China-Malaysia Relations Threatened by Piracy Case
China has reportedly released 12 Indonesian pirates who earlier
this year hijacked a Malaysian fuel tanker. China's decision not
to extradite the pirates to Malaysia, and other irregularities in
the way the case has been handled, has drawn allegations that
Beijing has been covering up its own complicity in the hijacking.
This case threatens to sour relations between Malaysia and China,
which could, in turn, threaten the safety of the ethnic Chinese
minority in Malaysia.
On October 21, Beijing declined to comment on reports that last
Thursday it released 12 Indonesian nationals accused of hijacking
a fuel tanker in April. Since the hijacking, the pirates were
held in Haikou, capital of China's island province of Hainan.
China reportedly released the accused Indonesians last week
without trial and in spite of Malaysia's request for their
extradition. When asked about the hijackers' release, a Haikou
border official told Germany's Deutsche Presse Agentur that "It
is a secret," and insisted that China had acted in line with
correct legal procedures.
The Malaysian tanker Petro Ranger, bound from Singapore to Ho Chi
Minh City with a cargo of $1.5 million worth of diesel fuel and
kerosene, was seized by the Indonesian hijackers in the South
China Sea in April 1998. The hijackers held the ship's
Australian captain at gunpoint for 10 days, transferring more
than a third of the cargo to a Chinese-registered vessel, Jin
Chao, before the Petro Ranger was intercepted by Chinese maritime
police on April 26. Malaysia requested extradition of the
pirates as soon as their capture was reported, on May 1. Adding
insult to injury, Captain Kenneth Blythe and his 21-member
multinational crew were then detained by the Chinese police in
Haikou for 45 days, while an investigation was carried out and
the Malaysian shipping company arranged their release on bail.
The Petro Ranger was not allowed to depart from Haikou until what
was left of the fuel was siphoned from its holds by the Chinese
authorities and sold, with the proceeds being kept by the Chinese
as security.
The release of the Indonesian pirates drew an outraged response
from the Piracy Reporting Center of the International Maritime
Bureau on Kuala Lumpur. The Center charged that China's decision
to release the pirates suggested a "deep plot to cover up China's
participation in criminal activity." "This is not the first time
that the Chinese ports have been used to shelter hijacked
vessels. Local officials have been involved in earlier criminal
activities," the Center claimed. The Center said that this
marked the second instance of China ignoring its commitments to
fight piracy under Article 10 of the Rome Convention, which
Beijing signed in 1988. China reportedly released 14 pirates who
had been arrested in Beihai, Guangxi province, in 1996. China
still holds the Cyprus-flagged vessel seized in that case, and is
demanding $400,000 for the release of the ship and its cargo.
This case threatens to disrupt what have recently been good
relations between China and Malaysia. Although Beijing joined
Indonesia, Singapore, and Philippines in reacting to Malaysia's
treatment of arrested former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim,
China's criticism of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad
was restrained. In a very neutral tone, China's Foreign Ministry
spokesman Zhu Bangzao said in September, "As a friendly neighbor
of Malaysia, China sincerely hopes that Malaysia can have
political stability and its economy can return to the development
path as soon as possible." When commenting on Malaysia's
implementation of a tight new fiscal policy, Chinese Ambassador
Wang Yusheng, said China viewed "Malaysia's decision to embark on
foreign exchange controls as measures to deal with its own
domestic issue and China will respect it."
Clearly, relations between China and Malaysia have lately been
defined primarily by the need for economic cooperation. Both
countries have stated their intention to make future investments
in each other's economic and business sectors. Mahathir,
stressed this aspect in his comments on China-Malaysia relations
for the Malaysian edition of the Business Times. "We would like
to invest more in China and we would like China to invest here.
We must increase trade between the two countries, and we should
cooperate with each other in facing the difficult years ahead,"
he said. Mahathir also said Malaysia was very happy about China
being a "very stable country."
However, relations between China and Malaysia have not always
been rosy, and it has only been through the direct efforts of
Mahathir himself that the Chinese minority in Malaysia has seen
the reduction of persecution against them. In Malaysia, as in
Indonesia, the Chinese minority has been a historical target when
the domestic political and economic situation deteriorated. If
Malaysia chooses to make a substantial issue of what likely was
Chinese involvement in the hijacking of the Petro Ranger, it
could mark the beginning of a new campaign to demonize Chinese in
Malaysia. The ensuing cycle of deteriorating bilateral relations
and persecution of Malaysia's Chinese minority, while possibly
giving Mahathir a minor nationalistic boost, can do nothing for
Asian political and economic restructuring and recovery.
On the Chinese side, the decision to forego prosecution of this
piracy case may mark weakness in Beijing's efforts to crack down
on both corruption and Chinese military entrepreneurship. While
there is no clear evidence of direct Chinese military involvement
in this case, nor will any likely surface, the military has been
deeply involved in smuggling operations. The handling of this
case and its unanswered questions leave Beijing's reform efforts
in doubt, as it could have made a poignant show trial on a
domestic and international level. Now it's just a sore spot with
Malaysia.
___________________________________________________
To receive free daily Global Intelligence Updates
or Computer Security Alerts, sign up on the web at
stratfor.com, or send your name,
organization, position, mailing address, phone
number, and e-mail address to alert@stratfor.com
___________________________________________________
STRATFOR Systems, Inc.
504 Lavaca, Suite 1100
Austin, TX 78701
Phone: 512-583-5000
Fax: 512-583-5025
Internet: stratfor.com
Email: info@stratfor.com
|
