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To: Hawkmoon who wrote (25155)12/31/1998 3:53:00 PM
From: goldsnow  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 116773
 
Ron, I have long believed that a cataclismic event in Russia is unavoidable..indeed a collapse of ruble and Russian default was entirely predictable (surely it was to Russian mafia/politicians, that was openly transferring IMF money to Swiss accounts) Where I disagree
with you is in the area of consequences of political unrest that is brewing in Russia. For starters that would lead to drastic cut-down of oil/metals flow out of Russia with instant commodities/oil inflation, what are the chance for USA/World markets to move forward in such an uncertain enviroment? I would suggest that defensive stocks are indeed
"defence", Aluminum, nickel, oil (Russian exports)....As for Dollar/Euro , it is likely that USA would have to underwrite as usual a lion portion of Russian related "expenses", where I agree that they are going-up (substantially in 1999 or else...:(

Russia '99 base metal sales seen stable, price low
05:14 a.m. Dec 31, 1998 Eastern

By Sebastian Alison

MOSCOW, Dec 31 (Reuters) - Russian base metals exports will stay steady to
marginally higher next year as exporters look to boost hard currency revenues, and as
a result prices will remain depressed in an oversupplied market, analysts said this
week.

''I would expect exporters to maintain export levels or increase them because of their
current increased profitability,'' said analyst Tatyana Nikolskaya at Pioneer Securities
in Moscow.

''It would be stupid to cut exports right now when the rouble is depreciating, and as
the depreciation is expected to continue to the end of next year, they will probably be
strong until then,'' she added.

Exports of metals and the other key commodities, oil and gas, form the backbone of
Russia's hard currency earnings. Sales of these raw materials usually account for 70
percent of export revenues, although low oil prices are now shifting the balance.

But metals prices are also low. This is forcing Russian exporters to keep sales as high
as possible to maintain revenues, even though the high volume of supplies, coupled
with poor demand, especially from East Asia, is depressing prices further.

Russian aluminium exports are a little over three percent up this year from 1997. Trade
ministry data published last week showed exports in January to October at 2.3 million
tonnes, from 2.2 million in the same period last year.

''They are working to increase capacity,'' Martin Squires, head of research at Rudolf
Wolff in London, said. ''Aluminium production has been increasing steadily over the
last two years.''

He added that Russia was a high-cost producer, with extremely high employment
costs as many plants were responsible for a range of social provisions outside the
scope of western employers.

Costs were also high because finished metals had to be transported thousands of
kilometres to markets from smelters in Siberia, and because many production
processes were antiquated.

But despite high costs, he expected Russia to keep exports up because of its urgent
need for cash. Russia is mired in economic crisis and all exports have become more
profitable since the effective devaluation of the rouble in August.

Squires added that there were two big unknown factors which might affect the
apparent predictability of Russian supply.

The first was political instability. Since the economic turmoil began in August, some
regional politicians have introduced economic measures independently of the centre.

These include Alexander Lebed, governor of the Krasnoyarsk region where several of
the biggest aluminium plants are located, and Squires said the market was uncertain
about how political decisions taken locally might affect supply.

The other main uncertainty concerned the size of Russian stocks, and especially stocks
of scrap.

''There is a lot of scrap in Russia, and since devaluation, even more so than before,''
Squires said. ''It's very difficult to gauge how much they've got. Some say 10 years'
worth.''

He added that Russia had some 13 percent of the global aluminium market, over 20
percent of nickel and some four percent of copper. ''If they were to come out with
stocks for some reason, it would have a significant impact on the market.''

Russian equities analyst Alexei Kapkin of Dresdner Kleinwort Benson said that by
contrast with aluminium, nickel exports were unlikely to rise next year because of a
lack of investment at the country's largest producer, Norilsk Nickel (NKEL.RTS).

''To increase exports they need to increase production. To increase production they
need to upgrade their equipment, and for this they need to raise a lot of money. At the
moment they don't have enough sources of money to upgrade,'' he said.

Norilsk has a five-year plan to spend $1.7 billion on upgrading, but in 1998 it raised
just $80 million, Kapkin said. As a result, Norilsk would concentrate next year on
keeping exports at 1997 levels rather than trying to raise them.

Nickel exports in the first 10 months of this year were 172.9 million tonnes, trade
ministry data showed, off 3.4 percent from the 179 million tonnes in the same period in
1997.

The outlook for metals prices is not encouraging for Russia's depleted state coffers.

Squires said that investment made in plants in Latin America, Australia and North
America when prices were higher and the demand outlook for Asia was good meant
even more production would come onstream next year.

((Moscow Newsroom, +7095 941-8520 moscow.newsroom+reuters.com))

Copyright 1998 Reuters Limited.



To: Hawkmoon who wrote (25155)12/31/1998 4:12:00 PM
From: Investor-ex!  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 116773
 
Hi Ron,

A gold standard by default limits the expansion of the money supply as there is only so much gold available.

There is ALWAYS enough gold to set any standard one wishes, including 100% backing. Of course, barring adequate new supply or excessive money creation, gold is subject to continual re-pricing in fiat terms, ever higher. But that's the whole point of gold-backing in the first place.

Taken together with silver (bi-metallism), I submit that adequate new supply is NOT the problem. Annual gold production is a couple percent of existing stocks, about the same as annual global growth. However, annual global money creation is far in excess of the underlying growth rate.

This glaring "flaw" in the system provides benefits to but a few. Instead, the general level of distress includes gross, unproductive currency speculation, unknown mountains of leveraged derivative positions, and inflated, volatile equity markets trading without the merest threads of fundamental reality.



To: Hawkmoon who wrote (25155)12/31/1998 6:21:00 PM
From: goldsnow  Respond to of 116773
 
Business: The Economy

Red-letter year for Russia

Russia's 1998 financial meltdown hit the people hard

Russia stands at the crossroads as it enters 1999, its
conversion to a capitalist economy under a cloud after
the country's financial system went to the brink during
1998.

And in turn, the near-financial collapse of Russia's
economy in 1998 helped push the world economy as
close to the brink as it has been since the Great
Depression.

When the Asian crisis spread to Russian markets, it
appeared Latin America might follow and plunge the
whole world into financial meltdown. However, concerted
action by leading industrialised nations and the
International Monetary Fund stopped the rot.

But it's the Russians that have felt the brunt of 1998's
market mayhem. Inflation was 84% over the year, the
economy contracted by 5% while 29% of the whole
population - that is 42m people - now live below the
poverty line, earning $28 a month or less.

Seven out of ten Russians
don't expect their lives to
improve in 1999, despite the
government's pledge to
resurrect the economy.

Prime minister Yevgeny
Primakov has conceded that
little has improved since he
assumed office in September
but he has pledged that the
economy will be turned
around in the coming year.
"We are not magicians. We
cannot make the country economically prosperous in
only a few months. But we must do it."

The declining health of President Boris Yeltsin has not
helped with many believing he has surrendered much of
the responsibility for running the country to the prime
minister.

Anatomy of a meltdown

The Asian crisis had spilled over to Russia by March '98
as exports fell and the government ran out of money.
President Yeltsin responded by sacking prime minister
Viktor Chernomyrdin and his cabinet and appointed
Sergei Kiriyenko - a 36 year-old unknown.

The new government failed to halt the slide, unable to
win the confidence of the markets. The stockmarket fell
and the state-controlled rouble exchange rate came
under pressure as Western investors pulled out. But the
worst was yet to come.

In July, the IMF outlined a $22bn loan package to bail
out the government - but only if Russia agreed to tough
austerity measures.

Soros speaks, Russia shakes

Alarm turned to crisis when the billionaire financier
George Soros warned that the turmoil in Russia's
financial markets had "reached a terminal phase." His
prophecy became self-fulfilling as the markets crashed in
August.

Drained of hard currency
reserves, the government
was forced to abandon the
rouble's pegged trading range
around 6.3 to the US dollar -
effectively allowing it to
devalue at the mercy of
market forces.

And devalue it did, rapidly
losing 70% of its value
against the dollar, despite
the fact that trade on the
currency exchange was
halted several times. For a while there were just no
buyers.

Street panic

On the streets the real exchange rate went well above
the official rate with some paying 25 roubles or more for
one US dollar and flocking to the banks to withdraw their
rouble savings. Meanwhile, inflation ran rampant as
buyers and sellers lost confidence in the rouble.

Russia's main stock
exchange hit an all-time low
at around 50 points in
September. Only a year
before the RTS index had
stood at around 570.

An early casualty was
central bank chief Sergei
Dubinin who stepped down
because of the
Communist-dominated
parliament's frustration over
his efforts to tackle the
crisis.

Adding to those problems, the IMF withheld the first
tranches of its loan package, saying there was not yet
clear proof that the new government was trying to cut
spending and raise revenues to balance its books.

Yeltsin sacks prime minister - again

In late August, President Boris Yeltsin reacted by
sacking the Kiriyenko government in favour of former
prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. But parliament
refused to endorse him and the political stand-off was
only resolved when former foreign minister Yevgeny
Primakov emerged as a compromise candidate.

Mr Primakov said he would resort to printing money in
order to pay state workers, some of whom hadn't been
paid on more than a year. He said the government
planned to pay off its wage debts to state workers before
the end of 1998 and to the military by the end of January
1999.

He said the debts owed to pensioners could not be paid
until the end of 1999 and admitted the government might
need to print even more money to cover those debts. In a
bid to ease fears of ensuing hyperinflation, he insisted
the amount of new roubles would be "very insignificant"
and a "controlled emission".

Banking crisis

1999 will see an enormous shakeout of the Russian
banking system, with half the country's 1,500 institutions
expected to slide into bankruptcy, according to the
Russian central bank.

Russia's central bank has already revoked the license of
Inkombank after it effectively went into liquidation as a
result of the financial crisis. Oneximbank and Tokobank
have since suffered the same fate.

The pressure on banks is immense. Much of the foreign
debt of banks, as well as the government and private
firms, was denominated in hard currency. As the rouble
fell, buying the dollars and Deutschmarks to service the
debt got ever more expensive. The price of foreign
currency commitments sky-rocketed.

The government tried to protect those hit hardest, buying
them time by announcing a unilateral 90-day moratorium
on debt repayments. The freeze has now expired and
those creditors want their money back and may well go
to court to get it.

Meanwhile, the government also defaulted on its own
debt, refusing to honour its repayment commitments on
GKO treasury bonds to both foreign and domestic bond
holders.

This hurt Russian banks as much as anyone else,
because they are large holders of these bonds too. The
government's action wiped out a large share of their
assets.

The prognosis

The passing of a tough austerity budget just before
Christmas holds hopes of bringing the economy back
under control in coming months and securing further
emergency funding from the IMF.

The government's hopes of resurrecting the economy
also depend on the success of the central bank's plan to
rehabilitate the banking system. It plans to bail-out the
biggest and most important of the troubled banks while
allowing up to 700 to go bankrupt.

But this is a high-risk strategy. Such wholesale
collapses may result in a further crisis of confidence in
the financial system.

The New Year begins with fingers crossed - among the
Russians themselves as well as thousands of Western
bankers and investors.

news.bbc.co.uk