Answers emerge about Iraqi defiance of "no-fly" zones
Summary:
* Iraqi defiance of no-fly zones may be more than just saber-
rattling and brinkmanship. Evidence has surfaced that U.S. air
cover was to have shielded an Iraqi army coup attempt.
Analysis:
Saddam Hussein chaired a meeting of Iraq's leadership on January
4, devoted to reviewing the status of the Iraqi army in the
aftermath of Operation Desert Fox, the U.S. and British air
strikes on Iraq in December. After the meeting, Saddam vowed to
continue to resist allied patrols of "no-fly" zones in northern
and southern Iraq. This is a reassertion of similar commitments
made by Iraq last week to shoot down any enemy plane entering its
airspace, which culminated in at least two incidents in which
allied planes were fired upon by Iraqi missile batteries in the
no-fly zones. Many have speculated that this is simply another
tactic by the Baghdad regime to engage the U.S. in a protracted
campaign of confrontation aimed at forcing a reduction or
elimination of economic sanctions against Iraq. However, it
appears now that Iraqi defiance of the no-fly zones was in
response to the protection those zones provided to forces hostile
to, and preparing to confront, the Iraqi regime.
The London-based "Al-Hayat" newspaper reported on January 1 that
allied air cover was a driving force behind a failed coup by some
commanders of the Iraqi 3rd Army Corps in southern Iraq during
Desert Fox. The newspaper stated that senior commanders of the
3rd Iraqi Army Corps stationed around the southern Iraqi city of
Basra were "preparing military action against the regime during
the U.S. missile strikes," while U.S. forces tied down the
Republican Guards, Special Security Services, and Saddam's
personal guard in the area.
In addition, the rebellious forces reportedly had the support of
a neighboring Arab state. A Ba'ath party official, who declined
to give his identity, said that the units were prompted into
action by the fact that they were "deployed under U.S.-British
air cover and air support, as well as under ground and logistical
support from an Arab state neighboring Iraq." If "neighboring"
Iraq means bordering Iraq, that would suggest that either Jordan,
Syria, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia were involved in the coup plot as
well. Kuwait, which hosts U.S. forces and is only 50 kilometers
from Basra, would appear to be the most likely party.
Despite U.S. air cover and ground support from the "neighboring
Arab state," the attempted coup by 3rd Corps officers evidently
failed. The same Ba'ath official told Al-Hayat that a move by "a
group within the army with the aim of breaching security" was
"encircled and its elements were eliminated". Nine
"infiltrators" were arrested for their roles as intermediaries
between the intelligence services of the neighboring Arab state
and the Iraqi coup plotters. Also two, presumably brigade-level,
commanders of the 3rd corps, Brigadier General Ali Ma'ruf al-
Sa'idi and Lieutenant Colonel Sabah Dhiyab al-Khalidi, were
arrested and executed by special order of the Ba'ath party
regional commander, Al Hasan al-Majid, who had been appointed
just prior to the U.S. led strikes.
While the 3rd Corp's coup attempt apparently failed (perhaps
uncovered even before Desert Fox, judging by the Ba'ath party and
military shuffling that occurred) it still provided a good reason
for Iraq to challenge the no-fly zones. If one coup plot could
form under U.S. air cover, others could follow. The imposition
of the no-fly zones in 1991 and 1992 to protect Iraq's Kurdish
and Shiite Moslem populations left Saddam with only the
Republican Guard and the other Iraqi security services to counter
any adventurous regular army commander. Previously, he could call
upon his air force to halt the advance of Iraqi tanks rolling on
Baghdad.
After U.S. missiles wiped out the command infrastructure of the
Republican Guard and other special security forces, Saddam's
control was reduced to nearly zero. With no check in place, the
3rd Corps attempted to exploit the situation. Further impetus
may have been provided by the fact that, while U.S. warplanes
were bombarding other Iraqi military targets, other aircraft were
reportedly tasked with dropping thousands of propaganda leaflets
over Iraqi troop positions around Basra (the same units belonging
to the 3rd Corps), warning them against any retaliatory moves
against Kuwait. The leaflets instructed Iraqi soldiers to "stay
where you are, stay put, do not threaten anyone and you won't be
hurt." More than a simple warning, these leaflets may have been
an explicit signal or at least a reassuring nudge to 3rd Corps
commanders that the U.S. was on their side.
In the December 22 Global Intelligence Update, we outlined
evidence indicating a strong potential for a coup attempt in Iraq
(http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/122298.asp). We predicted
that any attempt would most likely emerge from the Shi'ite
population centers in southern Iraq, to which at least two
Republican Guard divisions had been relocated. Indeed, the Ba'ath
official cited by Al-Hayat mentioned that, "the Iraqi government
distributed a special memorandum on the security situation in
Baghdad and other Iraqi cities in respect to "scattered incidents
carried out by some suspect elements during the days of U.S.-
British aggression". This appears to confirm the reports of the
Shi'ite uprisings that we mentioned in that GIU. However, there
was apparently more underway than sporadic sabotage in Najaf, and
U.S. air strikes and air cover in the no-fly zones were clearly
involved.
With the no-fly zones now explicitly connected to U.S. efforts to
overthrow Saddam, the Iraqi leader's decision to defy those zones
is undoubtedly more than just part of a tit for tat with the U.S.
It is critical to Saddam's efforts to quell whatever other coup
attempts and insurrections may be forming in the absence of
strong internal security forces. Saddam still directly controls
the air defense forces and small Iraqi air force, even though he
delegated authority for the rest of Iraq's armed forces,
immediately prior to Desert Fox, to his most trusted aids.
Presumably, he regards the air force as his final line of defense
against another attempted coup. However, this is possible only
if he can use his missiles to diminish the presence of allied air
power over Iraqi territory. Otherwise, the superiority of allied
air power renders the Iraqi air force useless. This may be the
logic behind the Iraqi missile challenge to the no-fly zones.
Even more pressing than a coup attempt from within his own
military, Saddam still faces opposition from other groups within
and outside of Iraq. With the support of the U.S., the various
Kurdish factions in northern Iraq are reportedly uniting (though
this process has been long-running and erratic at best). And, as
we reported in our last GIU, the Shiites in southern Iraq are
also attempting to exploit the current situation. Nevertheless,
Iraq has the resources to quash uprisings by the Kurds or the
Shiites, or even a coup initiated by one or another of the
regular Iraqi army corps, and it is unlikely that these mutually
antagonistic elements could launch a coordinated uprising.
In our last GIU we indicated that Saddam had ordered a major
restructuring of the Iraqi military under regional commands. On
December 18, General Izzat Ibrahim, vice-chairman of Iraq's
ruling Revolution Command Council and Commander in Chief of the
Northern Iraq Regional Command, sent a letter to Saddam Hussein
stating that "we have instructed the armed forces to restrict
their mission to the protection of the borders of the homeland."
This evidence suggests that Iraq's capability to thwart external
aggression has been severely diminished. It is significant that
the Turkish army continues applying pressure on Iraq by
maintaining between 10,000 and 25,000 troops just inside the
border of northern Iraq, ostensibly to fight off the remnants of
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) rebels still left in Iraq.
Iran, though attempting to enhance its influence with Arabic
countries, is faced with a harsh economic crisis that may be
partially solved through another military gambit directed at
Iraq. What is unclear is whether the U.S. is willing to see Iraq
dismembered as a byproduct of its desire to topple Saddam.
Saddam managed to halt a coup attempt around Basra. We still do
not know what other coup attempts were thwarted or what others
are still in the works. What we do know is that Operation Desert
Fox had a greater impact on Iraq's internal politics than
previously thought. Iraq's move thus far has been to strike out
at the no-fly zones. The U.S., while vowing to retaliate against
Iraqi defiance, is countering with a draw down in forces. It is
thereby playing down Baghdad's latest initiative, but at what
cost to the internal opposition to Saddam's regime? The question
is, what next?
Saddam has decentralized authority over the Iraqi military
thereby inviting each "feudal" military leader to check the power
of the others. This stratagem may serve to thwart a coup, but it
is not a particularly prudent national security policy. By
dividing these forces regionally, they become a less coherent,
less mobile, and less interactive fighting force. Saddam may be
gambling with the fact that the political dynamics of neighboring
states bar aggression against Iraqi territory. We are not so
sure.
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