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To: TD who wrote (22031)10/20/1998 10:36:00 PM
From: CIMA  Respond to of 116764
 
Pakistani Killings Highlight Problem of Rising Fundamentalism

The endemic violence in Pakistan between Sunni and Shiite Moslems
accelerated last month with the killings of several leaders of
the Sunni organization, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).
Throughout October, the tit-for-tat killings continued,
culminating on October 17 with the assassinations of Hakeem
Mohammad Saeed, a former governor of the southern Sindh
Provinces, and Maulana Mohammad Abdullah, the chief prayer leader
of the main Sunni mosque in Islamabad. These killings, as well
as recent military and political events, are the result of a
rapidly accelerating slide by Pakistan towards a fundamentalist
Taleban-like state.

The long-running conflict between the majority Sunni and minority
Shiite Moslems in Pakistan is an ongoing source of concern in the
country. But this conflict has been exacerbated by Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif's embrace of activist, fundamentalist Sunni
leaders, as his regime has come under fire for weak leadership
and alleged corruption and mismanagement. Accusations that
Sharif was incapable of maintaining internal stability led him in
early October to force the resignation of the head of the
military along with several other generals. Although the change
in command put generals sympathetic with Sharif in charge of the
military, the ousted generals maintain ties within the military
and are unlikely to settle into quiet retirement. Shortly after
the military shakeup, Sharif succeeded in pushing through a new
constitutional amendment making the Islamic Sharia the supreme
law of the land. Sharif's reliance on radical Sunni elements and
his consent to formally adopt the Sharia, as defined by those
elements, has raised the concerns of many that Pakistan will soon
be enforcing Islamic law in the same way as the Taleban do.

This brings us to the fundamental underlying reason for not only
the increase in violence, including the killings of Saeed and
Abdullah, but also the split between the military and the Prime
Minister. Pakistan was the major force behind the creation of
the Taleban, but the Taleban have not only subsequently evolved
into an independent force, outside Pakistan's direct control, but
have also built a great number of philosophical sympathizers
within Pakistan. The Taleban have also been strikingly
successful in their campaign to conquer Afghanistan, and this
success, coupled with Iran's increased presence on the border of
Afghanistan, has led to a rise in Sunni fundamentalist fervor in
Pakistan. The burst of nationalism following Pakistan's nuclear
bomb tests only contributed to this energy. In mid September, in
an attempt to moderate the increasing fundamentalist fervor in
Pakistan, Pakistan closed its borders with Afghanistan. This
was, however, too little too late. The fire was already burning
in Pakistan. This in turn sparked fears both within and outside
Pakistan that the country would soon be engulfed in a situation
very similar to Afghanistan, with Sunni fundamentalist forces
rising like the Taleban to crush all opposition and enforce an
extremist code.

Within Pakistan, the army was among the first to become
concerned. In an address to the Naval War College on October 5,
the Chief of the Army, General Jehangir Karamat, said that
internal security should be the top priority, and criticized
Prime Minister Sharif for being weak. He suggested as a solution
the creation of a National Security Council, which would give the
military more power to control the internal sectarian fighting in
Pakistan. Karamat was also opposed to the Prime Minister's plan
to introduce the constitutional change institutionalizing the
Sharia. Karamat misjudged his support, however, and two days
later resigned from his post. This was mistakenly seen by some
as a sign of the growing democracy in Pakistan, but in fact was a
result of just the opposite. Two days after Karamat's
resignation, on October 9, the Sharia law was passed. Prime
Minister Sharif quickly took advantage of the vacancy left by
Karamat and placed a junior general as head of the army. This
move was a direct affront to the senior generals, and several
resigned. Sharif filled the top posts with people loyal to him,
thereby apparently avoiding a military-led change of government.
However, General Karamat and the other generals still have strong
connections in the military, and cannot be ruled out yet.

Fighting between Shiites and Sunnis in Pakistan continued to grow
throughout October as the military and constitutional changes
took place. On October 3, there was a failed bomb attack on a
Shiite judge, and on the fifth, another Shiite judge and his
daughter were gunned down on their way to school. Then on
October 9, the Iranian Cultural Center was attacked, leaving the
security guard dead. On October 17, Hakeem Mohammad Saeed,
former governor of the Sindh Provinces, was killed. Saeed had,
just a few days before, accused government officials of being
involved in the drug trade and hiding illegal money overseas.
Also on the seventeenth, Maulana Mohammad Abdullah, a leader of
the SSP and chief prayer leader of the main Sunni mosque in
Islamabad, was killed. The next day, there was an attack on a
Sunni shrine.

Saeed's death was the first killing, in the recent round of
violence, of a major public personality not directly affiliated
with either Moslem sect. His death, and the death on the same
day of Maulana Mohammad Abdullah, represents a major inflammation
in the fighting. Saeed was not a supporter of either the Sunni
or the Shiites, but instead ran a clinic as well as several
pharmaceutical plants. He had taken a stand against the
government for corruption. His death resulted in demonstrations
calling for the government to step down. Abdullah, on the other
hand, was a staunch supporter of Osama Bin Laden and his SSP
organization supports the Taleban. As the chief prayer leader in
Islamabad, he helped define the positions of the Sunni in
Pakistan. His death is extremely significant. There are many
interested in seeing the current government fall and in slowing
the spread of Sunni radicalism. Eliminating Abdullah certainly
contributes to the latter and may help undermine the regime as
well.

The military and the more moderate Pakistanis don't want to see
Pakistan turn into another Afghanistan. Neither do the Shiite
minority. Wherever Shiites are in trouble, Iran enters. Iran
has not only expressed an interest in protecting Shiites around
the world, but it also has no desire to see a radical Sunni
alliance spreading from the Gulf of Oman to the Turkmenistan
border. India, Pakistan's traditional enemy, is also concerned
that a Taleban-inspired Pakistan would increase its belligerence
in Kashmir and in other disputes. China is also monitoring the
situation, as it has no desire to see its traditional counter to
India begin instead backing the Moslem separatists in Xinjiang.
Finally, the United States has an interest, as Pakistan is
located in a strategic midpoint between Central and Southern
Asia, and has been useful to Washington in keeping both the
Iranians and the Indians in check. Abdullah's murder may be part
of the tit-for-tat, but Iran and the Pakistani military are
potential suspects as well, as they have reason to attempt to
slow the rise of the Sunni fundamentalists and bring down
Sharif's government.

Whether Saeed and Abdullah were just more victims of the
continuous fighting, or taken out by others interested in slowing
the spreading Sunni radicalism is uncertain. However, that
Pakistan created, in the Taleban, a Frankenstein's Monster,
returning to terrorize its creator, is quite evident. Sharif's
alignment with the Sunni radicals, although intended only as a
way of removing attention from his political problems, has placed
Pakistan on a slippery slope to Talebanization. This is a major
concern for Pakistan's neighbors, and poses a security risk to
the region. A radical trigger-happy Sunni fundamentalist
Pakistan next to a Hindu nationalist India can only lead to
disaster. A Taleban state stretching along the entire eastern
border of Iran is something Tehran can not tolerate. For this
reason, we expect to see the specter of the Taleban in Pakistan
trigger many more killings, of higher placed religious and civil
leaders, resulting in a continued state of tension and violence
for months to come.

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