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Politics : Idea Of The Day -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: IQBAL LATIF who wrote (21159)10/31/1998 8:37:00 PM
From: AlienTech  Respond to of 50167
 
For IQBAL LATIF's eyes only. POP SECRET!

Financial CounterIntelligence By ScotM a Sr. Manager, Engineering Systems.

Warren Buffet

Sometimes I need to sit back and try to figure out what the Wizard is doing. I have been having some conversations with out corporate pilots, and with our more knowledgeable engine support people (we make jet engines, btw). So here is the scenario as I see it:

Buffet buys USAir a couple of decades ago because back then all the airlines were run by pilots and generals and the like. The plan is that good business management should be able to make a buck where no one has before. He doesn't, but he learns something. He learns a lot. He already knew that asymmetrical information - the kind you get from someone who knows someone who does - is the most valuable commodity to leverage into making money. So what is the useful information in the aircraft/airline/corporate jet business? I'll get to that.

He buys Flight Safety - probably the biggest and best Commercial and corporate jet pilot trainer other than the US Air Force, and even those guys have to go through the commercial training to requalify. Then he buys Comsgate, the fixed base operator (aircraft gas stations if you will). Then he acquires USAIG - a major player in aircraft insurance. Now, all of these are great companies that provide a good product/service and make money and will continue to be the leader. But there isn't any real growth and not the kind of turnaround or grass root or grossly undervalued type of deal he usually does. In fact, it doesn't look all that brilliant on the surface. So what's the deal here. Buffet gets into a business that has historically lost money and is too complex to make any major bucks in his lifetime. This is outside his modis operandi, his profile. Or is it?

Talking to the corporate pilots a couple of years ago, as out hangar is just down the runway from Chrysler's Pentastar hangars, I remember them talking about how all the Chrysler planes were going to Berlin for the Auto show. "Oh yea? All of them? Who all is going?" The whole legal department, a huge contingent from the treasury and finance group. And they don't just go to Berlin, but Stuttgart and Dusseldorf. Hmm…and then a couple of years later the big merger. Asymmetrical information. Not enough though, and I wasn't thinking in those terms back then. Stay with me gang, as this is going somewhere.

So Buffet bought those companies, some with more than the usual publicity and fanfare in their respective trade journals. But what does he really get out if it? Asymmetrical information. The Insurance group has the database on all the fractional share ownership in corporate jets. Lets see, Coke flies planes owned by GE and leased to CL Partners. Ltd. IBM, GM and Ford and the Fortune 1000 all have similar arrangements. The insurance industry has that information. Flight Safety knows who is adding, upsizing, downsizing, deleting aircraft (because the pilots need training or requalification). The Fixed Base Operators have the serial numbers of the planes being refueled, maintained, and the location of those usual service centers. All asymmetrical information.

Add one more thing. The FAA now has online and available to anyone every day, all the flight plans filed by every major aircraft for aircraft landing sites the FAA had cognizance over.

I'll be damned. Buffet has built an antennae!

He now knows what the normal flight patterns are for every corporate jet, regardless how buried it is in leasing and fractional ownership and holding companies. So lets say Chrysler files a flight plan to send a couple of planes to Germany every year for the Auto Show. But in 1996 that pattern changed, substantially, with three times the flights and visits to a global competitor's home city. It is a fairly simple task to query the fixed based operators you own, and the insurance company you own to find out if they are going somewhere out of the ordinary. By exception he can now be made aware of unusual activity by corporations and privately held companies as they move outside their normal business. Then you set up screens to query the FAA database for specific aircraft/company/flight plans to see if the activity increases or ends. And none of the information is insider.

This is just speculation, of course. But you know, that plan does fit his profile. Just a thought.

So now the question is, how could one make some money off of this situation if that is what the Wizard is doing. Well, its fairly easy for me to identify some major corporations who hare having a miserable string of quarters, and don't look to meet the next earnings. So we form a company, lets call it a Market Analysis Consultancy. We meet with the CEO's and give them the scenario and this plan:

1. For the price of flying myself and a couple of executive-looking buddies, maybe them or some of their officers now and then, we will file flight plans into the cities of plausible takeover companies, check to see where their planes are going (Vail, Geneva, wherever), stay at high priced hotels, reserving classy conference space, being somewhat secretive, and fly out when they do, or after some reasonable time fame. We would need to pull some friends (I'm thinking SI members here) into this on occasion to have dinner at Too Chez or Tribute's at a couple hundred a plate and talk about the financials of the particular companies involved. One does want to be overheard now and then.

2. This information will get picked up on Buffet's screening system, as we won't make any secret of it, and it will look suspiciously like a merger or takeover or major agreement. The share price will go up, their options are worth more, the shareholders are happy, and I had a good time at a fairly high, but relatively cost effective pay scale.

3. Then, to make this all terribly sophisticated, a ‘subsidiary' of ours we will publish a quarterly stock letter, at a very stratospheric price, that will identify the best stocks to own for the next year or so. This of course, would only be available to the other execs who appreciate the value of analysis and are willing to pay the, oh, $10 grand a month we would charge for it. And the subscriber base would be limited to the Fortune 500 CEO's I would think.

4. Eventually, just the newsletter price alone would pay for our own planes, and then the IPO, probably as an Internet-based company (one of those ‘perfect-model' scenarios) that screens out this counter-intelligence for Berkshire Hathaway-type firms…

Anyone see anything illegal here?



To: IQBAL LATIF who wrote (21159)11/1/1998 10:55:00 AM
From: IQBAL LATIF  Respond to of 50167
 
Rev Up Spending
IMF's about-turn on fiscal stimulus won't work

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By Salil Tripathi in Singapore

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October 29, 1998
I t is a policy reversal that the International Monetary Fund has begun to push aggressively. Throwing off its customary austerity, the IMF wants Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia to rev up their fiscal engines and spend their way out of the economic blues. And if they rack up budget deficits in the process, that's okay, too.

The IMF set budget deficits in September at 3% of GDP for Thailand, 4% for South Korea and 8.5% for Indonesia, revised since the Fund announced its policy about-turn in July. But economists say the size of these deficits won't be sufficient for badly needed bank capitalization and social safety-nets. What's more, governments are loath to fall too far into the red, anyway.

As many experts see it, this impetus isn't strong enough. "At such a time Asia needs a massive fiscal stimulus, and that's not coming through," notes Manu Bhaskaran, chief strategist at SG Securities in Singapore. P.K. Basu, chief economist at Credit Suisse First Boston in Singapore, concurs. Using Thailand as an example, he notes that the country's budget deficit of about 200 billion baht ($5 billion) forecast for 1998 is "too little," given that its current-account surplus is expected to be 418 billion baht. He points out that Thailand's GDP is targeted to shrink 8.3%. Because deficit financing is measured as a percentage of GDP, in absolute terms, Thailand's public spending would be less in 1998 than it was in 1997. "If that isn't tight money policy, what is?" muses Basu.

Indeed, some economists believe the fiscal stimulus won't work unless governments use their rising foreign-exchange reserves to increase domestic spending. Exporters sell the hard-currency earnings they bring into the country to the central bank via commercial banks. To pay for the hard currency, the central bank either prints new money on the strength of the increase in its reserves, or reduces the capital-adequacy ratios of the commercial bank concerned. This creates new liquidity in the system--a monetary expansion that the IMF would readily approve. The main worry is that the commercial banks might use the new liquidity to boost their reserves rather than lend it out, thus weakening the fiscal-stimulus initiative. "There is an air of irrational exuberance in the IMF's thinking," says a regional economist with a European brokerage in Singapore.

The severity of Asia's economic illness prompted the IMF's monetary rethink. Circumstances have changed since the IMF first urged tight monetary policies on Asia's sick. The early days required austerity to help economies to stabilize. "That period is behind us. Now is the time to expand," says IMF Asia-Pacific Director Hubert Neiss, reiterating an argument that the IMF has been making for the past three months. Indeed, the region is beginning to perk up: Currencies are no longer bouncing like yo-yos; interest rates--although still high--have fallen; and foreign reserves have grown since the lows of 1997.

Neiss believes a fiscal stimulus--handled properly--will help liquidity to flow back into Asia. He says confidence in the region would return by early 1999, thus attracting private money, if global conditions are favourable. This in turn will help governments to pay for bank recapitalization, easing the burden of corporate debt.

But the IMF's target economies aren't completely convinced. "In other countries, we have to urge governments not to run budget deficits; in Asia, we have to encourage them to expand fiscally. But Asians don't like running large deficits," said Stanley Fischer, the IMF's Washington-based deputy managing director.

Indeed, Indonesia and South Korea have dragged their feet in stimulating demand because they are accustomed to running budget surpluses; in the past, multilateral agencies, including the IMF, have praised them for this. And Thailand has resisted a larger budget deficit, says an IMF official in Bangkok, despite "a blank cheque" that the fund is willing to write for social spending.

In fact, Asian governments had wanted to steer clear of budget deficits altogether, hoping that export earnings would bounce back and foreign capital would return. Neither has happened, admits Miranda Goeltom, a director at Bank Indonesia, the country's central bank. Exports haven't risen in dollar terms in Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia, for example, as global overcapacity has depressed prices in the key Asian manufacturing industries such as electronic goods. Nor is it likely that the volume of exports will pick up; the pace of world economic growth is forecast to slow to 2% in 1998 from 4.1% in 1997. Foreign capital, too, remains skittish. David Hale, chief global economist at the Zurich group in Chicago, doesn't think it will return anytime soon to Asia--or to any emerging market, for that matter.

But the IMF's fiscal-stimulus plan perhaps offers too little, too late. If governments will spend less in absolute terms in 1998 than they did in previous years, the outlay for bank recapitalization or social safety-nets simply won't be enough. According to estimates by the Asian Development Bank early this year, social-safety schemes would cost 7% of GDP in Indonesia, and about 5% of GDP in Thailand.

Calculating the cost of bank recapitalization is trickier, but Asian bankers say it could range from 25% to 50% of GDP in each of the three countries. Depending upon exchange rates used, that could amount to between $75 billion and $150 billion. But current-account surpluses for the trio are expected to collectively total just $57 billion, says SG Securities in Singapore.

There are few financing options available, however. The World Bank and the ADB can provide only a fraction of the needed funds. Tapping Asia's private savings would be difficult. Few Asian countries have active markets for bonds, or other fiscal instruments, in which to pour savings. Depending upon the limited fiscal stimulus would be like depending upon a freak shower to reinvigorate a parched landscape.



To: IQBAL LATIF who wrote (21159)11/1/1998 11:00:00 AM
From: IQBAL LATIF  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 50167
 
Buying opportunity seen as Tokyo blue chips turn red
By Anthony Rowley

M

ANY of Japan's so-called blue-chip companies have suddenly
turned into "red" chips -- they have gone into the red in the first half of fiscal 1998. Others expect to make losses in the second half of the year as sales continue to ratchet downwards and as the collapse of Asian markets adds to the corporate misery in Japan's recession-hit domestic market.

As with Japan's macro-economy, the picture in the corporate sector appears to be one of almost unrelieved gloom and few analysts are prepared to predict any significant improvement this side of the year 2000.

Good-bye growth: There is misery too among analysts, with some suggesting that Japan's economy is now "beyond the point of repair". One report, predicting a 2.6 per cent contraction in Japanese GDP in the year to March 31 next, was titled "A Farewell to Growth". Equity strategist Giles Ockenden at Jardine Fleming Securities in Tokyo is suggesting that the Nikkei-225 stock average, which currently stands at around 13,500, could fall to nearer 10,000 before the current economic crisis in Japan is over.

Yet even the most bearish analysts appear to accept that there is -- or will be -- a case for buying Japanese stocks before long. Mr Ockenden, for instance, argues that the worsening crisis will "radicalise Japanese people and corporates" and that the Tokyo stockmarket will rise again like a "phoenix from the ashes". Others believe that the Obuchi government may yet stave off a crash by throwing enough money at the economy.

Corporate sector pain is becoming acute. By one estimate, combined recurring profits in the first half of fiscal 1998 (ended Sept 30) for 820 non-financial firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange's first section plunged 30 per cent from a year earlier. This is the largest half-yearly fall since 1975, when Japan was hit by the first oil shock. After-tax profits are meanwhile estimated to have dropped by 65 per cent.

The corporate results season is still in full swing, but a survey of 120 companies showed that actual operating profits in the first six months slumped by 53 per cent on the back of a sales decline of 8 per cent, while pre-tax profits plunged by 46 per cent.

Results from individual blue-chip companies highlight the dramatic nature of the profit collapse. NEC, Japan's largest semiconductor manufacturer and leading personal computer maker, fell into consolidated pre-tax losses of 24.5 billion yen (S$342.4 million) in the first half and the electronics giant has forecast a full-year loss at the consolidated level, its first in six years.

Meanwhile, Fujitsu, Japan's largest computer maker, reported a 68 per cent drop in consolidated interim pre-tax profit.

More shocking was news that flagship consumer electronics giant Sony Corp's consolidated operating profit in the first half fell by nearly 15 per cent -- despite a near 10 per cent rise in sales. Sony expects the situation to worsen in the second half and that red ink will flow for the first time in six years.

Toshiba, Japan's second biggest electronics maker, went into the red for the first time in 48 years. Electronics conglomerate Hitachi, meanwhile, reported its worst half-year profits since 1949 and declined to forecast for the full year.

The pain did not stop there. A group of 117 Japanese wholesalers reported their first-ever annual decline in sales and profits since records were begun in 1972, while major Japanese department stores also reported slumping revenues and profits.

Major restructuring: The core of the problem, according to many analysts, is that Japanese companies are refusing to face up to the need for major restructuring -- especially of their workforces -- and for cutting costs.

Rather than deregulate the economy so that new jobs can be created, the government is pleading with corporations to keep labour on, to avoid rising unemployment.

Some analysts believe that a collapsing economy will force a painful labour shakeout and that a host of other reformswill hoist rates of return on equity in Japan from around 2.5 per cent to near 10 per cent over the next few years. This justifies an "overweight position" in Japanese equities even now.

Other analysts believe that massive prospective fiscal stimulus in the shell-shocked banking system will help arrest the economic decline. Corporate earnings will then begin to benefit from as early as next year.

Either way, the bears do not look like having things all their own way in Tokyo.