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Strategies & Market Trends : Graham and Doddsville -- Value Investing In The New Era -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: porcupine --''''> who wrote (922)10/21/1998 7:11:00 PM
From: Freedom Fighter  Respond to of 1722
 
Tootsie Roll Update - V.I.W.

I sold my shares of Tootsie Roll yesterday at $42. I purchased the shares in July of 1997. The profit was a little over 85% in slightly more than 1 year. There is nothing wrong with company. It has been modestly overpriced for awhile now but I was willing to hold it because I had no other investment ideas for the proceeds and I thought it was a good takeover target for someone big. That does not seem as likely now so I used the recent Fed liquidity rally to cash the ticket. It remains a company that I would love to own. Just at a more sensible price. However, I would like to add that I think it is less overvalued than most companies.

Wayne Crimi
Value Investor Workshop
members.aol.com




To: porcupine --''''> who wrote (922)10/22/1998 8:18:00 PM
From: porcupine --''''>  Respond to of 1722
 
Timid Japanese Bank Bailout Just Might Do the Job -- NYTimes

ECONOMIC SCENE -- October 22, 1998

By MICHAEL M. WEINSTEIN

The law that the Japanese Parliament recently
passed to rescue broken-down banks commits several
blunders. It
does not require insolvent banks to close. It does not
require banks to disclose losses. It does not require
wobbly banks that accept taxpayer money to lend to
creditworthy borrowers -- the primary purpose of a
bailout.

The obvious prediction is that Japan will remain
credit-starved, dragging down other economies in Asia
and beyond.

But the prediction may be wrong. The law takes the
important step of injecting public money into failing
banks. Despite its flaws, the measure might pry open
clogged credit lines and channel money to companies in
need of a fresh start. As Adam Posen of the Institute
for International Economics, author of a new book on
the Japanese economy, says, "The bill will succeed
despite itself."

Japan's banks are buried in bad loans and confront an
economy that has slipped into recession. Thus they are
loath to lend even to reliable customers. But if banks
do not lend, companies cannot invest, and the economy
cannot grow.

The crisis has been worsened by an accounting system
that allows banks to mask losses. Fanciful financial
reports have scared away investors and creditors.
Worse, the phantom bookkeeping pretends that borrowers
can repay impossibly large loans.

Japan needs its banks to wipe bad loans from their
books so borrowers can start afresh. To that end, the
law creates three pots of public money totaling about
$500 billion, more than 10 percent of Japan's annual
output. The United States' savings and loan bailout in
the 1980s cost about 2 percent or 3 percent of output.

The first pot, about $150 billion, will pay off
depositors at banks that close. Their assets will be
transferred to a government agency for resale to
private investors, much the way Resolution Trust Corp.
worked in the United States.

The second pot, also around $150 billion, will be used
to nationalize insolvent banks that the government
decides to keep open. The government will run these
banks until private owners take over, mirroring the way
the Roosevelt administration handled the 1930s banking
crisis.

The third, most controversial pot has no U.S. parallel.
It will pump about $200 billion into private banks that
the government deems shaky but solvent. In return, the
government will get stock. The idea is that the
taxpayer money will build up the banks' capital so they
can resume lending.

Daniel Tarullo, formerly President Clinton's top
adviser on international economic policy, is not
convinced the plan will work. "There is no clear
mechanism for moving the $500 billion out the door of
government and into banks," he says. "Banks have to ask
for assistance. But by asking for assistance, the bank
managers identify themselves as incompetent, invoke
intrusive government monitoring and put their jobs in
jeopardy. That is hardly an incentive to play along."

Critics ask why the government should bail out
supposedly solvent banks. Besides, nothing in the law
forces banks that take public money to write down loans
to feasible levels. Tarullo points out that the ruling
party has a history of letting banks serving
agriculture and construction -- its core supporters --
do as they want.

The legislation is vague, critics point out, relying on
bureaucrats to fill in the blanks. That might have
worked well when the finance and other ministries were
all-powerful. But now they are largely discredited, and
the ability of the bureaucrats to discipline private
markets is dubious.

The threat is that insolvent banks, operating under the
cover of a bogus accounting system and a compliant
government, will limp along, draining resources from
productive parts of the economy. Tarullo paints a
picture of continued drift.

Perhaps, Posen says, Japan's recent past is not
prologue. Yes, the parliament should have forced banks
that take public money to write down old loans and use
the cash to issue new loans. But, he says, there are
good reasons to believe all this will happen anyway.

He argues that the discipline of international capital
markets, which have largely shut off Japan's banks,
will force banks to take the government bailout. On
Wednesday, three major Japanese banks were reported to
be preparing applications.

Posen also predicts that these banks will be forced by
public pressure and new political forces to pass along
cash to worthy borrowers.

He points out that the law was not written according to
Japanese custom by bureaucrats in the Finance Ministry
but was drafted, at the request of cabinet officials,
by a younger generation of Parliament leaders.

U.S. officials have been clamoring for the Japanese to
clean up their bank mess -- no matter how. The bailout
passed by the Parliament will waste lots of taxpayer
money. It will not dispense justice. It will not by
itself turn the Japanese economy around -- fiscal
measures will also be needed.

But by throwing serious money into locked credit lines,
the law does take an essential step toward ending
Japan's immediate crisis. For now, that might be all
the world needs.

Copyright 1998 The New York Times Company