Anti-Saddam Coalition Builds,
While Military Options Remain Inadequate
Amid much conjecture about military action against Iraq,
following Baghdad's suspension of UNSCOM monitoring, a key U.S.
ally in the region has now hinted that it may support another
Desert Storm against Iraq. On November 10, the Saudi newspaper,
"Al-Bilad" wrote:
"Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is misinterpreting the stand
taken by Arab countries which have stated several times that they
oppose any action against the Iraqi people. (The Iraqi
leadership) must understand that nobody can prevent a military
strike on Iraq if such action is approved by the UN Security
Council. Support for the Iraqi people does not mean Iraq will be
able to escape its commitments to the UN and halt cooperation
with arms inspectors. The ideal solution for the Iraqi regime to
avoid another Desert Storm would be to accept totally the demands
of the UN."
This mention by a major Saudi newspaper of another possible U.S.-
led invasion of Iraq through Saudi territory dramatically changes
the equation in the current U.S.-Iraq standoff. During U.S.
Defense Secretary Cohen's visit last week to Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf states in search of support, Saudi's King Fahd
reportedly rejected any use of Saudi airbases in the event of a
military strike on Iraq. However, on November 6, NBC news
reported that "despite a public statement from Saudi Arabia that
it's soil would be off-limits in the event of further strikes on
Iraq, privately the Saudis said that support operations
(refueling, supply and maintenance operations) could be mounted
from Prince Sultan Airbase." This report, likely generated by
Cohen's entourage, was the first indication that there might be
some flexibility in the Saudi position. The Al-Bilad story
confirms the shift.
What is the driving force behind the Saudi change of heart? The
answer is -- as in all Persian Gulf matters -- oil. A
combination of factors, including the Asian economic crisis, has
caused a glut in world oil supplies. The resulting decline in
oil prices has severely damaged oil-dependent economies. Saudi
Arabia has been doubly hurt by the price drop and the Asian
economic collapse, as Saudi Aramco had bet heavily on Asia. Yet
despite efforts by other OPEC members and even some non-OPEC
countries to reduce global crude oil production, Iraqi production
has continued and even gradually increased. Military action
against Iraq would undoubtedly have one desirable effect. It
would probably boost oil prices in the short run, and if
sustained, could force Iraqi oil off the market. This prospect
cannot but help please the Saudis.
The United States appears to have broken through the isolation we
described last weekend. If Saudi Arabia is prepared to view a
new Desert Storm with equanimity, the U.S. may have some real
military options. Of course, the Saudi news report indicated
that the use of Saudi territory is contingent on a vote of the UN
Security Council approving military action. So far, the British,
the U.S. have been alone in supporting some military action,
while France and Russia have vehemently opposed this option.
However, things are changing there as well. On November 10,
Agence France Presse cited French Foreign Ministry spokesman
Francois Rivasseau as saying, "We are not ruling out any
response. Military strikes are an option." This leaves Russia
as essentially the only country completely opposed to the
"military option" against Iraq. We think that it is extremely
unlikely that Moscow will change its position.
The U.S. currently has about 13 warships in the Gulf, including a
carrier air wing aboard the USS Eisenhower. This number should
reach 25 within the next ten days, including the USS Enterprise
Battle Group and another Marine Expeditionary Unit. This would
mean that the U.S. would have an "afloat force" of 140 aircraft
and the capability to launch 200-300 Tomahawk missiles.
Additionally, the U.S. has numerous aircraft stationed in Turkey
and throughout the rest of the region. The U.S. also has 1,600
troops in Kuwait and 1,000 troops in Saudi Arabia, with equipment
for another 6,000-9,000 troops pre-positioned in Kuwait and
Qatar. This is enough for a series of hard air strikes against
Iraq, but not for a sustained air campaign, and certainly not for
offensive ground operations.
So far two options appear to be on the table. One is a limited
strike against nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) targets.
The other would be a limited air campaign against a wider array
of strategic targets, including valuable economic assets. The
former strategy depends on U.S. intelligence sources. How
confident is the United States that it knows the precise location
of Iraqi NBC targets? The paradox of precision guided munitions
is that the thing that makes them most valuable, precision,
demands levels of intelligence that are frequently beyond the
ability of intelligence services to deliver with extremely high
levels of confidence. The ability to hit a given room in a
building requires that you know what room to hit.
The other strategy would be a more sustained air campaign within
the limits of available aircraft and logistical support. This
sort of attack would go beyond NBC sites to attacks on command
and control facilities or key industrial infrastructure, such as
Iraq's power grid. The problem is that Saddam has faced these
air strikes before. He can absorb the punishment or end it,
simply by agreeing to allow inspectors in. In other words,
Saddam has the ability to turn U.S. air strikes on and off,
without actually making any substantial concessions.
There is an interesting aspect on the ground. Saddam's forces
appear to be deployed in defensive positions anticipating air
attacks rather than ground attacks. A ground attack would catch
them poorly deployed. But a ground attack would require
substantially more time to mount and, most important, could lead
to substantial casualties. Moreover, with commitments in the
former Yugoslavia and Korea, this is not a time for an imbalanced
commitment of ground forces. Interestingly, the U.S. shifted 18
A-10s to the region. These are primarily close air support
weapons for armored and mechanized forces. Now, 18 are not
enough to support a major ground offensive, but they would be
very useful for limited engagements or to deter Iraqi ground
attacks following air strikes. So, the U.S. is clearly thinking
about the situation on the ground right now.
The U.S. is in a paradoxical position. The political situation
appears to be improving dramatically for the United States.
Apart from Russia, a coalition in favor of military operations
appears to be developing both globally and regionally. The
Russian opposition is not trivial, and while it will not effect
Iraq here and now, it will have long term repercussions. The
problem is that the military options that appear available are
simply not substantial enough to deter Saddam. More important,
if Saddam becomes concerned, a simple announcement accepting
inspections will be sufficient to turn off the air strikes, even
if Saddam later manipulates and reneges on his promise.
This is the key problem. Even with political support and
decisive military options, Saddam is in control of events. He
can create crises. He can abort crises. The very geometry of
the relationship is asymmetric. The U.S. cannot deliver a
decisive blow against Saddam, nor can it disengage. This means
that Saddam can control U.S. behavior. Increasing the political
coalition's cohesiveness merely reemphasizes the military
limitations on the U.S., as well as showing that, regardless of
support, Saddam is in control of the situation.
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