Signs Finally Emerge of Coup Threat to Saddam Hussein
December 22, 1998
On December 20, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein declared that Iraq had
emerged "victorious" after Operation Desert Fox, the 70-hour aerial
bombardment of Iraq by the United States and the United Kingdom. In a
speech broadcast on Qatar's Al-Jazira satellite television, Saddam praised
Arab people for their "support of Iraq in the face of aggression" but
attacked "the weak, the two-faced, the grudge bearers and the traitors."
Saddam has survived the latest round of U.S. led military attacks, aimed
ostensibly at his weapons of mass destruction. However, those attacks
apparently had a secondary goal -- supporting a coup attempt launched
from within Iraq. Judging from Saddam's statement and other evidence
from within Iraq, the second goal may be bearing fruit.
Fears of a coup have prompted a large number of purges in Iraq since the
end of the 1991 Gulf War. The commanders of military units have been
liquidated many times, with units reorganized for fear that they may rise up
against him. Prior to Desert Fox, the Iraqi military experienced another
purge -- one strikingly different for its extent and the accompanying
directives. The Iraqi armed forces are composed of five regular army
corps, five "regular" Republican Guard divisions, and one "special"
Republican Guard division. Before Operation Desert Fox, the regular
army corps were deployed along Iraq's borders. This has not changed. In
northern Iraq, the 1st and 5th corps are stationed around the cities of
Krkuk and Mosul in order to protect against Turkish incursions and to
guard the oilfields of this area from the depredations of Kurdish militias.
The 3rd and 4th corps were deployed in southern Iraq along the Kuwaiti
and Iranian borders, respectively, to guard these oil rich areas from Shiite
opposition groups in south-central Iraq. The 2nd corps is stationed
directly to the east of Baghdad to protect the eastern flank from Iranian
incursions directed against Iraq or against Iranian opposition groups based
inside Iraq.
Shadowing these army corps were divisions of Iraq's elite "regular"
Republican Guard divisions. Since they are the best- paid and
best-equipped divisions, the Republican Guard divisions reinforced the
regular army corps in case of attack. But they also served to monitor any
corps commander that evidenced even the slightest inclination to march on
Baghdad. This is why the Republican Guard divisions were always
physically stationed between the regular army units and Baghdad. In this
way, the regular Republican Guard keeps an eye on any over-zealous
commander. One or two of these regular Republican Guard divisions
were always kept around the Shiite areas of Najaf and Karbala, for fear
of an Iranian-backed Shiite uprising.
The "special" Republican Guard division was stationed in Baghdad proper
and operated as a fail-safe mechanism by providing a final line of defense
against a coup led by a commander of a regular Republican Guard
division. It also was the key unit that ran the concealment operation for
Iraq's weapon's of mass destruction (WMD) operations. Because of the
role of the special Republican Guard, it was the most likely one to have
been directly targeted by U.S./British strikes.
Immediately in advance of the commencement of Desert Fox, Saddam
Hussein issued a number of directives altering this structure. The
commanders of the regular army corps were placed under regional
commanders who were recruited from among Saddam's closest aides.
And units of the regular Republican Guard were all redeployed to
Baghdad and to southern Iraq.
The first directive dealt with the command of regular army and naval
forces. It stated that "until further notice, four regional commands shall be
established." The first command, the Northern Command, is responsible
for the northern half of Iraq and includes the 1st and 5th corps. The
Northern Command was given to Staff General Izzat Ibrahim, the second
in command in Iraq, and the person that was allegedly the target of an
assassination attempt last month. The second, the Southern Command,
was placed under, a new commander, Staff General Ali- Hasan al-Majid.
The Southern Command controls the area closest to the Iranian and
Kuwait borders and has direct control of the Iraqi 3rd and 4th corps and
the small Iraqi navy.
The third is the Central Euphrates command. This command included the
Shiite districts of south central Iraq and came under the command of
Muhammad Hamzah al-Zubayadi, an individual who is not a military figure
but a member of the Baath party. The are no units attached to his
command. The reasons for this are clear, as there are no regular army
units regularly stationed in that area. However, at present, two Republican
Guard divisions are reportedly in the vicinity and under the direct
command of Saddam's son, Quasay Hussein.
The last, and perhaps the most important command for the security of the
regime, is the Central Region command. This one controls Baghdad and
the surrounding region. It falls under the direct command of the Iraqi
Minister of Defense, Staff General Sultan Hashim Ahmad, with the
remaining Iraqi 2nd Corps under his authority.
Though none of the regular army units are being physically moved around
Iraq, the fact that they are now reassigned under the direct command of
the highest-ranking members of the Baath party in Iraq is significant. This
means that Saddam has virtually lost faith in all of his other commanders.
More evidence of this fact lies in the next set of directives. They state that,
"the duties of commanding a region shall be to defend within the
boundaries of the geographical area... to confront any foreign aggressors
that target Iraq's sovereignty, its independence, and security and to
preserve internal security..." Additionally, the last few directives state that
these commanders should receive instructions only from Saddam himself
through his special security service, the Fadaiyin, and that Saddam himself
will remain in direct control of all air force, army aircraft, and all air
defense units.
What these directives suggest is that not only may no regular army unit be
moved without the approval of Saddam himself, but also they may not
take any action without Saddam's approval. This means that even though
Saddam has placed his most trusted aides in charge of these units, he has
put in place an institutional mechanism, the security service, to control
them as well. Finally, by keeping control over the airforce, he has
established yet another fail-safe mechanism, this one to thwart Iraqi tanks
rolling on Baghdad.
There may be other reasons why Saddam is running scared. The
"Al-Zaman" newspaper in London reported, on December 18, that
Saddam Hussein along with his two sons, and the Minister of Defense
have been hiding in a bunker in the Karakh district of Baghdad since the
initial warnings of an air strike were confirmed. The next day, "Al Zaman"
reported that armed members of the Baath party were being deployed
throughout Baghdad and other major Iraqi cities to confront any "unrest or
emergencies that might arise." Also, since the strikes took out virtually all
of Iraq's major communications facilities, the Iraqi armed forces have been
forced to operate via massagers and mobile radio transmitters.
Why all the paranoia? There is evidence that the Iraqi opposition has
begun to respond positively to increasing U.S. efforts aimed at toppling
Saddam. A rebellion may have already begun. On December 19, the
same day that the 70-hour aerial bombardment of Iraq came to a halt, the
London based "Al-Sharq al-Awsat" newspaper reported that armed
civilians in southern Iraq were engaged in an uprising against Iraq's special
security forces. The newspapers stated that an armed group tried to seize
a radio and television station around Salihiya but were repulsed after a
three-hour confrontation with Republican Guard forces. The newspaper
also spoke of armed clashes around Hibibah and Thawrah districts
located southwest of Baghdad. Other reports tell of night-time sabotage of
power plants and other infrastructure targets in the south.
In an interview with "al-Sharq al-Awsat", also on December 19, Hamid
al-Bayyati, the representative of the Supreme Council for the Islamic
revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) reported that he had received information that
Iraq is making changes to its forces in order to protect regime from a
popular uprising. SCIRI is one of the most powerful opposition groups in
Iraq and is made up of pro-Iranian Shiites from the southern Iraqi districts.
Bayyati reported that, in order to quell any popular uprising in southern
Iraq, Republican Guard forces have been withdrawn from Mosul in
northern Iraq and deployed to Baghdad. He mentioned as well that
another Republican Guard division took up positions on the main road
between Baghdad and Basra.
This gives further credence to the fact that Saddam is worried about a
rebellion or invasion in the south. Additionally, the Republican Guard
division that moved south from Mosul likely took the place of the special
Republican Guard division that guarded Baghdad and appears to have
been targeted by the air strikes. This would mean that not only are there
are no elite Iraqi forces to check either Turkish incursions into northern
Iraq or Kurdish dissident groups, but Saddam is now leaving the 1st and
5th corps without Republican Guard watchdogs. By moving yet another
Republican Guard division to the south of Baghdad, this one from the
border with Iran, Saddam leaves the 2nd corps unchecked and the Iranian
border without elite reinforcements. Redeploying troops to maximize
internal security has undermined the logic of Iraq's national security. With
Iraq's communication infrastructure bombed out and the Republican
Guard pulled back to Baghdad, Saddam has opened a window of
opportunity for any dissident officers in the 1st, 2nd, and 5th corps.
Essentially, Iraqi is left with its elite units stationed around Baghdad and
southern Iraq. While the idea of a land invasion of Iraq aimed at removing
Saddam has been broached in the U.S. before, this is obviously not an
option considering the political climate in Washington. Bombing in
advance of impeachment hearings is one thing, but an invasion is another
altogether. However, another possibility, a Shiite uprising, may not be too
far off. After all, in the same December 19 report, Bayyati also mentioned
that Iraqi forces were already shelling Shiites in the Amarah and Najaf
administrative districts in southern Iraq.
There was also a report in "Al Hayat" on December 17 that Ali Aqa
Mohammadi, the Iranian security official in charge of Iraqi affairs, was
actively pursuing contacts with Iraqi opposition groups and may have also
met with officials from the British government to discuss the situation. "Al-
Hayat" cited a source as saying that Mohammadi wanted to ascertain
what role the Iraqi opposition, more specifically, the Iranian-backed
SCIRI, would play in any efforts to topple Saddam. The source also
quoted him as saying, "if the Americans are serious about removing
Saddam, then Tehran would not object" and that Iran "is watching the
situation in Iraq with interest and will adopt a more effective policy now
that it has decided to support the change." However, it must be noted that
the U.S. would not welcome an Iraq in which Iranian interests were
dominant, nor do the Iranians want a post- insurrection Iraq dominated by
the United States. During the recent talks between Iranian Vice President
Hasan Habibi, Syrian officials and Iraqi opposition figures in Damascus,
Habibie explicitly warned against the dangers of a U.S. effort to topple
Saddam.
To sum up the situation, air strikes, no matter how intense, cannot topple
Saddam in the absence of an on-the-ground invasion or an armed
insurrection. However, it seems that the air strikes may have sufficiently
degraded Saddam's power, particularly his communications infrastructure
and his special Republican Guard unit, such that the SCIRI has been
enticed to act on its own. There is a small window of opportunity for the
Iraqi opposition. Saddam appears to be off balance. With Iranian and
U.S. backing, the opposition may have a chance to strike. Yet the U.S.
and Iran are still only allied in their opposition to Saddam, and remain at
odds over what comes next. The Iraqi opposition remains divided, and
has failed previously to pose a credible threat to Saddam. Unless
someone moves quickly, Saddam will soon reestablish his footing. |
