SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Gold/Mining/Energy : Magnesium Alloy Corp. (MGAC.U - Cdn unlisted) -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: GlobalMarine who wrote (63)10/29/1998 10:38:00 AM
From: Ron Everest  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 103
 
Strategic Alert DRC:

Rand, it is probable that the political scene in Angola and DRC are the reason for the trading activity.

Global Intelligence Update
Red Alert
October 29, 1998

Angolan Rebels May Target U.S. Interests in New Offensive

According to a "duly identified and generally reliable source"
cited by the Angolan newspaper "Actual," Angola's UNITA rebels
have completed preparations for a major offensive to be carried
out in Bengo, Uige, and Cabinda provinces. Among the areas UNITA
reportedly plans to seize are Ambriz District and the area around
Libongos, from which the rebels can bombard Luanda with medium-
range missiles. The source said that preparations for the
offensive had been completed under the leadership of Portuguese,
South African, and Iraqi "experts," and that fractures within
UNITA have led UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi to rely in large part
on mercenaries from Rwanda, Uganda, South Africa, Namibia, Libya,
and Iraq. Moreover, as Savimbi reportedly feels that the United
States has "betrayed" him, he is reportedly mulling a
"preemptive" strike against U.S. interests in Malongo, in the
Cabinda enclave. As of October 28, UNITA had succeeded in taking
three towns in Uije and Malanje provinces, reportedly facing
little or no resistance.

The U.S. has effectively severed ties with UNITA. In an October
23 letter to Congress, President Bill Clinton outlined the steps
he has taken to isolate UNITA. These include an embargo on arms
transfers and petroleum sales to UNITA, an embargo on the
transfer of aircraft and aircraft parts to UNITA, a blockade of
flights to or from UNITA-controlled territory, and on August 18
of this year, the freezing of UNITA assets in the United States.
Russia, one of three official observers of the Angolan peace
process with the U.S. and Portugal, has imposed similar sanctions
on UNITA, as has the UN. All three observer countries severed
contacts with Savimbi in August.

On October 28, a delegation of top U.S. African affairs officials
arrived in Angola to discuss the peace process in Angola and the
neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The
delegation includes Under Secretary of State for African Affairs
Susan Rice, who went on record last month tacitly supporting
intervention in the DRC, as "The DRC should not be used as a
haven for UNITA, Interahamwe, and others to destabilize Uganda,
Rwanda, and Angola."

Under Secretary Rice, National Security Council Director for
Africa Gayle Smith, and special envoy Howard Wolpe are scheduled
to meet with Angolan Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura, though
they have no plans of meeting with UNITA representatives. The
delegation will, however, reportedly meet with a group of UNITA
dissidents who recently split from the group. Luanda has cut off
all contact with Savimbi and is negotiating with the UNITA
dissidents as if they represented the group, a clearly futile
diplomatic gesture, which the U.S. is apparently choosing to
support.

The war in northern Angola, which never really ended despite the
1994 Lusaka Peace Accord, is heating up rapidly. The conflict
was accelerated by the war in the DRC, where UNITA assisted the
rebels and the Angolan government intervened on behalf of the
Kabila regime in order to prevent the reestablishment of a pro-
UNITA regime. Mobutu Sese Seko, the former leader of the DRC,
then known as Zaire, allowed UNITA to use Zaire as a rear area
for logistics. Several factors threaten to make the latest
escalation in fighting more severe than at any time since 1994.
First, the deep split within UNITA means that Savimbi must fight
not only to defeat the Luanda government, but to maintian the
support of his own army.

Second, UNITA no longer enjoys a major national sponsor.
"Actual" newspaper's source alleged that South African officials
have substantial business ties with UNITA, which precluded South
African intervention in the DRC. However, South African support
for UNITA appears to be limited to business relations and turning
a blind eye to mercenary involvement in Angola. The increased
role of mercenaries is another factor which may fuel this phase
of Angola's ongoing war, as are possible links to Uganda, Rwanda,
Libya, Iraq, and other countries. These links not only represent
the continued spread of Africa's now nearly continental war, but
with Iraqi involvement, draw the U.S. further into Africa's
conflicts. Finally, the targeting of U.S. interests, and
particularly of oil interests in the Cabinda enclave, means this
latest fighting threatens a substantial international economic
impact as well.

___________________________________________________

To receive free daily Global Intelligence Updates
or Computer Security Alerts, sign up on the web at
stratfor.com, or send your name,
organization, position, mailing address, phone
number, and e-mail address to alert@stratfor.com
___________________________________________________

STRATFOR Systems, Inc.
504 Lavaca, Suite 1100
Austin, TX 78701
Phone: 512-583-5000
Fax: 512-583-5025
Internet: stratfor.com
Email: info@stratfor.com



To: GlobalMarine who wrote (63)4/18/2001 2:33:51 AM
From: Ron Everest  Respond to of 103
 
Deployment to the DRC: The Rwandan Dilemma
17 April 2001
stratfor.com

After years of fighting Africa’s most complex contemporary war, the armies of six nations disengaged March 29 and allowed U.N. observers to deploy in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Contingent upon the complete disengagement of the estimated 60,000 foreign troops, the deployment marks the first substantive step toward ending the country’s nearly three-year-old war.

Efforts to end the war have become increasingly complex, but the simple motivations behind the war will dictate the terms of its end. Five of six nations involved are motivated by greed: a grab for land and resources.

Rwanda is the exception to this equation. Unlike the other players, the Rwandan government has been driven by security concerns. The government in Kigali has pursued the conflict as an extension of Rwanda’s ethnic struggle between Hutu rebels and the Tutsi-led government.

The Rwandan Patriotic Army (APR) has an increasingly strained relationship with its local rebel allies. A split is probable between the rebels’ former leadership, which still commands loyalty from its fighters, and the government of Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Simultaneously, the Rwandan forces’ chief concern – some 60,000 Hutu rebels, known as the Interhamwe – show no evidence they will stop fighting.

The conflict is a labyrinth of political alliances between no less than six nations and as many as 10 local groups. On one side are more than 20,000 Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean soldiers allied with government troops fielded by the government in Kinshasa.



On the other side is a tenuous alliance between Rwandan forces and an estimated 6,000 Ugandan troops. Ugandan forces have set up a friendly government in the northeast under the Congolese Liberation Front (CLF), led by Jean Pierre Bemba, reports Ugandan daily New Vision. The Rwandans provide support and direct the 25,000 fighters of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), a conglomerate of ethnic groups headquartered on the Rwandan border.

The government of the DRC on April 16 called for a meeting of the U.N. Security Council in order to seek economic sanctions against Rwanda, accusing the government of delaying its redeployment of forces. The request follows a setback in the peace process over the weekend when rebels from the RCD barred nearly 120 U.N. peacekeepers from deploying in Kisangani.

The current government, led by Joseph Kabila, appears to have moved toward a peace settlement to preserve itself and appease senior officers in the military, worn out by a war of attrition. But there are clear signs the Rwandan government does not believe Kabila is committed to peace.

The Rwandan Hutu refugee population has no reason to buy into the peace process now unfolding. They are not part of the inter-Congolese dialogue, will not be part of any unity government, and will not return peaceably to take power in Kigali. In fact, since the cease-fire agreement, fighting has intensified in South Kivu, according to South Africa’s News24.

Rwanda ultimately has no compelling reason to withdraw its forces. While Rwandan forces are worn out by the war, the government can continue to fund its effort, based on revenues from mines in South Kivu and North Kivu provinces.

Compounding problems for the Rwandan government is evidence of a rift that may emerge inside the political leadership of the Rwandan-backed rebels, the RCD.

Last October, Kigali reportedly sent a delegation of high-level government officials to Goma, the RCD capital, to accept the resignation of the group’s president and two vice presidents, according to Reuters. The group’s president, Emile Llunga, was replaced by Adolphe Onusumba, a 35-year-old doctor who previously acted as the RCD’s foreign minister.

Kigali was likely trying to tighten its hold on local rebel allies, but the move may backfire. Where Llunga enjoyed considerable loyalty within the ranks of the RCD’s combatants, Onusumba has only limited military training. The way Llunga was replaced suggests the move was heavy-handed and could reinforce the view of Onusumba as a puppet of the Rwandan government.

As pressure grows for the war’s end, the interests of Rwanda’s allies will begin to diverge from Rwanda itself. With a peace deal, there is no hope of taking Kinshasa by force – a stated goal of the RCD. Even the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, intended to draw up a post-war DRC, does not offer the RCD rank and file very much.

An outright withdrawal by Rwandan forces would be problematic, as they need their allies to secure their western flank. A split with the RCD would make such an operation complicated. Such a possibility is not far-fetched; the RCD has split before and sent a splinter group into the arms of the Ugandan government in 1999.

A reoccurrence could turn some of the rebels toward Uganda in order to ensure a flow of weapons into the country while securing an avenue for trade to the outside world. The Ugandan government’s aims are economic and it could be enticed to assist splinter elements of the RCD in an effort to gain the economic assets now under Rwanda’s control. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni would be happy to fight the Congolese down to the last Rwandan.