Signs of Possible Rebel Splintering Ahead of Peace Talks
The town of Mitu in the eastern Colombian province of Vaupes was
the scene of the latest carnage in Colombia, when as many as
1,000 rebels attacked the local police station on November 1, in
what has been described by some observers as a show of strength
prior to negotiations with the government. According to official
reports, the 53rd Front of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) launched an attack on the police station in Mitu
at 3:00 a.m. local time. The rebels, reportedly led by Henry
Castellanos, also known as Commander Romana, moved to immediately
secure the city's airfield and cut off communications to the rest
of the country. While there has been no official confirmation,
it is believed that all of the city's 125 policemen were killed
or taken prisoner.
The attack came just a week before approximately 2,000 government
troops are to finish withdrawing from a 15,000 square mile area
in the heart of Colombia. This demilitarized area, roughly the
size of Switzerland, is to be the stage for talks between the
government and Colombia's largest rebel group aimed at bringing a
peaceful end to almost four decades of civil war. This latest
incident has again fueled speculation over the commitment of
Colombia's guerrilla armies to the peace process. However, this
week's massacre may signal an even more fundamental problem.
Aspects of the attack in Mitu suggest that there may already be
autonomous factions forming within Colombia's largest insurgent
group.
The isolated nature of the incident at Mitu, the fact that the
rebels reportedly used improvised weapons, and the reported
identity of the FARC unit that attacked the town, all raise
serious questions. First, while Colombia's general baseline
violence continues unabated, the attack on Mitu does not appear
to be part of a nationwide escalation. Colombian National Police
chief General Rosso Jose Serrano commented on November 2 that the
assault was a final show of strength before the peace talks
commenced. But historically, when the guerrillas "send a signal"
to the government, or put on a show of strength, there has
typically been organized violence throughout the country. When
Pastrana assumed office in early August, rebel groups initiated a
spree of violence throughout the country that lasted several
days. At the time, government officials saw the guerrilla rampage
as a "farewell" to the Ernesto Samper administration. Yet so far
there have been no other indications of rebel activity on the
scale of what occurred this past weekend. The attack on Mitu was
very effective, but it was also isolated.
Additionally, the FARC reportedly used "homemade" missiles in its
attack on Sunday, which is the second time in recent months that
a FARC unit has reportedly used improvised weaponry. On August 3
the FARC leveled the Miraflores anti-narcotics base in
neighboring Guaviare Department using the same type of improvised
missiles. The fact that the rebels are using improvised weapons
is extremely significant in light of estimates that FARC has an
annual revenue of approximately $500 million. There is no good
reason to use improvised weaponry unless there is nothing else
available. Improvised weapons are often unreliable, dangerous to
use, and less accurate when compared to standard military
hardware.
The use of homemade weaponry could indicate that estimates of
FARC income have been greatly exaggerated, or have recently
fallen off. In either case, this would suggest that the reported
relationship between the FARC and narcotics traffickers may not
be as strong as is suspected. This, in turn, would actually
contribute to the peace process, as there would be less financial
reason for the FARC to remain in the field.
However, there is an alternative explanation. The group that
attacked Mitu may not be receiving money from the central FARC
leadership. Given the fact that the rebels used what is
essentially a "poor man's" bazooka in its attack, it is clear
that this group is not funded as well as the rest of the FARC is
reported to be. Nevertheless, while Mitu's attackers may not
have the money to afford Soviet-made RPG-7 rockets or other heavy
weaponry, they were nonetheless extremely effective. If in fact
the rebels that attacked Mitu are not receiving funding from the
FARC treasury, or are receiving insufficient funding, there is a
very good chance that the attack on Mitu was executed for the
express purpose of weapons procurement.
This too has two possible explanations. First, if individual
FARC units must scavenge for weapons, it would suggest a lack of
coordination and control in the FARC chain of command between
central leadership and the various fronts. A FARC front forced
to secure its own weapons, or make weapons because it cannot
afford them, may not always adhere to FARC policy.
Alternatively, this isolated attack could be the act of an
isolated unit, a faction that has been severed from or split from
the FARC leadership. That FARC has not warned of factionalism is
not odd, in that the rebels would not want to show internal
weakness immediately before peace talks began.
If a faction opposed to the current negotiations has formed
within FARC, it will have serious ramifications for the peace
process. In the late 1980s the Ricardo Franco Front of the FARC
was blamed for the failure of a 1988 cease-fire agreement between
the government and the FARC. Other splinter groups have been
formed from dissident factions of the Ejercito de Liberacion
Nacional (ELN), Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (EPL), and the
Movimiento Abril 19 (M-19) since the 1980s. While most of these
splinter groups have either faded into obscurity or have been
crushed by government troops, none of them had the funding that
rebel groups do today. While the group that struck Mitu is
apparently suffering financially, there is no reason to believe
that this is a long-term problem. It is widely believed that a
large portion of rebel income is derived from narcotics related
activities.
If the attack on Mitu was carried out by a faction opposed to the
peace process, it becomes even more significant if that group
was, as it has been identified, the 53rd Front under Commander
Romana. Romana is one of the FARC's most powerful military
commanders, and his 53rd Front has played a major role in many of
FARC's most recent and significant attacks, including the
devastating assault at El Billar. If Romana is now a dissident
within FARC, with 1,000 troops at his disposal, the peace process
is as good as dead.
Unless additional evidence emerges later this week indicating
that the Mitu incident was, in fact, a centrally-condoned FARC
"signal," we believe that the attack represents a breakdown in
control between central FARC leadership and the numerous fronts
that comprise the FARC army. If the 53rd Front has splintered
from the FARC leadership, it could hamper or derail the peace
effort underway in Colombia. And in the event that the
government is successful in ending the civil war with the FARC
and ELN, the 53rd Front, and possibly other groups as well, may
continue to fuel the violence that has plagued Colombia since the
1960s.
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