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Strategies & Market Trends : Telebras (TBH) & Brazil -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Steve Fancy who wrote (9482)11/5/1998 6:30:00 PM
From: lebo  Respond to of 22640
 
We will cross that bridge when we get there. That's a year 2000 problem that we don't have to worry about until 2000.



To: Steve Fancy who wrote (9482)11/5/1998 6:37:00 PM
From: Fred Levine  Respond to of 22640
 
Steve and all-- More economic projections.

Brazil and Mexico: More Growth in Mexico, a Clearer View of
Brazil

Ernest W. Brown (San Francisco)

Now that Brazil has announced its fiscal package and we have an idea of the size and scope of
spending cuts and tax hikes, we are revising our forecasts for the fundamentals in Brazil and Mexico,
putting aside the two scenarios first explored with analysts in early September.

We know now that Brazil is proposing a fiscal package that proposes to make a "fiscal effort" --
spending cuts and tax increases in the federal budget -- which is the equivalent of 3.3% of GDP during
1999E. As previously reported, we figure that R$22 billion of these cuts are likely to see the light of
day, about 2.4% of GDP in 1999E. (Other cuts, totaling 0.4% each in state and state enterprise
budgets, have been proposed, but not agreed on.)

Brazil: The tax measures proposed should take their toll on the Brazilian economy by raising the cost
of engaging in financial transactions (by raising the CPMF tax from 0.2% to 0.38%), by reducing
disposable income (by taxing upper income civil servants, requiring a wider range of employees to
pay the COFINS tax) by directly reducing aggregate demand (through cuts in discretionary spending
of government) and by a myriad of other reductions in government's net contribution to domestic
demand.

In our view, a short and relatively deep recession is in store for Brazil, extending from 4Q98 through
2Q99. Modeling the incremental effect on economic growth is not straightforward because, if the
package is successful, lower interest rates would help to support economic activity and reduce the
amount of recession. Spending on durable goods, already hard hit by very tight credit in Brazil, would
be curtailed. Incremental capital spending would be cut. Nondiscretionary spending -- on foodstuffs,
clothing, housing, communication, energy -- would remain relatively unscathed.

Because of these offsetting effects, getting specific about the numbers is a bit of an art, but here goes
anyway. The recession is likely to be concentrated in the first part of 1999. We assume that GDP in
4Q98 declines 2%; GDP falls 7.5% in 1Q99, 4% in 2Q99, and then grows by 1% in 3Q99, picking up
at the end of the year to a 2% rate in the last quarter. This means an assumption that GDP falls by
2% throughout 1999. We're much less sure of the magnitude of the declines than we are of the timing:
lots of negative growth, all of it concentrated in the first half of 1999.

Recovery should continue slowly in 2000, as GDP grows by a bare 1%. On an aggregated basis, we
assume that private consumption spending falls by 2% in 1999, and government consumption by 3%.
Government fixed investment in the economy we think will fall by about 2%, and private investment
growth will be nil. Reportedly, the Brazilian government is assuming that inflation will be 2% in 1999,
factoring in price increases in public sector goods and services. A lack of pricing pressure makes even
this much inflation doubtful, in our view. Tight liquidity is demanded by Brazil's current defense of
the real and this should take its toll on the Brazilian economy in 1999, just as Argentina's defense of
its currency brought sharp recession in 1995. Brazil has to choose between devaluation and deflation,
and is going to choose deflation, we believe.

In terms of the remaining parts of the fundamental forecast, we are basically adopting the "Stout
Defense" scenario first presented in September as our base case (70% probability) scenario. We
assume the bulk of the measures proposed by the Cardoso government pass the Congress or are
otherwise implemented in November, leaving mopping up for December or for early 1998 (assuming,
as we do, that a support program from Brazil's creditor allies materializes in the near future.)

In this constructive environment, a sharp drop of interest rates is highly likely from current levels to
around 30%. As the budgetary effects are felt in 1Q99, declines to 25% by end 1Q99 are probable,
with rates reaching 21% by midyear. In the second half of 1999, rates wouldn't decline by much more,
only reaching 20% by year end 1999. We'll admit to being a bit divided on the interest rate outlook in
the second half of the year. After all, rates at this level are still very high in real terms: 19% at midyear
and still 18% at year's end. The constraint on further downward movement of interest rates is the
dollar equivalent rate or "coupon", which falls below 10% at midyear under this scenario and settles in
at 13% by year's end, quite low by recent standards. We don't see nominal interest rates falling much
further because of the steady currency devaluation. This interest rate scenario is unchanged from our
early September "stout defense", and clearly is most at risk to delays.

The real should end 1998 at R$1.20, a 7.7% nominal depreciation with respect to year-end 1997 and
1999E at R$1.30, an 8.1% nominal depreciation. Accounting for deflation during 3Q98 and very low
inflation in 1999E, real depreciation of the currency would amount to about 9% vis a vis the U.S.
dollar in both years. It is worthwhile pointing out that a weaker dollar would mean that real
devaluation of the currency vis a vis the rest of the world would be significantly more. Our view on
the odds of a maxi-devaluation haven't changed markedly since early September: for the coming four
month period; the odds of a maxi-devaluation remain at 30%. We think the odds of a devaluation can
be significantly lowered by passage of the package. We remain convinced that, regardless of the merits
for or against a one shot devaluation, that the Cardoso government will continue to use a
mini-devaluation system.



To: Steve Fancy who wrote (9482)11/5/1998 8:48:00 PM
From: md1derful  Respond to of 22640
 
Hey buster, you better not take any profits!! Anyway Cramer (Kramer??) says at the third rate cut buy financials and brazil, big time...go figure!! Love the price action..go MO too.



To: Steve Fancy who wrote (9482)11/5/1998 8:56:00 PM
From: Steve Fancy  Respond to of 22640
 
Emerging mkt bonds climb on optimism on Brazil

Reuters, Thursday, November 05, 1998 at 16:35

NEW YORK, Nov 5 (Reuters) - Emerging market bonds ended
higher Thursday as investors took succour from some political
progress in Brazil on reforming the country's bloated pension
system, traders said.
Emerging market bond prices moved up by one to
one-and-a-half points after Brazil's Congress defeated three
amendments that would have watered down efforts to trim the
government's liabilities on pensions for government employees.
"It is an important first step in Brazil," said Paulo Leme,
Latin American debt strategist at Goldman, Sachs & Co. "What is
important now in Brazil is governance, that they can implement
policies," he said.
Brazil's benchmark "C" <BRAZILC=RR> bonds were 2-1/4 points
higher at 64-3/4 points late Thursday amid scattered buying,
traders said.
Analysts said they expected the International Monetary Fund
is to announce a financial package for Brazil sometime between
Friday and the middle of next week. Initial estimates put the
package at $30 billion, but now $45 billion is expected.
"It is the Colin Powell theory," said Robert Hormats,
economist at Goldman Sachs. "The greater the force you commit,
the less you have to use it," he said.
At a conference on Andean region countries sponsored by
Goldman Sachs in New York on Thursday, some participants said
plugging the fiscal gap will work temporarily in Brazil. Over
the long run, however, Brazil needs to bring down short-term
interest rates, which may require a currency devaluation.
Harvard University economist Jeffrey Sachs, a proponent of
currency devaluations under certain conditions, said Brazil's
real is overvalued by between 30 percent and 50 percent.
Speaking at the conference, Sachs said Brazil's over-valued
currency is stifling growth in Latin America's largest economy.
Meanwhile, Russia's bonds traded lower, bucking the wider
market trend. The benchmark PRIN bonds <<RUSPRIN=RR>, created
from restructured Soviet era debt, fell an 1/8 to bid at 7-1/8.
Russian government officials indicated Wednesay that the
country may have to restructure external dollar-denominated
debt.
A food aid and credits deal clinched between Russia and the
United States hung in the balance Thursday after a last-minute
spat over tax exemptions forced the postponement of a planned
signing ceremoney.
In Washington, U.S. officials said the two sides were still
talking about the package, under which Russia was to receive
credits worth $600 million to buy food.

Copyright 1998, Reuters News Service



To: Steve Fancy who wrote (9482)11/5/1998 8:57:00 PM
From: Steve Fancy  Respond to of 22640
 
POLL- Brazil's devaluation risk drops in near term

Reuters, Thursday, November 05, 1998 at 20:24

By Noriko Yamaguchi
SAO PAULO, Nov 5 (Reuters) - The risk of a steep, sudden
devaluation in Brazil has fallen thanks to the government's
resolve to cut costs and likely international aid for Latin
America's largest economy, a Reuters poll of economists found.
The poll of 34 economists in Brazil and the United States
found the probability of a once-off devaluation of more than 15
percent between now and the end of 1998 fell to 6 percent from
13 percent in a previous poll last month.
The survey, conducted between November 3 and 4, found the
likelihood of a devaluation in the first six months of 1999
also fell noticeably to 17 percent from 22 percent.
Economists said the government's $84 billion austerity plan
announced last week brightened prospects that Brazil would soon
secure a credit line from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), reducing the risk of a devastating devaluation.
Brazil-watchers said the government seemed to be doing what
was needed to fend off a crisis.
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso was given a boost late
Wednesday when the lower house of Congress finally approved a
long-delayed pension reform bill that seeks to tackle the
country's massive $35 billion social security deficit.
The vote was seen as a test of the government's ability to
push ahead with other reforms and cost-cutting measures
included in its austerity plan.
A devaluation in Brazil would throw Latin America into
financial mayhem, provoke a region-wide recession, hurt U.S.
exports to the region and possibly hurt the world economy.
"Chances of a devaluation have fallen significantly with
the hopes of the IMF credit, although a lot depends on whether
Congress approves the announced budget cuts," said Jaime Alves
Neto, chief economist at Banco Patente.
"A bigger risk therefore lies in the first half of 1999
when those Congressional prospects become clearer," he added,
betting on a 40 percent devaluation risk in that period.
Another risk factor closely monitored by economists was the
level of Brazil's foreign currency reserves, considered the
country's main weapon against a speculative attack.
Brazil's pool of dollars has diminished to between $43
billion and $44 billion from $70 billion in July, before
Russia's crisis triggered financial turmoil worldwide.
Although capital flight from forex markets slowed to a net
$1.89 billion in October from $18.9 billion in September, at
the height of Brazil's crisis, future outflows would be
influenced by the government's ability to actually cut costs
and raise taxes, the economists said.
If dollar outflows keep draining reserves, Brazil would be
forced to alter its forex policy one way or another, they
said.
"If Brazil does not carry out a maxi-devaluation in the
next eight months, it will probably speed up the rate at which
it normally depreciates the currency," said Ken Colli at Credit
Lyonnais in New York.
The Brazilian Central Bank has been depreciating the real,
which trades in a tightly regulated band, by about 7.5 percent
a year since the currency was introduced in 1994.
Economists predicted the Bank could start depreciating by
10 to 12 percent next year.
Survey participants were asked the following question:
What are the percentage chances of an overnight devaluation
of over 15 percent in Brazil for the next six halves?
(34 responses)
98 H1 99 H1 99 H2 2000 H1 2000 H2 2001 H1
Average 6 17 15 13 12 12
Median 5 15 10 10 10 5
For more details on the poll please click on <BRAAP> and
<BRAAO> <BRAAQ>.
noriko.yamaguchi@reuters.com))

Copyright 1998, Reuters News Service



To: Steve Fancy who wrote (9482)11/5/1998 9:03:00 PM
From: Steve Fancy  Respond to of 22640
 
ADR REPORT - Emerging market highlights - Nov. 5

Reuters, Thursday, November 05, 1998 at 20:46

BRAZIL ADRS RISE ON REFORM OPTIMISM, INDONESIAN ADRS SURGE
NEW YORK, Nov 5 (Reuters) - Brazilian American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs) rose Thursday on optimism fueled by passage of
a key economic reform measure.
"The party continues," a trader said. "Everybody is happy
because Brazil is doing the right thing -- that's it."
Brazil's Congress Wednesday rejected opposition amendments
to a long-delayed bill to reform the troubled pension system.
The measure was seen as a test of the government's ability
to press ahead with other reforms and cost-cutting measures
included in an $84 billion austerity plan announced last week.
Other Latin American ADRs were mixed as U.S. markets
declined in profit-taking, and overall volumes were light.
Among market gauges, the ING Barings Latin American index of
leading regional stocks <.LAT> was up 1.21 percent.
Indonesian telecommunications ADRs were stronger in heavy
trade as foreign investors were attracted by bargain prices and
a weaker currency, the rupiah. The Jakarta market was up 7.6
percent overnight.
"Indonesia is hot right now. There is a lot of local
interest and there aren't that many names that you can get,"
leading to interest in telephone stocks, a trader said.
Here are some highlights among emerging market ADRs:
* * *
BRAZIL - Telephone issue Telebras SA (SAO:TELB4) (NYSE:TBR), a
bellwether Latin American ADR, was up 3-5/16 to 84-1/2.
Telebras was among volume leaders on the New York Stock
Exchange.
Unibanco Group (SAO:UBB) (NYSE:UBB) was up 2-2/16, or 11
percent, to 21-7/16 and was among percentage-gain leaders on
the exchange.
* * *
MEXICO - Telefonos de Mexico (MEX:TMX.L) (NYSE:TMX) was off 1/16
to 55-1/16 in light trade.
* * *
CHINA - Leading Chinese ADRs were lower amid profit-taking.
Among them, Jilin Chemical Industrial Co. (NYSE:JCC) (HKSE:0368) was
off 9/16, or 7.9 percent, to 6-9/16.
* * *
INDONESIA - Bellwether PT Telekom (NYSE:TLK) (JAK:TLKM) was up
11/16 to 6-1/16. Trade was more than twice normal levels and PT
Telekom was among volume leaders on the New York Stock
Exchange.
Long-distance telephone company Indonesian Satellite Corp.
(JAK:ISAT) (NYSE:IIT) rose 1-11/16 to 13-3/8 in heavy trade.

Copyright 1998, Reuters News Service



To: Steve Fancy who wrote (9482)11/5/1998 9:05:00 PM
From: Steve Fancy  Respond to of 22640
 
Brazil's Govt Seen By 68% As Capable Of
Handling Crisis

Dow Jones Newswires

BRASILIA -- The number of Brazilians who believe that the government
of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso is capable of handling the current
financial crisis has risen to 68% in October from 59% the month before,
according to a poll released in Brasilia Thursday.

Public opinion research institute Vox Populi said it interviewed 1,988
people in 194 cities across Brazil between Oct. 27 and 28.

The poll was commissioned by the National Transport Confederation
(CNT).

The rise in unemployment remains the population's biggest concern (45%
last month, compared with 35% in September), while 26% feel inflation
might return and 13% fear a devaluation of the real.

The current crisis is considered "very serious" by 59% of Brazilians, with
34% saying they've already starting to make personal budget cuts and 21%
planning to do so soon.

-By William Vanvolsem; 5166-244 3095; wvanvolsem@ap.org



To: Steve Fancy who wrote (9482)11/5/1998 9:06:00 PM
From: Steve Fancy  Respond to of 22640
 
U.S. Lawmakers To Visit Brazil To Talk
Trade, Fincl Aid

Dow Jones Newswires

WASHINGTON -- Sen. Joseph Lieberman, D-Conn., and Chairman of
the House Ways and Means Committee, William Archer, R-Texas, are
traveling separately to Brazil this month to discuss trade and international
aid issues with officials there.

Lieberman will be in Brasilia Monday and Tuesday on his way to a
two-week United Nations conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on
global warming for the rest of the week, his spokeswoman said. He will
meet with Connecticut-based companies with operations in Brazil, as well
as Brazilian Foreign Minister Luis Felipe Lampreia, other members of
cabinet and congressional leaders, she said. The state of the Brazilian
economy as well as U.S. support for Brazil amid its ongoing financial crisis
will be topics of discussion, she added.

Lieberman wants to show he's "optimistic there will be continued support
to help Brazil with its economic problems," she said.

Separately, Ways and Means Committee Chairman Archer will also travel
to Brazil this month with a delegation from the committee, a spokesman for
Archer said. The purpose of the trip is to meet with government officials
and parliamentarians on regional trade integration, multilateral trade issues,
fast-track and trade disputes, a spokesman for the committee added.

Fast-track negotiating status would force Congress to vote up or down on
trade agreements without amending them.

The trips come as the international investment community eagerly awaits
concrete news on a global emergency aid package for Brazil, which has
been struggling with a depreciating real, depleted foreign exchange
reserves, and capital flight as jittery investors remove their funds from
emerging markets. Expected to be around $30 billion, the package will
involve the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and
Inter-American Development Bank with bilateral aid a likely component.

-By Kristi Bahrenburg, tel: (202) 862-9295; or e-mail:
kristi.bahrenburg@cor.dowjones.com



To: Steve Fancy who wrote (9482)11/5/1998 9:09:00 PM
From: Steve Fancy  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 22640
 
Brazil Telebras Spinoff ADRs To List On NYSE On Nov. 16

Dow Jones Newswires

NEW YORK -- American depositary receipts of companies spun off from
Brazil's Telecomunicacoes Brasileiras SA (TBR, TBH), or Telebras, will start
trading on the New York Stock Exchange on Nov. 16, the company said
Thursday.

The date of record for the distribution of spinoff ADRs to holders of Telebras
ADRs will be Nov. 13.

The company didn't provide the price at which fractional holdings - above or
below the multiple of 300 - will be cashed out by the Bank of New York, the
depositary agent of Telebras.

Following are the names of the companies, their ticker symbols and number of
new ADRs per 300 of Telebras:

Embratel Participacoes SA (EMT), 300 new ADRs
Telesp Participacoes SA (TSP), 300 new ADRs
Telesp Celular Participacoes SA (TCP), 120 new ADRs
Telemig Celular Participacoes SA (TBM), 15 new ADRs
Tele Leste Celular Participacoes SA (TBE), 60 new ADRs
Tele Norte Leste Participacoes SA (TNE), 300 new ADRs
Tele Centro Sul Participacoes SA (TCS), 60 new ADRs
Tele Celular Sul Participacoes SA (TSU), 30 new ADRs
Tele Sudeste Celular Participacoes SA (TSD), 300 new ADRs
Tele Centro Oeste Celular Participacoes SA (TRO),
100 new ADRs
Tele Nordeste Celular Participacoes SA (TNT), 15 new ADRs
Tele Norte Celular Participacoes SA (TCN), 6 new ADRs

Telesp Participacoes, Tele Norte Leste Participacoes and Tele Centro Sul
Participacoes are fixed-wireline companies.

Embratel is the national long-distance carrier.

The remaining eight firms are cellular providers.

Although the ADRs haven't yet traded in New York, analysts have followed
the performance of the underlying companies, listed in Sao Paulo on Sept. 21.

Two stocks jump out as analysts' darlings: Telesp Participacoes SA, from Sao
Paulo state, and Tele Norte Leste Participacoes SA., both local carriers.

Tele Norte Leste covers the northeastern states, with a population of 85.8
million and a gross domestic product of $322 billion, according to Robert
Flemings Securities.

Telesp serves 34.8 million people, with a GDP of $290 billion. As Santander
Investment analyst Patrick Jurczak said in a report, the firm "has the highest
liquidity of all the post-privatization entities, has no merger risk, operates in the
economic center of Brazil, has huge pent up demand, and high barriers to
competition. In addition, it benefits from high cash flow to fund capital
expenditures."

Also, Telesp is controlled by a group of Spanish companies led by Telefonica
SA (TEF), which is well-versed in operating Latin American post-privatization
telecoms.

Observers say that a negative for Telesp could be a lower upside than a riskier
and less liquid proposition like Tele Norte Leste, which isn't controlled by an
experienced operator.

For example, Paribas analyst Carlos Constantini believes that Telesp has a
26% upside, while Tele Norte Leste could rise 62% over a 12-month period.

Analysts favor local carriers over cellular firms because they "are less affected
by competition than cellular, their growth potential is high, and their profitability
in terms of margins will be sustained in the medium term, unlike cellular
companies, whose margins will be cut in the next one or two years," said
Deutsche Bank Securities' Regio Martins.

However, some cellular firms have caught the experts' eyes.

Sao Paulo state once again leads the pack, with Telesp Celular as the most
recommended in an informal Dow Jones survey, followed by Telemig Celular,
of Minas Gerais state.

Telesp Celular is managed by Portugal Telecom (PT) while Telemig is
controlled by Canada's Telesystem International Wireless Inc. (T.TIW)

As for investors who don't want the trouble of so much choice, Telebras
HOLDRs and RTBs - two basket securities - will continue to replicate the
pre-spinoff Telebras. While HOLDRs will represent 12 ADRs, the RTBs will
represent RTCB40s, the most liquid Telebras security traded in Sao Paulo.
Telebras ADRs (TBR) will continue to trade in New York until further notice.

At the end of October, of the 128 million Telebras ADRs outstanding, 48
million were in the form of HOLDRs, according to depositary agent, The Bank
of New York.

Telebras ADRs - as befits the proxy for Latin America - have had a bumpy
year.

The share reached a high of $134 on April 1, when most investment firms had
target prices between $150 and $180 for the end of 1998. It then crumbled
under the general emerging market malaise - with a brief respite after the
privatization in July - reaching a low of $51 5/16 on Sept. 10.

Since that date, Telebras ADRs have rallied 70%, to close at $88 on
Thursday.

Analysts will now have about a week to study financial statements from the
companies, and figure out recommendations and price-targets.

It should be noted that since the individual ADRs have different ratios to the
underlying shares, current price-targets in reals for the underlying companies
don't always translate one to one.

-By Margarita Palatnik; 201-938-2226; margarita.palatnik@cor.dowjones.com



To: Steve Fancy who wrote (9482)11/5/1998 9:21:00 PM
From: Steve Fancy  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 22640
 
Closing figures for the Baby Bras Preferred shares on the Bovespa for: 11/05/1998

******* The 12 Baby Bra preferred shares represent the Bovespa close at 3:00...NYSE close may be different

Company Type Symbol OPEN HIGH LOW CLOSE CHG TRADES $ VOLUME
======= ==== ====== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ====== ============
EMBRATEL PAR PN * EBTP4 17.50 19.81 17.10 19.80 +11.86% 433 1,029,900,000
TELE CL SUL PN * TCSL4 1.41 1.49 1.39 1.45 + 2.83% 241 1,210,000,000
TELE CTR OES PN * TCOC4 0.86 0.92 0.86 0.92 + 5.74% 187 946,700,000
TELE CTR SUL PN * TCSP4 10.50 13.00 10.50 12.50 +17.92% 364 1,240,100,000
TELE LEST CL PN * TLCP4 0.56 0.65 0.56 0.65 +12.06% 207 1,055,700,000
TELE NORD CL PN * TNEP4 0.75 0.83 0.73 0.81 + 8.00% 262 1,861,100,000
TELE NORT CL PN * TNCP4 0.33 0.37 0.32 0.37 +12.12% 234 1,547,300,000
TELE NORT LE PN * TNLP4 14.50 16.50 14.50 16.00 + 5.26% 362 1,007,700,000
TELE SUDESTE PN * TSEP4 5.60 6.00 5.25 5.50 = 0.00% 274 1,040,600,000
TELEMIG PART PN * TMCP4 1.25 1.40 1.25 1.35 + 8.00% 235 1,179,800,000
TELESP CL PA PN * TSPP4 9.00 10.00 9.00 9.90 +10.00% 381 1,049,800,000
TELESP PART PN * TLPP4 34.00 36.98 33.30 36.00 + 4.34% 422 1,089,500,000
------
R$105.25
R$105.25 / 1.1892 = US$ 88.50

Closing figures for the Baby Bras Common shares on the Bovespa for: 11/05/1998

These shares trade only in Brazil (Control or Voting shares), will not match up to US ADR

Company Type Symbol OPEN HIGH LOW CLOSE CHG TRADES $ VOLUME
======= ==== ====== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ====== ============
EMBRATEL PAR ON * EBTP3 9.51 10.40 9.51 10.12 + 6.52% 32 72,900,000
TELE CL SUL ON * TCSL3 0.74 0.85 0.74 0.85 +13.33% 29 215,700,000
TELE CTR OES ON * TCOC3 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.68 - 1.44% 18 53,700,000
TELE CTR SUL ON * TCSP3 5.15 6.00 5.00 6.00 +13.42% 35 144,300,000
TELE LEST CL ON * TLCP3 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.38 + 2.70% 31 164,000,000
TELE NORD CL ON * TNEP3 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.48 + 4.34% 27 77,000,000
TELE NORT CL ON * TNCP3 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24 = 0.00% 21 40,900,000
TELE NORT LE ON * TNLP3 6.70 8.45 6.60 8.00 +19.40% 37 73,500,000
TELE SUDESTE ON * TSEP3 2.40 2.60 2.35 2.59 +11.15% 47 373,700,000
TELEMIG PART ON * TMCP3 0.87 0.87 0.81 0.83 - 2.35% 28 61,800,000
TELESP CL PA ON * TSPP3 4.89 5.20 4.80 5.20 +10.63% 53 159,800,000
TELESP PART ON * TLPP3 23.60 25.01 23.60 25.00 + 5.93% 46 82,100,000

Closing figures for Telebras receipts on the Bovespa for: 11/05/1998

These symbols are kind of the US TBH equivalent without the crazy premium.
I believe the first two are the normal receipts, don't know about rest...anyone?

Company Type Symbol OPEN HIGH LOW CLOSE CHG TRADES $ VOLUME
======= ==== ====== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ====== ============
TELEBR RCTB RON* RCTB30 53.50 59.50 53.50 58.50 + 8.33% 371 306,200,000
TELEBR RCTB RPN* RCTB40 96.50 104.00 96.00 103.30 + 6.82% 1417 2,483,100,000
TELEBR RCTB RON* RCTB30T 55.82 55.82 55.81 55.81 0.00% 2 1,000,000
TELEBR RCTB RPN* RCTB40T 103.23 103.23 103.23 103.23 0.00% 1 200,000
TELEBR RCTB RON* RCTB30T 59.50 59.50 59.49 59.49 0.00% 2 10,000,000
RCTB RPN* RCTBL18 13.50 18.80 13.30 18.60 +30.98% 45 132,000,000
RCTB RPN* RCTBL3 7.50 11.90 7.20 11.90 +54.54% 1094 2,505,000,000
RCTB RPN* RCTBL30 21.35 21.50 21.35 21.40 - 2.72% 6 28,000,000
RCTB RPN* RCTBL4 3.50 6.00 3.30 5.90 +61.64% 2370 4,905,000,000
RCTB RPN* RCTBL5 1.40 2.50 1.35 2.45 +63.33% 1261 2,423,000,000
RCTB RPN* RCTBL6 0.50 0.97 0.50 0.97 +%102.08% 58 219,000,000
RCTB RPN* RCTBX8 9.20 9.20 9.20 9.20 -51.57% 1 10,000,000
TELEBR RCTB RON* RCTB30F 54.00 59.00 53.70 59.00 + 9.25% 60 1,533,091
TELEBR RCTB RPN* RCTB40F 96.00 103.99 96.00 102.05 + 5.53% 84 2,024,247

Closing figures for other Baby Bra related symbols on the Bovespa for: 11/05/1998
Have no idea what these are...options? Anyone know or want to help figure it out?

Company Type Symbol OPEN HIGH LOW CLOSE CHG TRADES $ VOLUME
======= ==== ====== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ====== ============
TELE CTR SUL PN * TCSP4T 11.58 11.58 11.57 11.58 0.00% 4 4,000,000
TELEMIG PART PN * TMCP4T 1.32 1.33 1.32 1.33 0.00% 2 30,000,000
EMBRATEL PAR ON * EBTP3F 9.21 10.30 9.21 9.41 - 0.94% 4 56,200
EMBRATEL PAR PN * EBTP4F 17.90 20.00 17.90 20.00 +12.99% 8 271,825
TELE CL SUL ON * TCSL3F 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.75 = 0.00% 2 53,900
TELE CL SUL PN * TCSL4F 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.36 - 3.54% 1 4,704
TELE CTR OES ON * TCOC3F 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66 - 4.34% 3 53,900
TELE CTR OES PN * TCOC4F 0.95 0.95 0.84 0.84 - 3.44% 2 22,149
TELE CTR SUL ON * TCSP3F 5.50 6.00 5.00 5.15 - 2.64% 8 165,826
TELE CTR SUL PN * TCSP4F 11.20 12.35 11.00 12.35 +16.50% 5 118,298
TELE LEST CL ON * TLCP3F 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.35 - 5.40% 3 53,900
TELE LEST CL PN * TLCP4F 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 - 8.62% 1 4,704
TELE NORD CL ON * TNEP3F 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 = 0.00% 2 53,900
TELE NORD CL PN * TNEP4F 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 + 1.33% 1 4,704
TELE NORT CL ON * TNCP3F 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 = 0.00% 3 53,900
TELE NORT CL PN * TNCP4F 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 = 0.00% 2 54,704
TELE NORT LE ON * TNLP3F 6.80 7.22 6.40 7.22 + 7.76% 3 96,971
TELE NORT LE PN * TNLP4F 15.51 17.40 15.01 17.40 +14.47% 7 170,529
TELE SUDESTE ON * TSEP3F 2.30 2.55 2.30 2.36 + 1.28% 8 172,190
TELE SUDESTE PN * TSEP4F 5.51 5.80 5.26 5.79 + 5.27% 6 186,703
TELEMIG PART ON * TMCP3F 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 - 8.23% 2 53,900
TELEMIG PART PN * TMCP4F 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 - 2.40% 1 4,704
TELESP CL PA ON * TSPP3F 4.89 5.00 4.55 5.00 + 6.38% 6 199,003
TELESP CL PA PN * TSPP4F 9.50 10.30 9.11 10.00 +11.11% 8 174,905
TELESP PART ON * TLPP3F 22.10 25.00 22.10 25.00 + 5.93% 6 178,967
TELESP PART PN * TLPP4F 33.01 36.01 33.01 36.00 + 4.34% 6 165,804

Closing figures for other Telebras related symbols on the Bovespa: 11/05/1998

These symbols are for the 52 individual companies, no match to anything, provided FWIW.

Company Type Symbol OPEN HIGH LOW CLOSE CHG TRADES $ VOLUME
======= ==== ====== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ====== ============
TELEBAHIA ON * TEBA3 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 + 3.70% 1 20,000
TELEBAHIA PNA* TEBA5 25.90 26.95 25.90 26.95 + 3.85% 23 6,410,000
TELEBAHIA PNB* TEBA6 29.13 29.13 29.13 29.13 -39.31% 1 10,000
TELEBAHIA CL ON * TBAC3 13.00 18.50 13.00 18.50 +59.48% 6 260,000
TELEBAHIA CL PNB* TBAC6 27.00 32.00 26.99 32.00 +18.51% 13 2,970,000
TELEBAHIA CL PNC* TBAC7 24.00 26.00 24.00 25.10 +39.44% 5 280,000
TELEBRAS ON * TELB3 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 = 0.00% 19 43,400,000
TELEBRAS PN * TELB4 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15 = 0.00% 172 1,040,100,000
TELEBRASI CL ON * TBRC3 42.01 42.01 42.01 42.01 +14.93% 1 400,000
TELEBRASI CL PNB* TBRC6 51.00 55.00 51.00 55.00 + 7.80% 3 50,000
TELEBRASILIA ON * TBRS3 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 + 1.12% 1 10,000
TELEBRASILIA PN * TBRS4 97.00 97.00 97.00 97.00 + 3.19% 2 30,000
TELEMIG ON * TMGR3 20.00 22.99 20.00 22.99 +14.95% 5 520,000
TELEMIG PNB* TMGR6 37.50 38.50 37.00 38.39 + 1.29% 38 23,100,000
TELEMIG PND* TMGR8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / 0.00% 0 0
TELEMIG CL PNE* TMGC11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / 0.00% 0 0
TELEMIG CL ON * TMGC3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / 0.00% 0 0
TELEMIG CL PNB* TMGC6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / 0.00% 0 0
TELEMIG CL PNC* TMGC7 13.80 16.50 13.40 16.50 +21.32% 97 48,620,000
TELEPAR ON * TEPR3 95.00 97.04 95.00 97.04 + 2.14% 18 7,516,000
TELEPAR PN * TEPR4 239.00 239.00 219.99 230.00 = 0.00% 46 2,260,000
TELEPAR CL ON * TPRC3 30.00 33.00 30.00 33.00 +10.00% 18 5,087,000
TELEPAR CL PNB* TPRC6 60.00 65.00 60.00 63.49 + 2.37% 27 2,181,000
TELERJ ON * TERJ3 22.00 25.00 22.00 25.00 +13.63% 14 21,220,000
TELERJ PN * TERJ4 39.00 40.00 38.00 40.00 + 1.78% 415 176,640,000
TELERJ CL ON * TRJC3 27.00 28.00 27.00 28.00 + 3.70% 11 10,550,000
TELERJ CL PNB* TRJC6 44.00 45.50 44.00 45.00 + 0.89% 76 41,060,000
TELESP ON * TLSP3 139.98 147.00 139.98 143.00 + 0.70% 25 5,170,000
TELESP PN * TLSP4 227.00 231.00 220.00 231.00 + 1.76% 537 145,100,000
TELESP CL ON * TSPC3 29.10 32.50 29.00 31.50 + 8.62% 85 42,630,000
TELESP CL PNB* TSPC6 66.00 71.04 65.00 70.50 + 5.22% 189 53,830,000
TELEMIG CL PNC* TMGC7T 14.25 14.26 14.25 14.26 0.00% 2 2,000,000
TELERJ PN * TERJ4T 39.73 39.74 39.73 39.74 0.00% 3 300,000
TELEMIG CL PNC* TMGC7T 15.86 15.87 15.86 15.87 0.00% 2 400,000
TELERJ PN * TERJ4T 41.04 41.05 40.30 40.62 0.00% 5 2,270,000
TELEBAHIA ON * TEBA3F 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 - 3.70% 2 14,440
TELEBAHIA PNA* TEBA5F 24.06 24.06 24.06 24.06 - 7.28% 2 7,952
TELEBAHIA PNB* TEBA6F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / 0.00% 0 0
TELEBAHIA CL ON * TBAC3F 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 +12.06% 1 6,426
TELEBAHIA CL PNB* TBAC6F 26.00 30.00 26.00 30.00 +11.11% 4 26,902
TELEBRAS ON * TELB3F 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 = 0.00% 5 91,900
TELEBRAS PN * TELB4F 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 = 0.00% 3 39,704
TELEBRASI CL ON * TBRC3F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / 0.00% 0 0
TELEBRASI CL PNB* TBRC6F 50.00 51.00 50.00 50.01 - 1.97% 3 7,997
TELEBRASILIA ON * TBRS3F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / 0.00% 0 0
TELEBRASILIA PN * TBRS4F 94.52 94.52 94.50 94.50 + 0.53% 5 15,947
TELEMIG ON * TMGR3F 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 - 5.00% 1 1,699
TELEMIG PNA* TMGR5F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / 0.00% 0 0
TELEMIG PNB* TMGR6F 37.10 37.50 35.70 37.50 - 1.05% 5 11,160
TELEMIG PND* TMGR8F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / 0.00% 0 0
TELEMIG CL ON * TMGC3F 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 -10.00% 1 2,088
TELEMIG CL PNB* TMGC6F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / 0.00% 0 0
TELEMIG CL PNC* TMGC7F 12.00 15.20 12.00 15.20 +11.76% 2 3,280
TELEPAR ON * TEPR3F 91.00 91.00 91.00 91.00 - 4.21% 1 619
TELEPAR PN * TEPR4F 220.00 230.00 210.00 230.00 = 0.00% 14 5,148
TELEPAR CL ON * TPRC3F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / 0.00% 0 0
TELEPAR CL PNB* TPRC6F 61.00 64.99 60.02 62.00 - 0.03% 10 4,190
TELERJ ON * TERJ3F 20.11 22.00 20.11 22.00 = 0.00% 4 12,971
TELERJ PN * TERJ4F 38.01 39.30 38.01 39.30 = 0.00% 13 31,188
TELERJ CL ON * TRJC3F 27.00 27.00 26.01 26.01 - 3.66% 2 1,114
TELERJ CL PNB* TRJC6F 44.00 45.00 43.01 44.71 + 0.24% 11 26,950
TELESP ON * TLSP3F 140.00 142.01 138.01 142.00 = 0.00% 14 62,897
TELESP PN * TLSP4F 223.00 230.00 219.01 229.99 + 1.31% 55 234,371
TELESP CL ON * TSPC3F 28.99 32.00 28.99 32.00 +10.34% 11 49,640
TELESP CL PNB* TSPC6F 66.00 70.00 65.00 70.00 + 4.47% 22 92,301