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Strategies & Market Trends : Investment in Russia and Eastern Europe -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Jim Fraser who wrote (893)1/19/1999 11:02:00 PM
From: CIMA  Respond to of 1301
 
Central Europe Leaps to Support Ukraine's Continued Relationship
with the West

Summary:

* The Council of Europe and the International Monetary Fund have
recently criticized Ukraine's efforts at economic and political
restructuring, and appear prepared to write the former Soviet
republic off. Central European countries, with a foot in the
door of the West but facing a growing threat from Russia, do not
wish to see Ukraine let go so easy. Candidate NATO members
Hungary and Poland, as well as Romania, are trying desperately to
keep Ukraine's options open and to keep the West engaged with
Kiev -- a noble effort which may unfortunately be doomed from the
outset.

Analysis:

In a report published on January 19, the Council of Europe
threatened to withhold Ukraine's membership due to Kiev's failure
to comply with the commitments it assumed when it joined the
Council in 1995. According to the report, Ukraine has failed to
abolish the death penalty, implement legal and judicial reform,
and enact a new civil code and laws on political parties.
Moreover, the report criticized Ukraine for not respecting the
rights of prisoners and for allowing only limited freedom of the
press. The report blamed Ukrainian Parliament members and other
officials for failing, as of the end of 1998, to meet the
country's commitments to the European parliamentary assembly. On
January 27, the Council of Europe will put Kiev on notice: Should
Ukraine fail to comply with its various commitments by the June
session of the Council, the Ukrainian delegation's powers will be
suspended.

In addition to being condemned by the Council for its delay in
implementing these measures, Ukraine has been strongly criticized
for its lackluster economic performance. According to Mohammed
Shadman-Valavi, the head of the IMF mission currently evaluating
the country's economic results, "the government's inefficient
policies in recent years have virtually deprived it of an
opportunity to borrow abroad, and the country has to take
difficult and unpopular decisions to stay afloat." By January
26, the IMF mission to Ukraine should announce whether the Fund
will resume its financing program, which was suspended in
November 1998. The IMF requires that the Ukranian government
demonstrate that its expected 1999 revenues are realistic before
the loan can be renewed. In short, Kiev has to develop and
implement a plan for covering the expected budget deficit of 1
percent of the GDP. According to Roman Shpek, the Chairman of
Ukraine's National Agency for Development and European
Integration, Western creditors could declare Ukraine bankrupt in
1999, provided the IMF does not resume its financial support for
payment of interest on foreign debts. What is certain is that
Ukraine's hard currency reserves are extremely low. Given this
and Ukraine's current political circumstances and the economic
decline, the latter having been caused to no small extent by the
economic crisis in Russia, the primary commercial partner of the
Ukraine, Ukraine's prospects for speedy improvement of its image
in the West are dim.

While Western Europe and the IMF appear ready to write off
Ukraine, Ukraine's post-communist neighbors -- Poland, Hungary,
and Romania in particular -- have leapt to shape their actions to
reflect the geostrategic importance of Ukraine. During Ukrainian
President Leonid Kuchma's recent visit to Warsaw, Polish
President Alexander Kwasniewski promised that Poland would back
Ukrainian efforts in dealing with international institutions such
as the European Union, the IMF, and the World Bank. Kuchma
pledged, in turn, that his country would model its attempt to
obtain integration with European economic and defense
organizations on Poland's experience. During the talks,
Kwasniewski stressed that "the year 1999, the year of
presidential election in Ukraine, is a very important, if not the
most important, period for the strengthening of the Ukrainian
sovereignty."

In a further effort to maintain contact with Ukraine, Hungary and
Romania plan to establish a joint unit of military engineers by
the end of this year. The new unit will be devoted to conducting
peacekeeping missions and fighting national disasters. During a
recent meeting of Romanian, Ukrainian, and Hungarian Ministers of
Defense in Ukrainian city of Uzhgorod, an agreement was signed to
establish "fraternal" relationships between Romanian and
Ukrainian military units stationed along their common border.
Central European countries, which will feel the greatest impact
of Ukraine's final position in Europe, understand the strategic
importance of including Ukraine in the Western military sphere,
especially at a time when Russia has started restoring its former
empire by founding the Russia-Belarus Federation. Hungary and
Poland, already well on their way into NATO and with their feet
in the door of other Western European institutions, are using
what influence they can muster toward the West to force a
reconsideration of the future of Ukraine.

Although Ukraine is at the brink of financial collapse, it is
still making an effort to gain integration into the West and
continues to shun a deeper relationship with Russia. On January
14, the Ukrainian Parliament rejected for the third time a bill
on joining an inter-parliamentary assembly of the Commonwealth of
Independent States. Clearly, Ukraine does not intend to
voluntarily return to the Russian fold, if it only has another
option. The West now has a momentous geopolitical choice. On
the one hand, it could refuse to help the Ukraine by insisting
that its reformist efforts do not measure up, and demand that the
country implement draconian economic measures that would likely
generate political instability and, ultimately, force Ukraine's
return to Russia. On the other, the West could -- despite the
high economic costs involved -- attempt to thwart Russian
strategic ambitions by not leaving the Ukraine economically or
politically exposed. Despite the strategic imperative, those
costs may be just too high.

___________________________________________________

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To: Jim Fraser who wrote (893)1/26/1999 11:29:00 PM
From: CIMA  Respond to of 1301
 
Primakov Tightens Grip on Strategic Enterprises and Media

Summary

Anticipating parliamentary and presidential election campaigns,
Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov is strengthening, at an
accelerating pace, the regime's control over the media and
strategic industries. Primakov headed Russia's intelligence
service from 1991-1996, and since he took office as Prime
Minister in September 1998, he has appointed former KGB
colleagues to key positions throughout the country. Former
Soviet spymasters have now been installed as head of the
government administration, the Presidential Chief of Staff, the
director of the Department for Special Programs, and the chief of
the Main Control Directorate. On January 25, the former public
relations boss of the Russian Federal Foreign Intelligence
Service (SVR), successor to the KGB's international directorate,
was appointed First Deputy Director of the Russian press agency
ITAR-TASS. To increase the state control over the strategic
enterprises, Primakov named a former KGB colleague as chief of
the state weapons company Rosvooruzheniye, and launched a major
restructuring of the Russian oil and gas industry that included
personnel changes in the administration of many major companies.
Primakov's appointment of loyal Soviet-era cadres to strategic
posts is not merely building a strong political faction that is
loyal primarily to him, but one that controls the commanding
heights of the communications and large-scale industries.

Analysis

Since becoming the Russian Prime Minister five months ago,
Yevgeny Primakov has assumed the vast majority of powers from the
ailing President Boris Yeltsin. During this time, Primakov has
systematically appointed "his" people to key positions in Russia
-- "his" people being former officers of the KGB and its
successor agencies. In September 1998, former SVR official Yury
Zubakov was appointed head of government administration. Later
last year, Primakov succeeded in installing Grigory Rapota, who
has no experience in weapons trade, as the new head of the arms
exports monopoly Rosvooruzheniye. Rapota, who had worked for the
KGB since 1966 as an agent in Western Europe and the U.S., was
named by Primakov in 1993 as the number three man of the Russian
intelligence service. Primakov had to face serious obstacles to
win the Rosvooruzheniye post for Rapota and was able to succeed
in this effort only due to his post as a chief of the state
military-cooperation committee.

A number of other former Soviet spymasters were recently named
into key positions. Former high KGB and border guard officer
Nikolai Bordyuzha was named as President's Chief of Staff in
December 1998. According to the Russian magazine Obshchaya
Gazeta, Bordyuzha, as well as Zubakov, and the head of the
president's secretariat Robert Makaryan, were appointed to their
posts late last year on advice from Primakov. Other posts
currently occupied by former KGB agents and bureaucrats include
head of the Department of Special Programs, held by former FSB
deputy chief Viktor Zorin, and head of the main Control
Directorate, held by Nikolai Patrushev, also former FSB official.
Former KGB agent in Germany, Vladimir Putin, is now acting as
first deputy chief of the president, responsible for the
administration's relations with Russian regions.

Most recently, Primakov was involved in promoting the SVR's
public relations department chief, Yury Kobaladze, into a high
position in the Russian media. Last week, Russian newspapers
reported that Kobaladze would soon be named director of the
state-owned management company VGTRK, which owns the RTR and
Kultura TV channels, Radio Russia, and a number of regional radio
and TV stations and transmission systems. Kobaladze confirmed he
was offered the position and announced that he was retiring from
the Foreign Intelligence Service on January 22. However, on
January 25, Kobaladze was not placed at the helm of VGTRK, but
rather was named First Deputy Director of Russia's leading news
agency ITAR-TASS. The move is further evidence of Primakov's
serious, possibly long-term political ambitions.

Following the abject failure of neoliberal economic reforms in
Russia, the state has been gradually increasing its control over
the industrial sector. The main contributor to the state budget
in Russia is the oil and gas sector, which had been partially
liberalized during the last couple of years. Foreign investors
have been allowed to make major investments in the sector, and a
number of joint ventures with foreign partners were established.
Foreigners mainly contributed financial investment and technical
know-how to the Russian oil and gas sector. However, it is
becoming clear that the Russian government is now moving away
from liberalization and towards renewed dominance over this
industry. The Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy has recently
designed a plan for founding a national oil company by merging
such oil companies as Rosneft, ONAKO, and Russia-Belorussian
Slavneft. Also, the government plans a major restructuring of
the gas giant Gazprom, including all-encompassing personnel
changes.

We have predicted and subsequently tracked Russia's increasing
assertiveness in its foreign policy and Russia's rebuilding of
its empire. As Moscow, with the old Soviet crew back in charge,
reverts to familiar foreign policy patterns, the same clearly
holds true in domestic policy. Primakov, backed by his
Gorbachev-era supporters and colleagues among the security
apparatus, is now asserting control over the institutions of
government, the media and the military and extractive industries.
Those Primakov has placed in charge are quickly and
systematically reasserting familiar patterns of heavy-handed
control over Russia's internal politics. After briefly flirting
with economic and political liberalization, the Russian polity is
quickly reverting to a familiar form.

___________________________________________________

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or send your name, organization, position, mailing
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___________________________________________________

STRATFOR, Inc.
504 Lavaca, Suite 1100
Austin, TX 78701
Phone: 512-583-5000
Fax: 512-583-5025
Internet: stratfor.com
Email: info@stratfor.com