No-Load Fund Investor, is abandoning the sinking ship of emerging markets. Not that he was fully on board. He had reduced his exposure to emerging markets to 5% and as recently as late May was hanging tight.

Yet, in his most recent newsletter, which arrived hot-off-the-presses Friday, Jacobs reveals that he's dropped the asset class entirely and switched allocations to broader-based international funds. For those who've stomached the steep declines so far, he recommends dumping Montgomery Emerging Markets fund for the Montgomery International Growth fund, noting it's advanced 26.3% year-to-date on the strength of its mix: 63% exposure to Europe, 14% Japan, 8% Latin America and 8% in Southeast Asia, including Australia and New Zealand.

Jacobs also advises buying into American Century/20th Century International Discovery fund, calling it his "best non-100% European recommendation at this time." This fund has 72% of its portfolio in Europe and 9.4% in Canada. It features a small-cap bent and a minimum entry level of $10,000. So far this year it's up 29.4%.

Robert Markman long ago lost a $25 bet to Vanguard's Jack Bogle that an actively managed fund could beat a passive index fund. But only now is Markman changing his stripes.

Markman, who runs $430 million in private accounts and his Multitrust Fund of Funds from his home base in Minneapolis, is abandoning a long-held belief that diversified asset allocation is the best way to managing money successfully. Now he is using a narrowly focused portfolio of large-cap growth funds with a heavy component of indexing.

"This was a real hard decision," says Markman. "At some point, you just have to swallow your ego and what you think you know and take a look at what the evidence is showing you. Diversified asset allocation hasn't cut it and won't cut it. Markman is throwing in the towel. If you don't have the smarts, indexing is the way to go."

In the past six months, he's pared back the offerings in his private accounts from about 12 funds to just five: Marsico Focus; White Oak Growth; Papp America Abroad, Rydex Nova and Rydex OTC. As for his Multitrust funds, 70% of the assets in his Multitrust Aggressive portfolio are in Rydex Nova, Rydex OTC, Mutual Series Financial, Stein Roe Growth, Oakmark Small Cap and White Oak Growth. His Moderate portfolio is also heavily concentrated in Marsico Focus, Janus 20, Rydex Nova, Northeast Investors Trust and Papp America Abroad.

While it appears he's become a closet indexer, he maintains his new approach is designed simply to be more "market-sensitive" and, at the same time, "tax-sensitive." The outperformance of large-caps stocks is becoming too dominant a feature of the market too ignore.

Six months ago, he sold off his technology fund offerings from Pilgrim Baxter and T. Rowe Price, preferring to get his technology exposure from the Rydex OTC fund. And he's in the process of getting out of international funds, value funds and small-cap funds, mainly in his private accounts, to concentrate on more focused large-cap fund offerings.

Certainly, the performance of his funds has shown some improvement with his new strategy, after delivering mostly mediocre results for years.

One note of caution: The last time Markman tried market-timing was the spring of 1996, when he turned bearish. Unfortunately for him, the market had one of its better years.

HEMISPHERX BIOPHARMA INC(AMEX:HEB)

Top Ten Mutual Funds Shareholders
(* denotes new position) Rank Fund Name Shares Held Previous Net Chng. % Chng. % Owned Last Report
1 Dreyfus Premier Aggressive Growth 1,175,000 600,000 +575,000 +95.8% 5.4% 03/31/98
2 Dreyfus Aggressive Growth * 525,000 0 +525,000 -- 2.4% 02/28/98
Top Ten Totals: 1,700,000 600,000 +1,100,000 +183.3% 7.8%

HEMISPHERX BIOPHARMA INC(AMEX:HEB)

11 Institutions hold 9.06% of the outstanding shares as of June 30,1998.
Of these, 2 established new positions while 3 liquidated their holdings.
Overall, Institutions decreased their holdings by <29.18>% for the period.

Top Ten Institutional Shareholders
(* denotes new position) Rank Institution Shares Held Previous Net Chng. % Chng. % Owned Last Report
1 Kennedy Capital Management, Inc. 1,121,420 697,720 +423,700 +60.7% 5.2% 06/30/98
2 The Dreyfus Corporation 472,000 1,700,000 -1,228,000 -72.2% 2.2% 06/30/98
3 Gardner Lewis Asset Management, Inc. 137,900 153,800 -15,900 -10.3% 0.6% 06/30/98
4 Goldman Sachs Asset Management (US) * 100,000 0 +100,000 -- 0.5% 03/31/97
5 Barclays Global Investors, N.A. 45,987 31,787 +14,200 +44.7% 0.2% 06/30/98
6 Bear, Stearns Asset Management Inc. 41,800 49,300 -7,500 -15.2% 0.2% 06/30/98
7 Old Kent Bank (MI) (Invt. Mgmt.) * 25,000 0 +25,000 -- 0.1% 06/30/98
8 Crestar Asset Management Company 11,244 11,244 -- -- 0.1% 06/30/98
9 TradeStreet Investment Associates 10,000 10,000 -- -- 0.1% 06/30/98
10 CIBC Oppenheimer Corp. 2,000 2,000 -- -- 0.0% 06/30/98
Top Ten Totals: 1,967,351 2,655,851 -688,500 -25.9% 9.1%



cav




To: Baghul who wrote (1185)10/19/1998 1:24:00 AM
From: Cavalry  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 1637
 
good article on mm games


Heavily Shorted VS Normal Market Bid/Ask machinations by davewashdc
I will try to briefly respond to your question about the bid/ask machinations in the market. I am by no means an expert and have simply learned out of necessity to understand basically what is going on sometimes. I will discuss a typical market (part I); and a heavily-shorted one (part II).

Part I - Typical Bid/Ask Pricing of The Stock.

If you had level II you would know right away what I have been talking about in past posts because it shows what is really going on in a particular stock's marketplace resulting in the bid/ask you see on the screen (level I). A simple way to explain it is the stock's price is kind of like a see-saw; one seat buy, one seat sell. If the weight is more heavily on the buy side the price goes up, chasing the supply-demand curve up to the notch where the weight is more evenly distributed on the see-saw. The converse happens when the weight is more heavily on the sell side.

Level II actually shows how all the bids and asks are queying up to each seat on the see-saw, including the id of who (which MM's) are responsible for the weight distribution. As I understand it the bid/ask reported on level I are the sustainable bid and ask prices. That is why on quote.com, for example, they report the bid (sustainable) and the best bid. And also, that's why you can have sales that are outside of the bid/ask range and yet see the bid ask remain the same before during and after that sale. Quote.com is worth watching for awhile to understand what I am talking about. It turns yellow with each sale showing which side of the bid ask the negotiated sale was made. (If you click on the data area it reveals the bid ask info. I talk about.)

In what I call a normally-motivated market it is easier to understand how stock prices are set. I mean basically, in NASDAQ, the several mm's are trying to make a market and are competing for the client buyers/sellors' business. They establish and live off the spread between the buy and the sell. A bigger buyer or sellor will try out different MM's and to succeed in keeping their business they need to make sales and buys to keep their customers happy.

NASDAQ relies on the competition between MM's to self-regulate market action. In other words, in a competitive market the different MM's competing for the business will keep each other honest. Apparently there are also rules about their behavior. Thus, on level II you can see the different MM's trying to make a market on a stock, each one's current bid and ask, and also the current demand associated with the position. These guys make sales and purchases back and forth which we commonly see (in level I) as the general market in the stock.

Thus, if several MM's have customers that want to buy the stock; more than want to sell, then they raise their bid price (their want ads) because that will probably get more sell offers by walking up the demand-supply curve. If they have several clients that want to sell, more than want to buy, then they lower their offer (their for sale signs) to interest more buyers. Its a pretty efficient system, and the different MM's negotiate with each other pretty quickly, and can move large volumes of shares as the price moves up and down the supply demand curve.

Now, all the above is more complicated than descibed above and MM's can establish different spreads, can take out stop-loss orders by moving the price rapidly - particularly in lightly traded markets; and can move the market in the manner and timing of their buys and sells. But I won't get into any more detail; there are plenty of books with all the gory details.

It gets more interesting when the shorting of shares is introduced into the above mix.

Part II - Buying/selling in shorted markets.

When a market is heavily shorted like tdfx (2.6 M shorted shares in 10M float market), what is "normal" bid/ask behavior gets altered (influenced) by the changed motivations of the trading participants. Now there still may be be numerous (short-covering) buyers, but to get the business they put out lots of "want ads" that show a buying interest but only at a lowering price than what is being offered.

Thus, you will often see a sale at the bid price and then the bid will be lowered, as if the only people wanting to buy this dog are less and less willing to give up good money for it. Sales at the offer price, or at a negotiated in between the bid/offer price become rarer, but when made the bid price is often lowered. This is because the purchaser's (shorter's) primary motivation is to buy shares, yes, but at the lowest price the can get them at.

What also happens is that these "differently-motivated" MM's will have a stockpile of the stock and they will sell these shares to each other (back and forth) at the bid price or lower. In this way they can actually create a falling market, that results in a lowering price, frees up sellors willing to duck out, and of course gets them their covering shares at lower prices.

Eventually, if they dry up the pool of shareholders willing to sell, they allow the price to rise a bit (by staying off the bid for a while) and then lower the boom again (shaking the tree); or simply keep pounding the stock down using the 2 basic techniques above to free up more scared sellors. Of course, if shareholders refused to sell or called in their certificates the short positions would be in deep do-do. But that rarely happens because of the lack of organization among shareholders. (It takes less effort to sell or sit back and blame the company, than to actually do something and try and organize with other investors.)

All the above works best in a lightly-traded market, where there is believable doubt that can be created about the prospects of the underlying company, where good news can be contested, and where big buyers are unlikely to jump in and be a "fly in the ointment" of the above carefully-orchestrated trading activities.

In sum, look for buying at the bid, light trading, the size of the short position, consistent downward price walking behavior, shaking of the tree price behavior, fud, etc. You know, look for a lot of the things we have been seeing on this stock over the last 3-4 months. This indeed has been a good learning experience for me. I plan on using my lessons to make a lot more money in the future with the knowledge gained.

The only reason I have continually banged away at trading behavior as the cause of the price fall is because all the board discussions were looking for the cause of the fall in numerous places outside of the market. My main point remains that this short-term price fall is most likely (and largely) trader-induced.  

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cav



To: Baghul who wrote (1185)10/19/1998 1:29:00 AM
From: Cavalry  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1637
 


Stock Board Articles from around the Globe
The article quotes Yahoo as saying" they have no plan to start moderating their bulletin boards, which are massive, free-ranging discussions linked to the actions of publicly traded companies. "We have no change in sight in terms of that approach," said Mike Riley, Yahoo finance producer. "We really believe in free and open discussion."

But in the last week, Yahoo has changed its rules for posting, Riley said. Participants must now give an e-mail address where they can receive messages from Yahoo, which will help them track users who give valid ISP, company, or online service accounts. However, a user could still hide behind free, anonymous Web-based e-mail addresses or anonymous ISP accounts.

Yahoo implemented the e-mail-address policy after news of the Itex lawsuit broke, but Riley said they had already been considering the idea.

This is now the second suit that has come to light. The first involved Canadian Philip Service in July. Philip successfully subpoenaed Yahoo to find the IP addresses of its online critics, and is tracing the individuals through their ISPs.

wow janice a company got the isp addresses of atheir harshest bashers
wonder if cygs or aznt have similar plans for you and crew????

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cav



To: Baghul who wrote (1185)10/19/1998 2:57:00 AM
From: Cavalry  Respond to of 1637
 
asenio will fire another shot any day
constant shareholder updates great weapon vs shorts 2:30 am release on time again, love that heb, no company can come up with daily releases forever, spoon feeding in pieces their findings is intelligent tact


10/19/98 - HEMISPHERX: NEW CLINICAL DATA IN ONGOING CFS TREATMENT PROGRAM

New Data Through mid-1998 Compared with Historic Baselines
NEW YORK, Oct. 19 /PRNewswire/ -- Hemispherx Biopharma (Amex:HEB ), today released additional data from its ongoing Phase II clinical trials with the drug Ampligen(R) in the treatment of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS), as presented in a paper this past week at the American Association for Chronic Fatigue Conference in Cambridge, MA.

As summarized in the table below, studies B and D represent clinical programs that are currently underway, generating continuous new data and enrolling new patients. The data from these studies as presented at the Cambridge conference were the latest analyzed data available, representing results through mid-1998. Study A (first reported in a peer reviewed journal in 1995) and study C (first reported in a peer journal in 1994) were included to provide a complete set of cumulative data for comparative baseline analysis. Overview of Four Phase II Clinical Trials of Ampligen Therapy in CFS Study A Study B Study C Study D Study Design open-label open-label randomized, open-label placebo-controlled cost -recovery # of Patients 15 45 92(19) 30 % Female 73% 70% 75%(74%) 70% Age (mean) 44 35 35(40) 41 Duration (weeks) 24+ 24+ 24+ 24+ Dose (mg) 200-400 200-400 200-400 200-400 Dosing Frequency Twice weekly Twice weekly Twice weekly Twice weekly (thrice weekly) Location USA Belgium USA USA In addition to providing baselines, comparative analysis helps determine whether the natural history of the untreated disease is constant or variable over time and whether response to the drug (including outcome parameters and adverse event parameters) undergoes fluctuation or not. Detailed supporting data presented at the Cambridge meeting suggested that these baseline and outcome parameters in the Ampligen(R) studies were relatively constant, both with respect to studies conducted in the U.S. as well as studies conducted in Europe.

All CFS patients described in the above chart met the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) criteria for the diagnosis of CFS and were studied under various regulatory authorizations obtained from either the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and/or corresponding regulatory parties in the other countries. All patients entering the studies were included in the analysis. This data capture approach, termed "Intent to Treat" is intended to capture all relevant clinical information, including hardship in compliance with protocol requirements, etc. An "Intent to Treat" approach is generally considered the scientifically most rigorous approach in the analysis of clinical data on a prospective therapeutic drug. Also, under various regulatory guidelines and statutes operative in the U.S. and the European Union, clinical data developed in this manner, in support of a marketing application, meets the full regulatory standard of complete disclosure on all patients.

Hemispherx stated that it would shortly be issuing a similar status report with respect to a confirmatory Phase III clinical evaluation which is starting up in the U.S. and is a multi-center, randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled protocol.

Hemispherx, headquartered in Philadelphia, PA, is a biopharmaceutical company. The Company is engaged in the manufacture and global clinical development of new drug entities in the nucleic acid (NA) class for chronic viral diseases and disorders of the immune system including CFS (Chronic Fatigue Syndrome) Information contained in this news release other than historical information, should be considered forward-looking and is subject to various risk factors and uncertainties. For instance, the strategies and operations of Hemispherx involve risks of competition, changing market conditions, changes in laws and regulations affecting these industries and numerous other factors discussed in this release and in the Company"s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Accordingly, actual results may differ materially from those in any forward looking statements. SOURCE Hemispherx Biopharma

-0- 10/19/98 /CONTACT: William A. Carter, M.D., CEO and Chairman, 215-988-0080, Sharon Will, Investor Relations, 212-572-0762, or Fax: 212-572-0764, both of Hemispherx Biopharma; or William J. Jenks, Media, 212-232-2222, Fax: 212-232-3232, for Hemispherx/

/Web site: hemispherx.com (HEB) CO: Hemispherx Biopharma ST: New York IN: MTC SU:

cav